

10. The 10th separate reconnaissance battalion will focus on the eastern outskirts of Tarasovka. Conduct reconnaissance in the directions: 1) Smelaya, Luknov, Optovo; 2) Krasnopole, Dobrotovo, Reutintsy; 3) Krasnopolye, Altynovka, Le ninskoe.

11. The 19th separate anti-aircraft artillery division to take up firing positions in the Tarasovka, Smelaya area, the western outskirts of Krasnopolye.

12. Divisional exchange office - in the Putivl area.

13. I am with the operational group of the division headquarters - Tarasovka.

14. The second echelon of the division headquarters - Putivl.

Commander of the 10th Panzer Division Major General Semyonchenko

Military Commissar of the 10th Panzer Division Regimental Commissar Greznev

Lieutenant Colonel Semchuk, Chief of Staff of the Division!

All of the indicated areas of concentration of Semenchenko's 10th Panzer Division are located east of the point of attack of the 3rd Panzer Division on Konotop, thus, after the Model breakthrough to Krolevets and further to Konotop, the main forces of the 10th Panzer Division will be cut off from their rear and from his 40th army.

Between Krolevets and Konotop, the ultimate goal of the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Division, according to Bock's order of August 24, there are only 16 km and the Seim River. The only thing that the Southwestern Front could do that day to close the gap that had formed was to separate from its reserve and place on the southern bank of the Seim the 3rd airborne corps.

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Combat order of the commander of the 10th Panzer Division No. 30 of September 3 1941 for the defense of the Tarasovka, Krasnopolye region. SBD WWII. T. 33.

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pus, which took up defense on the front of Hizhki, Novoselsky, Zheldaki, Lizogubovsky! with the task of holding river crossings.

Meanwhile, Model's tankers and motorized riflemen continued to reap the benefits of their rapid advance: "On this happy day, the division was encouraged once more. It was a Chevalier of the Order of Lenin, General Engineer Chistov (T5s1\$yuy), who was arrested in the zone of action of the division. This high-ranking officer, being the chief commissioner of the Supreme Defense Council? Soviet Union, was supposed to | million workers to build a defensive rampart on the Desna. He is just

arrived by train from Moscow and had no idea that Novgorod-Seversky had already been in German possession for 8 days. Another important prisoner of the day was a captain from the operations department of the 45th Russian Corps.

The long rain turned all the roads into a thick mess and showed once again how dangerous the forces of nature are for motorized units. The 6th Panzer Regiment proposed to the division that its three battalions be reorganized into two, since due to the high losses in tanks, the combat power of the regiment had decreased by half.

The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment clears the town of Krolevets at night from dispersed Red Army soldiers who are still here. Later, the 1st battalion also approached from the north.

4 September. Fight for the Sejm. Secrets of the Soviet pilot. "At dawn, the bridgehead was expanded. Moto rifle companies lay on the heights a few kilometers south and east of the city. By noon, by order of the division, guards were posted in the southwest as well.

During September 4, the 6th Panzer Regiment advanced towards Krolevets with all its battalions. At 12.00 1st battalion

1 On modern maps: Lizogubovsky farm - Lysogubovka, Novoselsky - Novomutin. This milestone for the 3rd Airborne Forces is indicated in the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0129 by 10 p.m. on September 3, 1941, of the combat operations of the troops of the front.

? Maybe GKO.

The 345th Rifle Corps of the Bryansk Front these days fought in the area of the Znob station, which is 90 km north of Krolevets deg Wisbman @ ip Simeg E syeg, 1967. 5. 169).

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Oberst Lieutenant Schmidt-Ott left the city. He received a combat order to conduct reconnaissance in the direction of Spassky and seize the bridges across the Seim with a surprise attack. The battalion was reinforced by the 1st company of the 3rd motorized regiment, an engineer platoon and two guns, since its own forces - only 2 R-P tanks, 1 R-PG tank and 2 R-PU tanks (!) - are too weak for such enterprises.

The battle group is rapidly advancing, Cherepov (TzsNegeroy) passes, but in a small forest near Spassky himself! runs into strong enemy defenses. Oberst-leutnant Schmidt-Ott gathers a group. But the moment the tanks and armored personnel carriers take up their starting position, they are covered by enemy shells. A direct hit on the tank by the commander of the 2nd company, Oberleutnant Meyerhofer (Meugvo(eg), immediately kills him. One of the armored personnel carriers is also on fire.

The group tries to approach the settlement from the west, but again encounters strong defenses. Several captured civilians report that there are 20 Russian tanks in Spasskoye. When the patrol sent to the Seim establishes that there is no bridge across the river in this area, Oberst Lieutenant Schmidt-Ott stops the enterprise. At 19.00 the battle group returns to Krolevets.

The division drew up its forces in order to forge with a clenched fist the next day. In the afternoon of that day, the 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment, together with the 1st reconnaissance battalion, already reinforced by three light tanks of the headquarters of the 6th regiment, was moved to MaKoVsNIpa?. Oberst Lieutenant Münzel (Min2el), leaving light wheeled vehicles, advanced with tanks to a height of 2.5 km north of Mutin. Unfortunately, darkness quickly engulfed this very cloudy day, and further advance had to be stopped.

In the afternoon, Lieutenant General Model moved his command post to the school building in Krolevets. After a short time, enemy air raids began on the city. Right above the school building, an anti-aircraft gun hit one car. The pilot who jumped out of it landed by parachute not far from the command post. Lieutenant von dem Knesebeck (11. wop det KpezefesK), from intelligence

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. Obviously, this is the village of Leninskoe.
Failed to identify on the map.

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department of the division headquarters, quickly grabbed a motorcycle and rushed to the landing site. The Russian tried to run away, but the soldiers running towards him opened fire, and he fell down dead. When they examined his tablet, they found, among other things, important orders for the organization of air defense in Bryansk and Moscow, as well as an accurate map of the operational situation with the designation of the Soviet units located in front of the division. This booty was immediately reported to the corps and to the tank group. At the same time, it turned out that the head of the 3rd Panzer Division hit exactly at the junction between the 13th and 21st Soviet armies!! In the evening, Lieutenant General Model holds a meeting with his commanders. He ordered to take Mutin the next day and win the bridge over the Seim located there.

But the prisoners were taken by the other side:

"A survey of prisoners established the action in the Konotop direction of 10 md, 3 and 4 td, which are part of 24 ak," the intelligence report of the South-Western Front reported. The same report reported on the actual and alleged actions of the Germans: "Konotop direction. The enemy during 4.9 continued to develop success in the gap between the right flank

SWF and the 13th Army in the direction of Krolevets, Konotop and Krolevets, Bakhmach. By the end of the day, parts of the 4th division went to the front of Loknya, Krasnopolye. Units of 10 md operate from the direction of Vishenka to the south. In the direction of Glukhov, reconnaissance units of the 3rd division operate.

Enemy aviation actively supports the offensive of motorized units, conducting active reconnaissance and twice bombarding Korylskoye and Koroyop by forces of 12-22 aircraft ...

Conclusion:

1. The enemy motorized mechanized group operating in conjunction with the 13th Army in the direction of Konotop threatens to bypass the South-Western Front.

2. In the Kremenchug area, the enemy crossed the river. Dnieper with large forces (3-4 front). To develop success in the northern direction, the enemy, apparently, will be transferring forces from other sectors ... 2

1 Sezsheshe 4eg 3. Rapleg-O\Yup. Ve t-Vhapdeptioge 1935-1945. Negaizvevebehn vot Tgadi1opsue fi 4er P!m\$yup. Werisht: Uepav 4er Visppapd ne Soshcheg E scher, 1967. 5. 170.

? Intelligence report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 72 to the bcha

himself on September 5, 1941 on the grouping and actions of the enemy in front of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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"In the evening, Lieutenant General Model held a meeting with his commanders. He ordered to take Mutin the next day and win the bridge over the Seim located there, "this is how the 3rd Panzer Division ended this day, September 4th.

However, on the same day, A.A., previously withdrawn from the 37th Army, was introduced to the line of defense along the southern bank of the Seim, just opposite Mutin, located on the northern bank. Vlasov and the 3rd Airborne Corps, which is in the reserve of the South-Western Front!

3rd VDK, in command of which, after Major General V.A. Glazunov, Colonel I.I. Zate vahin, consisted of three brigades:

- 5th airborne brigade of Colonel A.I. Rodimtseva took up defense at the turn: Taranskoe, railway. bridge across the Seim north of Konotop, Lysogubovka, Sarnavshchina?. Opposite the positions of Rodimtsev's brigade, on the northern bank of the Seim, is the village of Melnya;

- 212th airborne brigade of Colonel V.G. Zholudeva took up positions east of the 5th airborne brigade: Gnilitza, Novomutin. Opposite this line, on the northern bank of the Seim, lies Mutin itself;

- 6th airborne brigade of Major P.M. Shafarenko continued the line of defense of the 3rd Airborne Forces to the east: Volchik (4 km south of the general line of defense), Novomutin, Khizhki. On the opposite bank, opposite Hizhek, there is a Stone.

"On September 4, the entire personnel of the 3rd Airborne Corps was brought into the defense area. The battalions began to dig trenches, organize a system of anti-tank, anti-infantry and anti-aircraft fire. On this day, the Nazis concentrated the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions on a narrow sector of the front and, with a blow to Krolevets, broke through the defenses of the 293rd Rifle Division. The troops of the 40th Army retreated with heavy fighting on the right flank through Glukhov to the east, and with the main forces - towards the Seim - into the defense zone of the 3rd Airborne Corps," recalled the former chief of staff of the 6th airborne brigade I.A. Samchuk".

1 On the basis of the 3rd Airborne Forces, the 87th Rifle Division was subsequently formed, renamed the 13th Guards Rifle Division.

2 In military documents and memoirs, these settlements are called as follows: Taransky, Lizogubsky farm, Sarnovshchitsy. Accordingly: Rotten, Housewarming Mutino, Mutino.

b Samchuk I.A. Bayonet and grenade // Rainbow. 1970. No. 8. S. 117-146. (See also: Samchuk I.A. 13th Guards, 1962).

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September 4, 1941. The decision of the commander of the 5th Airborne Brigade of the 3rd Airborne Forces to defend Konotop.

September 5th. Exit to the Sejm. "On September 5, at 06.00, the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment (Oberst Lieutenant Münzel) and the [th Reconnaissance Battalion (Hauptmann Zir Vogel) in front, with motorized rifles attached to them, tank destroyers and artillery, left their defense area and went forward . They captured the heights north of Mutin and threw the enemy there into the river valley. Around 1300, the battle group entered Mutin.'. 2nd Battalion, 3rd Motorized

1' Here could be part of the 293rd SDI of the 28th MSP NKVD.

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regiment, with the 1st company of the 3rd motorized regiment and the 1st company of the 394th motorized regiment subordinate to him, shouting "Hurrah!" attacked Russian positions and took 244 prisoners. The battalion lost 12 men killed and 50 wounded. Wahmister Kirschgeorg (Kisveev), supporting this blow

guns of the 2nd battery of the 75th artillery regiment, not far from the city, was also killed. And yet, when the tanks and riflemen broke through to the river, they had to look at how the bridge was blown into the air. Thus, the units that reached the river went over to the defensive.

The 1st Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment, which was on the defensive, attacked with its 3rd company Hauptmann Peschke (RezspKe) Slasskoe in order to also reach the Seim shore. However, the riflemen could not advance to the desired area, because they came under heavy fire from enemy artillery and tanks - including 32-ton tanks! In the afternoon, the Russians launched counterattacks, and the 3rd motorcycle flying battalion had to be urgently brought here. Major Pape (Rare) with his companies took up defensive positions opposite Spassky.

Since the river had not yet been crossed, the division ordered the 3rd Battalion, 6th Panzer Regiment (gaunt man Schneider-Kostalski) to advance on Kamen by noon. After a quick concentration in the starting position on the edge of the ravine, at 15.30 the Stone was reached. The 10th company of the 6th tank regiment advances even further - to Morozovka. The tanks of the battalion located in Kam not take enemy positions located on the southern bank of the Seim under fire. In the afternoon, the enemy began to respond with strong artillery and mines.

meteoric fire."

All the settlements named by the Germans lie on the northern bank of the Seim, where our 293rd SDI of the 28th NKVD MSP was located. The tanks mentioned obviously belonged to the 10th Panzer Division.

What do the combat documents of the Southwestern Front tell about September 5?

"The armies of the South-Western Front are fighting fierce battles in the Konotop, Chernigov and Kremenchug directions and are defending the east bank of the river Dnieper with fortified border KIUR

! Obviously - T-34.

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1. The 40th army fought on the entire front with the enemy's motorized units (10 mdi4 td). |

293 sds 28 msp NKVD, attacked by the enemy, by the end of 5.9 retreated to the south. bank of the river Seim and is concentrated in the Volchik region. By decision of the army commander, the division, after putting itself in order, will form an army reserve.

During several days of continuous fighting, the 293rd Rifle Division withdrew to the south. The division commander lost contact with the units, and the position of 1032 joint venture was not established. According to the Shtar Ma-40 report, the regiment remained in the Raygorodok, Zhernovka area. For mouth-

1032 SP sent RO 10 TD in the direction of Zhernovka \.

10 TDs 5 Ptabr continues to fight at the turn of Altynovka, Budenovka. The right flank of the division is covered by a 10 ap battery, two 5 ptabr batteries and a machine-gun unit.

19 TPI RB 10 TD were withdrawn to the area of Mariental, Proletarskoye (2 km north of Melnya, which was targeted by the 3rd Rapner-R\1op. - Auth.), constituting the reserve of the commander of the division
zii.

On the 2nd airborne assault, he restored the situation in the Korop area with an offensive (here the 10th G.R. then crossed the Desna - Auth.).

791 joint ventures (subordinate to the 2 airborne division) are fighting in the north-east. on the outskirts of Karyl'skoye (2 km northwest of Budenovka, which was occupied by our 10th TD. - Auth.).

4th airborne brigade from the Shkuraevka, Sinyutin line was removed with the task of attacking Korop. By the end of the day, the brigade captured Korop.

2 vdb, throwing the enemy back, seized Yegorovka and continues to advance in the north-east. direction.

3 vdb occupies the line Rybotin, Sokhachi, (suit.) Novoselok.

3rd Airborne Forces continues to occupy the defense at the turn of Novoselye Mutino, Zheldaki, Taranskoye.

21 dads of the RGK - at the OP in the area of \u200b\u200bNovoselye Mutino and Volchik supported the battle of 293rd rifle division.

At 13.00, a regiment of NTO RGK arrived to reinforce the army and occupied the base on the Ozarichi and Melnya fronts. 227 sd and the rest of the reinforcements have not yet arrived.

Shtarm 40 - Konotop "...

1 Possibly, the 1032nd Rifle Regiment is the same as the 32nd Rifle Regiment in the orders for the 10th Panzer Division.

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6 September. Seizure of the bridgehead on the Seimeu Konotop. "The morning of September 6 began with rain," we continue to read the history of the 3rd Panzer Division. — At 0900, an order was received for further advance. Since both in the center (Mutin, the junction of the 6th and 212th airborne brigade, plus the units of the 293rd infantry division of the 10th TD that retreated here, plus the 21st artillery regiment. - Author) and on the left flank (Kamen, 4 km east of Mutin , 6th brig. - Auth.) There were no opportunities for crossing, the priority was shifted to the right. It was necessary to capture the bridges in Melnya (12 km west of Mutin, 5th airborne brigade. - Author), while the 4th Panzer Division, which had pulled itself up, was forging Baturin (18 km west of Melnya. - Author).

In the first half of the day, the division, despite muddy roads, throws its forces into battle. The 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment, the 1st battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment and the 3rd motorcycle battalion are concentrated at the Cherepov half-station, with the task of attacking and taking Spasskoe. The 1st Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 394th Motorized Regiment are to advance through Altynovka to Melnya. They will be followed by the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 394th Motorized Regiment as a second echelon. The left group is again commanded by Oberst Kleeman, who is also subordinate to the 2nd and 3rd divisions of the 75th artillery regiment. Riflemen, motorcycle shooters and tanks from the Cherepov region, after a strong artillery raid by both artillery battalions on Russian positions in Spassky, launched an attack at exactly 12.00.

The 1st Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment (Major Welmann) attacked the settlement in the lowland from the northeast, occupied the cemetery and, after a short strong battle, captured the first houses. Following this, the tanks of Oberst Lieutenant and Münzel approach and, together with the arrows, penetrate into Spasskoye. The main enemy forces, not defending themselves, withdrew to the south. The combat vehicles immediately struck.

And soon tanks? were able to knock out 7 Russian combat vehicles? and armored vehicles. The 8th company of the 6th tank regiment near Lyubitov managed to destroy an enemy anti-aircraft battery. 3rd moto

1 bezsysme 4eg 3. Rapleg-Rmup. Bet-Brandeurge 1935-1945. egachzrevfefep wat Tga@lyupzuetapa deg Om5yup. Wersch: Uetsa eg Wispvapaia Soteg Vsmeg, 1967. 5. 171.

2 In the original: "Rapgeg" - "tank".

3 Original: "Katrekharep", which translates both as "tank" and as "battle
wow car."

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a cyclet battalion - commanded by Major Pape since September 1 - and a group of Hauptmann Peschke (1 platoon of the 3rd company of the 3rd motorized regiment, 2 platoons of the 4th company of the 3rd motorized regiment, 1 platoon of the 2nd company of the 3rd motorized regiment, 2 anti-tank guns of the 521st anti-tank battalion, one 8.8-cm anti-aircraft gun and one Do raG mortar) protected the flank of the advancing battalion. Now, however, they are quickly thrown to Ozarichi in order to seize the bridge over the Seim² here. Just at that moment, when the head of the 3rd motorcycle flight regiment approached the river, the bridge takes off into the air. At the same time, the last 3 combat vehicles of the 8th company of the 6th tank regiment receive hits and fail. The 7th company of the 6th tank regiment is still moving forward and occupies the half-station Melnya³, where the exhausted combat vehicles and the remains

pour in.

By 18.45 the enterprise on the left flank of the division was successfully completed. In the offensive zone of the right flank, all the planned goals were also achieved. The battle group of Oberst Lieutenant von Lewinsky at about 13.00 concentrated in its original position between the railway and the highway not far from the Cherepov half-station. Shortly after 1300, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Panzer Regiment (Oberst Lieutenant Schmidt-Ott) and the 2nd Battalion of the 394th Motorized Regiment (Major Dr. Müller) begin their attack.

The lead tanks and the 6th company of the 394th motorized regiment reached the settlement by 1500 and made their way to its southern outskirts. Of course, there were many Russians here in houses and huts, but they had to be driven out by the next companies. An hour later Altynivka was already free from the enemy. When the forces of both parts joined again, the offensive was continued.

Soon after leaving the settlement, the leading combat vehicles ran into the first Soviet tanks. After the first enemy vehicle is set on fire, the enemy starts

1 Apparently a 150mm rocket launcher. IA. Samchuk:

"And one more news - in the village of Ozarichi, on the northern bank of the Seim, the scouts captured the Nazis." The Melnya half-station is located 5 km northeast of the village of Melnya, the target of the offensive. 4 NY I.A. Samchuk: "Two civilians came to the location of the 5th airborne

brigade. both communists, and reported that the German infantry occupied Altynovka without a fight.

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waste. The battle group immediately pursues the evasive enemy. And after 2 km, she again runs into tanks, which took up defensive positions in a place favorable for this. As soon as our companies went on the offensive on the right side of the road, not far from Ruda, they were attacked by several enemy rifle companies.

Just at the moment when the battle becomes critical, the 12th company of the 6th tank regiment approached the southern part of Ruda - the 3rd tank battalion followed the 1st - from a long distance opened fire on Russian tanks. They started off. Russian arrows jumped up and took to flight. Our offensive rolled on. However, the enemy entrenched himself along the northern edge of SvolupzKu!. Noka, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment, was in its starting position for the battle, Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalsky suddenly appeared near Srgolyn\$Ku and attacked with his companies. After that, the Russians hastily retreated to the west.

When it got dark, General Model appeared. He ordered

Oberst Lieutenant Audersch (commander of the 394th Motorized Regiment) to advance with a combat group consisting of the 2nd Battalion of the 394th Regiment, an engineer platoon of the 394th Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment, one company of the 39th 1st sapper battalion, tank destroyers and units of the 75th artillery regiment in the direction of Melnya, and seize the bridge over the Seim located there (behind the bridge was the 5th airborne brigade of Rodimtsev. - Auth.). Immediately, in complete darkness, the offensive began. The goal is to reach the Seimas at night? It was impossible to approach the river during the day, because of the dominant heights on the opposite bank. The group moved forward slowly, since every village was occupied by the enemy and had to be taken in battle. Yet by about 2300 the river was reached. The lead tank of the 12th company of the 6th Tank Regiment, Chief Sergeant Blaich (Ba1sp) broke into Melnya and was immediately destroyed by two direct hits from an anti-tank gun (the RGK anti-tank regiment was located in the Melnya area. - Auth.). Non-commissioned officer Schultz and chief corporal Schultz were killed,

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If this is Karylskoye, then there was the 791st Rifle Division of the 135th Rifle Division, subordinate to the 2nd Airborne Command. On September 2, the 135th Rifle Division itself was returned from the 40th to the 5th Army of Potapov (Combat order of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 00347 of 09/02/1941).

2 This is about the "inability" of the Germans to fight at night.

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the chief sergeant himself was wounded. And yet the road to the river through Melnya was open.

Unfortunately, the riflemen of the 394th motorized regiment failed to get their hands on the bridge across the Seim intact. Before the eyes of the soldiers of the forward company of the 2nd battalion of the 394th motorized regiment just arriving here, the bridge flew into the air. Oberst Lieutenant Audersch made a decision: immediately, under the cover of darkness and with the help of inflatable boats of the sapper battalion of the 394th motorized regiment (Lieutenant Shterk), cross the river the entire 2nd battalion of the 394th motorized regiment and form a bridgehead on the opposite bank. Despite heavy enemy fire, this project was a success. During the night, to support the bridgehead with fire, tanks and heavy weapons took up positions.

In all likelihood, in order to prevent the transfer of parts of the 3rd Airborne Corps, which even had tanks, to the bridgehead opposite Melnya, the Germans depicted attempts to force the Seim throughout the entire line of defense of the 3rd Airborne Division:

"On the night of September 7, under the cover of units of the 3rd airborne corps, they (293rd infantry division of the 10th TD. - Author) crossed the Seim in the sector of the 5th and 212th brigades, and early in the morning rum, enemy infantry without artillery preparation tried to force the river in the area of the villages of Kamen and Mutino. How .

As soon as the Nazis began crossing, the paratroopers opened aimed fire at them from cannons and mortars. In an hour it was all over. The corpses of enemy soldiers remained on the shore, "I.A. Samchuk.

In the next Operational Report on the course of hostilities, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front gave the following assessment of the situation in the 40th Army zone:

"The troops of the South-Western Front are engaged in stubborn battles with the enemy's mechanical units in the Konotop-Bakhmach, Chernigov, Oster and Kremenchug directions, defending the center of the river. Dnieper at the front Chernin, KIUR, Kremenchug.

1. 40th Army (map 100,000).

1 Sezsysme 4er 3. Rapheg-Omyup. Vegltp-Vgapdepboga 1935-1945. Negaizvevebept wat Tga@yuopzuegFap@er Pim syup. Veish: Wayav eg Wispnashp8 Soshcheg Yussheg, 1967. 5. 172.

2 Samchuk I.A. Bayonet and grenade // Rainbow. 1970. No. 8. S. 132. 260

During the day, units of the army held back the offensive of the enemy tank and infantry units on the entire front.

3rd Airborne Forces defends at the line of Khyzhki, Zheldaki, Taransky.

6 airborne brigade fought with small enemy groups that crossed to the southern bank of the river. Seima Mugino. The enemy was thrown to the north bank of the river.

212 and 5 airborne infantry had no contact with the enemy.

1From 5 Ptabrs are conducting containment battles at the line of Leninskoye, Altynovka, Budenovka, Atyusha. At 1700 the division attacked with two motorized regiments and 50 enemy tanks (of which half were heavy).

At the same time, the right flank of the 2nd airborne brigade near Atyusha was attacked by infantry with 30 tanks. The army commander decided on the night of September 7 to withdraw the 2 airborne troops to the southern bank of the river. Seim. 10 TD after covering the withdrawal of 2 VDK, withdraw to the reserve in the Konotop region.

On this day - the day from which the connection of the South-Western Front with the 40th Army began to be lost - the 21st Army, which retreated to the Desna, which, since its submission on August 25 to the Bryansk Front, has never had an elbow connection with it, was transferred to the South-Western Front.

September 7th. Expansion of the foothold on the Seimas. The tragedy of the Soviet border lines. "At dawn, the 1st battalion of the 394th motorized regiment arrived from the Voronezh region to Melnya. On on-

Inflatable boats, under strong fire cover of artillery, tanks and anti-aircraft weapons, the battalion crosses over to expand the bridgehead to the opposite shore (the engineer company assigned for the crossing has not yet arrived). With the intervention of the 1st battalion of the 394th motorized regiment, the bridgehead was somewhat expanded. However, a significant increase was not possible, since the positions of the 394th motorized regiment were under constant machine gun fire. In addition, Russian planes continued to appear in the air and drop bombs on the German forces. In order to expand the bridgehead further - to the dominant heights that were occupied by the Russians - Oberst Lieutenant Audersch

1 Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0135 by 22 hours on September 6, 1941 on the combat operations of the front troops. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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early afternoon on 7 September requested air support. She was scheduled for 13.00. At the moment the German planes approached, General Model and Oberst Kleemann appeared at the command post of Oberst Lieutenant Audersch. The bombers made several runs and placed bombs on the Russian positions with amazing accuracy. The Russians began to withdraw, and the riflemen of the 394th Motorized Regiment attacked the dominating range of hills. Oberst Kleemann took over the leadership of the troops on the parade ground. Oberst Lieutenant Audersch with his command post is transported to the bridgehead.

The division quickly transfers the 39th engineer battalion of Major Beigel (Beigel!) to the bridgehead area. The companies and the pontoon-bridge column thrown across Altynovka immediately begin building the bridge and build it from three sections with a carrying capacity of 16 tons.

Over the next few hours, the division distributes its forces to continue the offensive on 8 September. 394th motorized regiment, 1st company of the 3rd motorized regiment, 521st and 543rd anti-tank divisions, 3rd battalion of the 6th tank regiment, 3rd motorcycle battalion and 6th battery 59 1st Anti-Aircraft Regiment form Oberst Kleemann's battle group. The 75th Artillery Regiment with the bulk of its forces approaches Möln in the dark and takes up firing positions. Oberst von Manteuffel's battle group (Mateijye!) remains on the same line of defense until it is relieved by a reinforced regiment of the 10th Infantry (Motorized) Division. The 3rd battery of the 75th artillery regiment and the 1st battery of the 543rd anti-tank battalion, left as a corps reserve, are again transferred to the 3rd tank division. The general's command post is deployed on the northeastern outskirts of Ksendzovka!. Lieutenant General Model himself, with his officers for assignments, is sent to Melnya, where the main communications post is being set up.

Since only the 394th motorized regiment is on the bridgehead, the division approves the following degree of urgency

1 Obviously, the Germans had pre-revolutionary maps: Ksendzivka, located 5 km north of Melnya, was renamed Proletarskoe back in 1917.

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transfer of their units across the pontoon bridge: the 3rd battalion of the 6th tank regiment with the 1st company of the 52nd 1st anti-tank battalion, the 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment with the rest of the 521st anti-tank battalion , |-th battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment, 35th tank regiment (4th tank division), 2nd division of the 75th artillery regiment, 2nd division of the 42nd artillery regiment, 3rd division 103 th Artillery Regiment!, the 3rd Battalion of the 75th Artillery Regiment and the vehicles of the units participating in the battle»>?.

The Soviet command had the following information about the events in the Melnya area:

"1. 40th Army.

Parts of the army with battles entered the southern bank of the river. Seim.

During the day, the enemy repeatedly tried to force. The Sejm was at the turn of Khyzhki and Melnya, but was repulsed by artillery fire.

In the afternoon, supported by strong artillery fire, the enemy succeeded in crossing the river on a broad front to an infantry regiment in the area of Melnya.

To counteract the development of the enemy offensive on Konotop, the army commanders are allowed to use the front-line reserve - 227 rifle divisions.

Konotop was attacked from the air by 61 enemy aircraft.

The position of the army units by the end of the day was not clear. No connection "...3

On this critical day for the Southwestern Front, when communication with the 40th Army began to be lost, another decision was made that well illustrates the problem of demarcation lines between the armies in the face of an enemy offensive not from one, but from several sides.

In connection with the inclusion in the South-Western Front, the 21st

The 1103rd Artillery Regiment, like the 35th Tank Regiment, was part of the 4th Tank Division.

2 Cezsysme 4er 3. Rapheg-O/yup. Ve t-Bran4epbigr 1935-1945. Negaizrevebep vot Tga @ yuopzueapa 4er Om syup. VegStart: UeCar 4er Vispwapaml8 Simeg E smeg, 1967. \$. 173.

Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0137 by 22 hours on September 7, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD VOV.T. 40.

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Army V.I. Kuznetsov, Kirponos ordered the establishment of new dividing lines between the armies. All these lines were oriented from west to east, exactly as they would have to be if the enemy attacked only from the west. However, the Germans also advanced from the north. Therefore, it turned out that the 40th Army of Major General K.P. Podlasa, at the time of the appointment of new demarcation lines, was located just on its left border: Vorozhba, Konotop, (claim.) r. Seim in the area of Golovenki, Mouth, (suit.) Semenovka.

If the 40th Army had retreated to the south after the loss of Kono-

top, then she would leave her area of responsibility and enter the band of the 21st Army, Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsova. Therefore, the 40th Army either had to keep the Seim tightly at Konotop, or retreat to the east so as not to leave its zone. And in any case, if the 40th Army had the opportunity to prepare the second echelons of defense, then these echelons could only be in the east, in their zone, but not in any way on the path of the Germans advancing south. The same tragedy happened with the reserves. If the armies of the South-Western Front had at least some reserves of their own (at least a regiment, battalion or security company), then they were always located either behind the flank junctions or in other "German-dangerous" areas (for example, the reserves of the 5th Army west of Chernigov and the reserves of the South-Western Front north of Chernihiv). The 40th Army, which actually left its zone by September 7, could keep its reserves and rears only in the east. In other words, the 40th Army, initially, from the moment of its creation and the most decisive days for the South-Western Front, still gravitated not so much to protecting the right flank of the South-Western Front, but to defending the Moscow (bypassing the left flank of the Bryansk Front) and Kharkov directions .. .

In the same - about demarcation lines - the Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front stated:

"40A, having united the units of the KhVO and allocating part of the liberated units, take up defensive positions at the turn of Glukhov, Cherepovo and beyond. Seim...

Commander-21 firmly defend the river. Gum...

40 and 21A change of parts of bunks. Sejm on the site Mishenki, Kerbatovka! produce on the night of 7 to 8.9.41 "2.

. Obviously, Mitchenki and Kerbutovka.

Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00383 of September 7, 1941 on the establishment of new dividing lines between the armies. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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To this it must be added that the change of units of the two armies was carried out exactly in that area and just at the time when the 10th motorized and 4th tank divisions of the Germans, who were here, encouraged by the capture of the 3rd Rapgeg-P /! \ 15yup of the Konotop bridgehead, proceeded to the next offensive on the Desna and the Seim.

8 September. Continuation of fighting on the Konotop bridgehead. Crossing of the 3rd Panzer Division through the Seim. Attack on the outskirts of Konotop. "TO. At 04:00, sappers brought the bridge to the required degree of readiness. Two hours later, the first tanks and armored carriers crossed the bridge to reinforce the Audersch battle group. The day started slowly. Arrows and transport

funds crowded into the bridgehead - a very low area, which was almost uncovered coastal meadows. From the southern end of the blown up railroad bridge, the enemy had a good view of the area and kept the pontoon bridge under constant artillery and mortar fire. Along the southern edge of the coastal meadows, the territory rose and continued like a chain of hills to a large forest on the horizon. The sandy cliff along the northern edge of the highlands was the only possible area for the concentration of troops in the starting position. Of course, this place was under enemy fire, which inflicted some losses on the artillery. From dawn, reconnaissance aircraft of 9./(N) Gebg-SessV\adeg 21 appeared over the area. They began to transmit radio messages to the ground.

At 10.30 a characteristic noise was heard in the air - "pieces" arrived. They pounced on the enemy positions and on the outskirts of the village in front of the very front line. While the first flight of aircraft was emerging from a dive, soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the 394th Motorized Regiment jumped out of their pits and attacked the enemy south of the railway bridge. Simultaneously with them, the combat vehicles of the 3rd battalion of the 6th tank regiment and units of the 521st anti-tank battalion took the village lying in front of the positions and at 1100 cleared it of the remnants of the enemy.

At this time, Oberst Lieutenant crossed to the bridgehead

The 19th squadron was armed with "frames" (E \ 189) and from the beginning of the war specialized in reconnaissance support for the 3rd Panzer Division.

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von Lewinsky with the 2nd battalion, anti-tankers assigned to it and riflemen sitting on the armor of combat vehicles. He approached the kutes and from there immediately launched an offensive exactly in a southerly direction - towards Virovka! The 35th Panzer Regiment of the 4th Panzer Division, which had already crossed to the bridgehead, followed closely behind him. Such a clear approach to the battlefield of the units of the division was carried out thanks to the exemplary and impeccable regulation of traffic by the groups assigned for this from the 1st battalion of the 6th tank regiment.

The von Lewinsky battle group was unable to move forward in the indicated direction due to the destroyed bridges and turned east. Here the tanks with arrows were able to advance along the railway to the south along the dry channel. An enemy was discovered in front of Virovka. Having opened fire, the tanks broke into the settlement, shot at a convoy of trucks and struck at the battery, which was just changing its position. In the middle of the settlement, the battle group turns to the southeast to take up opposite heights. Unfortunately, the lead tank went out of action just at the moment when 6 heavy Russian tanks appeared from the side, at a height. Before the enemy recognized our column, the 7th company of the 6th tank regiment took up a position

tion and knocked out 2 combat vehicles. At the same time, a light field howitzer of the 6th battery of the 75th artillery regiment, Lieutenant Weimann (\eumann) and a self-propelled gun of the 521st anti-tank battalion destroyed one more tank. The Soviets leave the battlefield. However, the battle group cannot move forward, as the enemy appears from the southwest. A light platoon of the regiment stops this enemy attack. 200 prisoners remain in our hands.

Flank cover for the advancing combat groups is provided by one specially composed battalion, which received a combat order to clarify the situation on the railway line beyond Konotop. Under artillery cover, tank destroyers, motorcyclists and sappers cautiously moved forward. However, strong

TV original - Verepk1. In the indicated direction is the village of Virovka and the railway station Virevka. These are, respectively, 4 and 2 km north of Konotop - the ultimate goal of the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Division according to the original plan.

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Using anti-tank guns and machine guns, the enemy forced the group to seek cover in a large cornfield.

Lieutenant Byurkner (Ba!Kpeg, 543rd anti-tank fighter battalion) was killed. The situation was facilitated by the intervention of "pieces". This chance was used by Oberleutnant Michels (M1sve!5), commander of the 3rd battery of the 543rd anti-tank battalion, to take advantage of his anti-tank guns. The heavy platoon of Lieutenant Fisher (E15sKVeg) successfully overcame the Russian oko py2. After that, the shooters and sappers manage to continue their enterprise. And the combat order for this support group is carried out in the afternoon.

Meanwhile, at about 2 p.m., Oberst Lieutenant Audersch's battle group crossed the railway line and an hour later, in a village not marked on the map, they ran into a strong enemy. A fierce battle broke out with the Russian 777th Rifle Regiment, which was especially well armed with anti-tank guns and therefore hindered our tanks in a frontal offensive.

In the end, the 2nd battalion of the 394th motorized regiment, with heavy weapons subordinate to it, managed to break this resistance. At the same time, 6 heavy and 1] light anti-aircraft guns, 4 anti-tank guns and 10 heavy infantry guns were captured. 200 people were taken prisoner. Among them were 6 uniformed girls aged 15-18 years. At dusk, the battle group dug in in the forest 2 km south of the railway. -

The 10th company of the 6th tank regiment returned to the Seim, where from 17.00 it supported the transition of the 3rd motorcycle battalion

1 Sezsisme 4er 3. Rapleg-O/mup. Veit-Brancher 1935-1945. Negaizrererep ut TgaChiopzuefapa 4er Omzyup. Vet: Wayayo 4er Visyrup4yup8 Soshcheg V sm, 1967. \$. 174.

2In the original - "CgaBep", which can be translated both as "trench" and as "trench". However, in the summer of 1941, individual rifle cells were more characteristic of Soviet defense than solid trenches.

3 It was the 777th Rifle Regiment of the 227th Rifle Division of the 26th Army. By September 3, the division was withdrawn from the battle and sent to Konotop as a front reserve. According to A. Isaev (From Dubno to Rostov, p. 674), the 227th division was commanded by Colonel Efrem Fedoseevich Makarchuk. On September 7, the commander of the 40th Army was allowed to bring this division into battle in the Konotop direction. However, on September 7, the 227th division was not near Konotop, but at the positions of the 21st Army in the Kerbutov ma area and km northeast of Konotop (according to the Opersvodka of the South-Western Front

yu 0137).

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across the destroyed railroad bridge. Both battalions of the 3rd Motorized Regiment and the rest of the division's battle groups crossed over the pontoons during the afternoon, and in the evening the entire 3rd Panzer Division (without rear services) was on the southern bank of the Seim!

Through the eyes of a participant in these battles from our side, this day looked like this:

"September 8, barely dawn, an enemy reconnaissance aircraft appeared over the positions of the corps. It circled over the positions of the forward battalions and flew off in a northerly direction. This visit did not bode well.

An hour later, a group of Yu-87s flew in. They attacked the battalion of the 5th brigade, which was on the defensive near the railway bridge. Now it could be assumed that it was here that the main blow of the Nazis would fall. Reports soon began to arrive from the front line that there was a large concentration of German infantry ahead, equipped with crossing facilities.

Heavy artillery and mortars fired intensively at the corps' combat formations. The leading edge of the 5th Airborne Brigade was subjected to especially strong treatment. The strike of aviation and artillery on a narrow section of the front was so strong that a strip of land two kilometers wide was literally plowed up.

Under the cover of artillery fire, enemy units began to launch inflatable boats, preparing to force the Seim in several places at once. The biggest

the concentration of fascist troops was in the band of the 5th brigade.

The fire of all the artillery and mortars that the corps had at its disposal was concentrated on the crossing Nazis. The river began to seethe, boil, powerful fountains rose between the boats. With the third hit, the gunners smashed a boat with an easel machine gun. Oars, knapsacks, overcoats floated along the river.

The paratroopers opened fire with all types of weapons. Gitle Rovtsy fell into the water and died from well-aimed shots of paratroopers. But the fascist command, striving to seize the bridgehead at any cost, continued to send more and more new units into battle. And on the site of the 5th brigade, commanded by Colonel A.I. Rodimtsev, they managed to capture a small bridgehead.

A fierce battle ensued on the shore. The forces were unequal

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nym, but the paratroopers, bled dry by the bombing and artillery shelling, fought not for life, but for death. And suddenly, at the moment when it seemed that the fighters of the 5th brigade, who were defending the area of the bridge, could not stand it, a heavy machine gun fired from a high cliff behind the bridge. His fire proved to be life-saving. The machine gunner blocked the way for the Germans, disrupted the work they had begun to restore the bridge across the Seim. M.D. was a bold bullet-tapper. Ivanov.

With great difficulty, the 5th brigade drove the Nazis out of the captured bridgehead. Calm has come. The paratroopers used it to strengthen their defenses. The Germans, on the other hand, were building up strength in order to resume the offensive.

The Nazis threw aviation into the positions of the corps. The planes literally ironed the trenches of the paratroopers. The fire of anti-aircraft batteries and heavy machine guns, whose crews suffered heavy losses, turned out to be ineffective.

The 4th battalion of Captain D.F. had the hardest time. Pas Tushenko (located to the east of the bridge. - Auth.). He was under the heaviest fire. All commanders of companies and vzvolov were out of order.

After the bombing, the Germans twice tried to force the Seim in the area of the Pastushenko battalion, but the fighters survived - the enemy could not cross.

The night did not bring peace. Enemy aircraft continuously hung over the battle formations of the corps, illuminating them with rockets and dropping small-caliber high-explosive fragmentation bombs. The brigades in this situation were unable to change battalions.

At night, a reconnaissance ka was sent to the location of the enemy. Before dawn, the scouts returned and reported a large concentration of German troops on the other side of the river. In one

from the villages they counted more than a hundred tanks and armored personnel carriers. Tanks and vehicles with infantry continued to arrive in Melnya from the north. It was the 3rd division of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group.

According to the memoirs of I.A. Samchuk is not visible that the Germans have already crossed the Seim, formed a bridgehead and approached Konotop itself. However, this is clearly seen from the Opersvodka of the Front:

"The troops of the South-Western Front are fighting at the turn of the river. Seim, Desna and in the Kremenchug direction ...

1 Samchuk I.A. Decree. op. S. 133. 270

The enemy with large forces, advancing from the north against the 40th, 21st and right flank of the 5th armies, captured the crossings across the river. Seim near Melnya, across the river. Desna near Butovka, Makoshino, Saltykova Maiden, Kovchin, Avdeevka, Brusilovo, Morovsk and develops an offensive, especially active in the Konotop and Chernigov directions. In the Kremenchug direction, the enemy, having expanded the bridgehead, is developing an offensive against the Kozelshchina.

1. 40th Army.

On the front of the 40th Army, the enemy crossed the river. The Sejm at Melnya, at 16.00 introduced tanks in the amount of 40 and pushed the army units to the south. The battle goes to the north-west. outskirts of Konotop. About 50 German submachine gunners intercepted the railway. dorota to Bakhmach and move on to Kokhanovka.

10 tdi 227 rifle divisions were put into battle.

Glukhov is occupied by an enemy tank unit. The ridge was abandoned by our units under pressure from the enemy with a force of 60-70 tanks.

9th of September. Refusal of the 3rd Panzer Division from the capture of Konotop. "Now even the last soldier knows what it's all about." The collapse of the northern flank of the Southwestern Front.

"After a cold night, during which it was hardly possible to sleep under the open sky, a new gloomy day began. The 3rd Panzer Division used this watch to group its forces into tighter formations. 394th motorized regiment cleans Popovka?. The rest of the subdivisions are gradually drawn into the Virovka area (Verepk!). The main forces of the division pass to the west of Konotop. The 10th infantry (motorized) division was given to take this large settlement. The 2nd company of the 39th sapper battalion of Talion, whose commander Oberleutnant Royver (Koeyer) was wounded today, seizes the airfield in Konotopez with a surprise attack. This company, led by Lieutenant Weigel (Ure),

: Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0139 by 22 o'clock on September 8, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

In the original - "Rgoro\Ka". Obviously, this refers to the village of Popovka on the western outskirts of Krolevets.

3 Previously, this airfield was subjected to systematic bombing, and on August 28, pilot Ivan Avdeevich Avekov shot down two He-111 bombers in the Konotop area.

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captured 2 aircraft and 17 prisoners. The enemy repeatedly attacks the 3rd Panzer Division from the east. However, after the firefight departs. The von Manteuffel combat group - the 1st battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment and divisional units - continues the offensive and by 14.00 was able to create a bridgehead at Shapovalovka (Speroma] o \ Ka). At the same time, the 3rd company of the 3rd motorized regiment blocks the bridges near ZhagakhogGK (Saranovka and Sosnovka are located in the indicated area. - Author) and Gurevka.

The 3rd Panzer Division creates a forward detachment led by the commander of the 521st anti-tank fighter division, Major Frank (EgapK), who receives a combat order: to move forward as far as possible. The 8th company of the 6th tank regiment and the light platoon of the 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment form the strike group of this detachment. Major Frank and his soldiers manage to quickly move forward - to Karabutovo! and reach the bridges by evening. The enemy is so overwhelmed that only after some time has passed he gathers his strength and begins to vigorously counterattack. However, riflemen, tankers and tank destroyers staunchly defend themselves against these blows and hold the bridgehead. Around midnight, the advance detachment of Oberst von Manthafehl arrives here and significantly reinforces it with the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment and the 2nd Division of the 75th Artillery Regiment.

At night, the division develops a plan for 10 September. The order is to advance in the direction of Romny in order to reach the Sula River there. Now even the last soldier knows what is at stake: this offensive must end with an association with a tank group coming from the south!

It is quite remarkable that the 3rd Panzer Division did not get involved in the fighting at Konotop, leaving it to the motorized infantry. Bypassing the city from the west, Model's division continued its swift march to the south. The command of the SWF threw its last reserves near Konotop: the 3rd airborne corps with a corps tank battalion,

| Karabutovo is located 20 km southeast of Konotop, on the Romen River.

2? Sezsysche Cheg 3. Rapgeg-Ouyup. Vel-Vgapdepogv 1935-1945. Negaizvwebep
wat Tgadlopzuefap@ 4er Olyuyup. Vet: WayPar 4er Wispvapdshp8 Soshcheg E
Estimate, 1967. 5. 175.

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tanks!, the replenished 227th rifle division with strong anti-tank artillery, and
reinforcement artillery regiments.

All these formations, including the remnants of Semenchenko's 10th Panzer
Division and the remnants of Lagutin's 293rd Rifle Division, were, in fact, bound
hand and foot by German forces of secondary importance and therefore could not stand
in the way of "first violin » Kiev cauldron - division of Model Ia. Two weeks earlier,
the entire 24th Army Motorized Corps had slowly flown south along the Bryansk
Front and through its funnel-shaped, with a corresponding opening between the
21st and 13th Armies, the left wing had collapsed directly on the 40th Army. Now
history was repeating itself. While the 40th Army was rising like a rock in its zone
of responsibility, the 3rd Panzer Division merged down from this rock like a waterfall.

However, by the evening of that day, September 9, at the headquarters of the Southwestern
Front, there was still nothing about the Germans breaking through Konotop in the south.
did not know:

"The troops of the South-Western Front are fighting hard on the front 40, 21, 5,
the right wing of the 37th army and in the Kremenchug direction ...

... 40 army. Fights go to Konotop and Bakhmach. There is no data on the position
of the parts "...2

By the morning of the next day, the situation had cleared up a bit:

40th Army. The position of the army units at the end of 9.9:

227th Rifle Division holds Konotop with its front to the west.

10 TD in the Mitchenki area with the front to the east.

2 VDK, 3 VDK 293 SD - the same position.

Enemy tank units and infantry continue their offensive in the direction of
Bakhmach, Konotop and to the south, where a gap has formed between our
units...3

As can be seen from this report, there was a 16-kilometer gap between the
Mitchenki and Konotop. But was the front really torn apart by the Germans? Or,
as in the case of the 21st and 13th armies, was there a primordial void?

1 When it comes to tank units of 1941, one always has to make a note about the presence or absence
of actual tanks in these units.

2 Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0141 by 22 o'clock on September 9, 1941 of the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

s Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0142 by 10 o'clock on September 10, 1941. SBD VOV, Vol. 40.

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Talking about how the 3rd Airborne Corps took up positions on the southern coast of the Seimau Konotop, I.A. Chuk himself emphasized:

"On the right, in the area of Putivl, a detachment of General Chesnov was defending, there were no neighbors on the left"¹.

As we know from the deployment of troops, on the northern bank of the Seim opposite the 3rd Airborne Command was the 293rd Rifle Division. To her left is the 10th Yatdi of the 2nd VDK. After the Germans reached the Seim in the area of Mutin, Kamen and Melnya, the 293rd Rifle Division and part of the 10th Rifle Division withdrew to the south coast in the sector of the 3rd Airborne Command. The 2nd Airborne Forces and other units of the 10th Tank Division, retreating behind the Seim west of Konotop, were to surrender their sectors to the 21st Army. It seems that to the left, to the east, from the 4th battalion of Captain D.F. Pastushenko (5th Airborne Brigade of the 3rd Airborne Forces) there really were no our troops ...

"On the morning of September 9, the enemy again delivered a powerful air and artillery strike. Now the main direction was determined quite clearly - the Nazis tried to break through to Konotop along the railway, - writes I.A. Chuk himself. - It was not necessary to count on help - the 40th Army fought bloody battles along the entire front and did not have any reserves. We had to fight off attacks by infantry and paratrooper tanks on our own.

Under the cover of powerful artillery and mortar fire, the first echelon of the enemy's 3rd Panzer Division wedged itself into the corps' defenses in several sectors. Battalion after battalion, regiment after regiment, were heading to the left bank of the river. The paratrooper units, exhausted by battles, were forced to retreat.

The Nazis delivered the main blow to the positions of the 4th battalion of the 5th brigade, which defended the area of the railway bridge. Under the cover of mortar and artillery fire and aviation, German sapper units, using the railway bed and the trusses of the blown up bridge hanging over the water, managed to quickly establish a crossing. A column of fascist tanks crawled onto our shore...

... Colonel Rodimtsev sent Pastushenko to help

,

a group of fighters from special forces along with a tank company of a corps tank battalion.

, Samchuk I.A. Decree. op. S. 131. 274

The heavily depleted units of the 5th Airborne Brigade were unable to hold the railway bridge. Parts of the 3rd and 4th tank divisions of the Guderian group rushed into the gap that had formed! - this is how this day ends in the memoirs of I.A. Samchuk...

Later, after the breakthrough of the infantry regiment "Grossdeutschland" (and after it other units of the 46th tank corps) to the south in the Putivl area (40 km east of Konotop), the 3rd Airborne Command was surrounded in the same forest, where he occupied the initial positions before the battles for Konotop: Zheldaki, Khyzhki, Cossack, Bochechki. Having no connection with either the front or the 40th Army, having no order to withdraw, Colonel I.I. Zatevakhin switched to independent combat operations. From September 11 to 17, the corps, which by that time still had tanks, attacked the communications of the 3rd Panzer Division south of Konotop. On September 17, the 3rd VDK established contact with the 40th Army and received an order to leave the encirclement. On August 19, he managed to break through to the east and link up with the remnants of the 40th Army in the area east of Buryl.

10 September. Decisive attack. Capture of Romen and the bridges over the Sulu. "September 10, at about 0600, the division begins a decisive offensive with all its forces," we continue to read the history of the 3rd division. "Unfortunately, the sky was overcast with dense clouds, and the rain turned all the roads and roads into mud. A lot of stuck vehicles can only be pulled out with the help of tractors. A motorcycle is attached to each truck. But it is not easy for heavy trucks either, they often sink in the mud right up to their axles. As a result, all columns and subdivisions are stretched and mixed up and soon become a hectic conglomeration of companies, platoons, squadrons and batteries. All this is moving forward very slowly.

Officers and privates of Frank's advance detachment, as well as the 1st reconnaissance battalion, 521st anti-tank battalion, 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment, 2nd battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment, 1st company 394- th motorized regiment, units of the 39th engineer battalion, the 2nd division of the 75th artillery regiment and several anti-aircraft

| Samchuk I.A. Decree. op. C, 134. 275

guns are literally buried in mud. Already by noon, the detachments approach the northeastern edge of the chain of hills, above which, like an island from a valley, rise the Romny.

Major Frank (EgapK) with the 3rd battery of the 521st anti-tank battalion, the 3rd company of the 39th sapper battalion

talon, one company of riflemen and one battery rushes to the first bridge. Tips that greatly fortified the deep valley of the Romaine River! anti-tank ditches and barbed wire, are so amazed by the imminent appearance of the Germans that they hardly think about resistance. The spearhead detachments of our division use this chance and, without stopping in front of the whistling shells, storm the bridge over the Bolishoi Romen and penetrate Romny from the northwest! Without stopping, they immediately make their way to the middle of the city up to the bridge over the Sulu. Oberleutnant Lingk (Mp8K), commander of the 3rd battery of the 521st anti-tank battalion, reaches the shore first. Without regard for anything, while the Russians are stunned, he slips to the opposite bank and leaves the bridge behind him! Lieutenant Schultze (Zspy[2e) and Lieutenant Seefeld (See Ye14, 39th Sapper Battalion) follow closely behind him. The bridge falls intact into the hands of the battle group!

Only now the enemy has awakened. Everywhere in this city, with white houses and clean cobbled streets, shooting and stubborn resistance begin.

The 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment (Oberst Lieutenant Münzel), with the 1st Company of the 394th Motorized Regiment subordinate to him, penetrated the western part of the city and joined in the defense of the bridgehead. A freight train was hijacked at the station, fully loaded with food and clothing. In the afternoon, at about 17.00, the marching group of Oberst Kleeman arrives in Romny and joins the implacable struggle. Row after row of houses engulfed in flames can tell how the cleansing is progressing - in the northern part of the city under the leadership of Oberst Kleemann, and in the south - under the leadership of Oberst von Manteuffel. Soviet aircraft are constantly attacking the lead detachments of the 3rd Panzer Division that have penetrated the city. Despite the bad weather, enemy attack aircraft continuously rush here and beat our groups.

1' The Romen River flows into the Sula River in the city of Romny itself.

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airborne weapons and bombs. Their own anti-aircraft weapons are ineffective, as the Soviets sneak up behind the city's high ground, and only soar upwards at the very last moment before attacking our troops in the gardens of the northern suburbs. Until the evening, when the night had not invaded, no less than 25 raids were made, the Romny turned into one flaming torch. The battle ended with the blowing up of the rails to the west of the city by the 3rd company of the 39th engineer battalion. The tension was so great that the troops no longer had the strength to rejoice at the victory!

It rains nonstop all night long. It is unlikely that vehicles will make their way to the Romny, everything is drowning in mud. At the same time, one must again and again admire the drivers of the supply convoys, who, with incredible efforts, manage to achieve

put supplies ahead of the fighting army. The situation with ammunition is tolerable. The fuel situation is tense. However, and this must be understood, along with a bad road, the distance to the nearest supply station is 400 km (!), the daily required supply weight of the hull is 1000 tons. From the beginning of the trip until now, the average daily travel of each truck of fuel convoys is 170 km!"

The Hero of Socialist Labor, Colonel-General of the Technical Troops Pavel Alekseevich Kabanov, commander of the 5th Railway Brigade in 1941, told us about who met the 3rd Panzer Division in Romny:

"At that time, the headquarters, commandant's, machine-gun platoons and two platoons of the 4th company of the 79th battalion were in Romny. The rest of the battalion units worked on the line. The 1st and 2nd companies covered the Rubanka-Bakhmach section, the 3rd and two platoons of the 4th company restored the tracks at the intermediate station Yuskovtsy of the Romny-Lokhvitsa section. The commander of the battalion, Major M.S., was also there. Smirnov and Commissioner Nazmutin Nurutinovich Amirov.

German tanks with a landing of submachine gunners burst into Romny suddenly. Our fighters and commanders did not lose their heads and met the enemy with rifle and machine-gun fire. On the streets of the city

| Sezsysme er 3. Rapgeg-Sumyup. Vejt-Vgapdepbige 1935-1945. Negaizrevebeben vot Tgadi1onzuegfapYa 4er Olu5yup. Vey: Wayayo 4er VisiNapashp8 Someg Vsme, 1967. \$. 179.

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Yes, a short but stubborn battle flared up. In this battle, lieutenant A.A. Orlov knocked out two German tanks from an ambush with grenades tied to them. The first enemy attack was repelled. But the forces were too unequal, and the battalion commander ordered the units to retreat across the Sula River. However, the 1st and 2nd companies did not have time to retreat and remained behind the rear of the Germans. Company commanders took advantage of the fact that the enemy had not yet had time to create a solid front, at night, hiding in the folds of the terrain, they began to withdraw units from the encirclement. Collisions with the enemy could not be avoided. In battles with the Nazis, the commander of the 2nd company, Senior Lieutenant N.M. Urusov, platoon commander Lieutenant S.F. Kosolapov and many Red Army soldiers.

While the 1st and 2nd companies were emerging from the encirclement, other divisions of the 79th battalion were performing a combat mission in the Romny-Yuskovtsy sector. Platoon of Lieutenant S.I. Chernyshev was ordered to defend the railway bridge across the Sula near the city of Romny and prepare it for destruction. The platoon repulsed several fierce attacks of the enemy. Then the Nazis crossed the river in the area of the highway bridge and hit the platoon on the flank. It was necessary to urgently destroy the bridge. Chernyshev did not have explosives, and he ordered in advance to

lay the bridge with logs and brushwood. When the Germans approached the bridge, our fighters set fire to the logs and brushwood doused with gasoline. Huge fires flared up. Under the influence of high temperature, the metal was deformed, and the bridge failed.

When withdrawing, our units manually and mechanically destroyed signaling and communications equipment, turnouts, and burned wooden buildings. An artillery depot was evacuated from Yuskovtsy station.

During these difficult days, one of the best demolition workers of the brigade, senior technician-lieutenant Pyotr Mikhailovich Litvinov, died. He was sent by the battalion commander for reconnaissance. In the trolley, Captain Saenko, an authorized special department, went with him. Along the way, they ran into German tanks. A direct hit from a shell killed the driver of the trolley and Litvinov. Saenko survived and returned to his unit at night!

' Kabanov P.A. Steel tracks. M.: Military Publishing House, 1973. S. 105.

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By evening, the command of the South-Western Front had the following information about the events in Romny:

"The southwestern front was broken through in the Konotop direction by the enemy advancing to the south, its advanced motorized units reached Gaivoron and Romny in the afternoon ...

1. 40th Army. There are no exact data on the position of units of the 40th Army. The enemy is developing an offensive by 4th Panzer Division with one motorized division to the south between Bakhmach and Konotop and ZTD in the direction of Glukhov, Vorozhba (in fact, the 3rd Panzer Division was still advancing south, in the direction of Konotop - Rum NY. - Auth.) . With

Army units hold Konotop and Bakhmach until 1000, preventing the expansion of the breakthrough between the indicated points. There are no new data.

According to a report from the chief of staff of the army, in battles from 6.9 to 9.9, up to 90 enemy tanks were destroyed by army units.

2. The 21st Army is conducting containment battles on the entire front, making private counterattacks in separate sectors. The enemy in the former grouping is developing an offensive, especially in the junction between the 21st and 40th armies and between 21A and 5A "...1

By the morning of September 11, intelligence of the Southwestern Front provided the following information about the enemy:

"1) Grouping and concentration. Enemy forces opposing the SWF, on 10.9.41, are grouped as follows:

zom. On the right flank of the front, in the Kamen, Ozarichi, - Konotop, Bakhmach sector, a motorized mechanized group consisting of 3, 4 TD and 10 MD is operating, directing its strikes at Konotop, Bakhmach, Romny and designating an attack on Putivl, Vorozhba (namely, designating, with the goal of tie down the 40th army. - Av7i ..) ...

2) The actions of the enemy.

Konotop-Bakhmach direction. Motorized units of the enemy (apparently, 4th division) in the morning of 10.9 broke through the front in the Konotop, Bakhmach sector and, spreading to the south, captured Romny by the middle of the day.

In the middle of the day, the enemy threw air in the Romny area

'
Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0143 by 22 o'clock
t 1941 on the fighting and the situation of the troops of the front. SBD V. T. 40.

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stuffy landing force numbering 100-150 people, which, apparently, connected with the approaching motorized units ... Conclusion: 1. The enemy

motorized units, having broken through the front of the right-flank army, are spreading in the direction of Romny, Mir Gorod "...1

The situation with the airborne assaults, which appear from time to time in Soviet reports, is not entirely clear. These could be real airborne assault forces - some kind of special division of the Germans, which are not mentioned either in the stories or in the memoirs of German infantry and tank commanders. It could be pilots who jumped out with parachutes or ammunition dropped by forward detachments. And finally, only airborne landings could explain the sudden appearance of enemy troops in areas that were considered deep rear of our troops.

On the same day, September 10, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front ordered the cavalry group of the 21st Army to be withdrawn to the reserve and concentrated in the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the 46th German tank corps. We do not know if the cavalry group managed to reach the destination area. After all, the transition route determined by the order - from Kuren (near Bakhmach) to Putivl - crossed in the area of the villages of Karabutovo, Yurovka and Shpotovka the path of the 3rd Panzer Division from Konotop to Romny. However, the very fact that the cavalry group was transferred to the east, together with the incorrect assumption that the 3rd Panzer Division also turned east from Konotop, suggests that even on September 10 it was assumed that the Germans were still "cunning" and they are about to hit Moscow or Kharkov from the south.

1 Intelligence report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 78 kbcha itself on September 11, 1941 on the enemy grouping in front of the front on September 10, 1941. SBD WWII. T. 40..

? Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00400 dated September 10, 1941 to the commander of the 21st Army to withdraw the cavalry group to the front reserve with concentration in the area of Putivl, Skunosov, Yuriev. SBD VOV.T. 40. Perhaps we are talking about a cavalry group under the command of Colonel General O.I. Gorodovikov. This group in the summer of 1941 acted jointly with the 3rd Army of V.I. Kuznetsov, subsequently merged with the 21st Army, which was commanded by V.I. Kuznetsov.

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It is obvious that by September 10, the control of the northern wing of the Southwestern Front by the command of the South-Western Front began to be lost. This is also evidenced by the combat order of the front to its northern armies:

"Very important

Commander 40, 5 and 21A

Copy: To the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army

Commander-in-Chief YuZN

Between your armies, in recent years, not only clear interaction has not been achieved, but also the maintenance of continuous communication. Communication between your armies is established on a case-by-case basis.

There is evidence that units of the 67th Rifle Corps of the 21st Army are withdrawing without a fight, which exposes the left flank of the 40th Army, which is fighting fierce stubborn battles with a superior enemy and holding its line, despite the fact that both flanks are open.

The Military Council of the Southwestern Front orders:

1. Take all measures to establish uninterrupted communications, clear interaction and elbow communication between the armies.
2. Eliminate the gap that exists between the 5th, 21st and 40th, 21st armies.
3. Immediately report on the measures taken to the Military Council of the Southwestern Front to eliminate the noted shortcomings.

Commander of the South-Western Front Colonel-General
Kirponos Member of the Military Council
Burmistenko Chief of Staff of the Front Major-General Tupikov!

11 September. Detection of fuel in Romny - you can

step further. As soon as the day began, already at 00.30, the chief of the General Staff, Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov sometimes commanded M.P. Kirponos to allocate two divisions from the 26th Army, "always with artillery", and send them as quickly as possible to the Romen region.

1 Combat order of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 00403 dated September 10, 1941 by the commander of the troops of the 5th, 21st and. 40th Army on maintaining interaction and communications between the armies. SBD WWII. V. 40 (September 11, Combat Orders Nos. 00415 and 00416 issued similar orders to the commanders of the 37th and 38th armies).

? Message from the headquarters of the High Command of the South-Western Direction No. 0329 of September 11, 1941 to the Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front Tao of the recommendation of the General Staff of the Red Army to allocate two rifle divisions from the army to cover Romna. SBD WWII.

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The possible speed of movement of the division removed from the front looked, according to the Combat order of the SWF headquarters, as follows:

"... in Withdraw 289 rifle divisions from the battle and concentrate in the area of Zoloto nosha ... Transportation to the area of concentration to be carried out by rail ... Loading station Zolotonosha, unloading station Lokhvitsa, Shevchenko concentration area, Serednya ki, Novoselovka (25 km east of Lokhvitsa. - Auth.). The first echelon is due at 8.00 12.9 "... 1

"On September 11, the 3rd Panzer Division defends the area it has reached around Romen," the historians of the 3rd Panzer Division continue their story. - With a small number of forces at the disposal, only dominant points and roads leading to the city can be defended. The rain that so soaked the supply routes, however, weakened, but the Romen garrison was practically cut off from rear communications. The most indispensable thing - fuel - is brought only on tractors.

The security zone is expanding to the south-southwest. Field positions with bunkers and anti-tank ditches were discovered on the heights south of Sula. A quick strike by the advance detachment of Major Frankali deprived the enemy of the opportunity to occupy this line. In the first half of the day, during the cleansing of the southern part of the city, rich warehouses of the Soviets were discovered. Even 400 cubic meters of fuel, warehouses with vodka and beer were found.

On this day, as well as the following day, in front of the lines of defense around Romen, nowhere does it reach serious contact with the enemy. Only own and enemy patrol groups roam the terrain ahead. Around the city rise 47 oil rigs as evidence of the recently discovered oil fields in this area. During the retreat, the Soviets set fire to 36 of them.

The commander-in-chief of the army group, Field Marshal von Bock, congratulated the division over the radio on the acquisition of Romen.

In the assessment of this day by the command of the South-Western Front, the number of enemy tanks, as it seems to us, is greatly exaggerated: "40th Army. Army units are fighting with a mechanized group against

1 Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00405 dated 1 | September 1941 to the commander of the troops of the 26th Army for the concentration of the 289th Infantry Division in the area of Shevchenko, Serednyaki, Novoselovka. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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nickname consisting of 3, 4 TD and 10 MD, which broke through the river. Seim at the Ozarichi front, Baturin. The enemy, having broken through the front armies to the full depth, is developing success in the direction of Romna. Up to 150 tanks and 350 vehicles were brought into the breach. At 10.30 10.9 the enemy occupied Romny. According to the report of the head of the reconnaissance group of the UR, on 11.9 there was movement from Romny to Sumy to a motorized regiment and 50 enemy tanks and from Romny to Belovod to an infantry battalion with tanks.

The remnants of the 293rd Rifle Division are defending on the Nechaevka, Cossack front (to the north of Cossack, in the forest along the Seim, there was the 3rd VDK blocked by the Germans - Auth.).

227 sd - 4 km east. Konotop.

Detachments of Chesnov occupy the front of Art. Tetkino, r. Seim to Putivl, covering the direction of Vorozhba.

In front of the front, up to 100 tanks and up to two battalions of enemy motorized infantry, operating from the direction of Volokishno.

10 TD strikes at the rear of the broken mechanized group. According to the report of the division commander, the division is advancing to the southwest. direction and mastered Mal. Sambur.

There is no data on the rest of the 40th Army.

According to the report of the army commander, 130-150 enemy tanks were destroyed during the period of fighting in the breakthrough sector. Sharm 40 (which was previously located in Konotop. - Auth.), According to the last report, on the move to Belopolye (75 km east of Konotop. - Auth.) "!

... 150 tanks entered into the breakthrough, another 100 are in front of the front of Chesnov's detachments, plus 150 were destroyed by the 40th Army in the place of the breakthrough, in total - 400 tanks. These are two whole tank divisions, the 3rd and 4th ...

Although ... What the hell is not joking! .. After all, if you believe the Germans themselves, then by the time the operation to encircle the troops of the Southwestern Front was completed, they were left without tanks and infantry at all.

before the attack on Moscow, they went for new combat vehicles to their base in Gomel ...

12-th of September. Throw to Lokhvitsa. This day, like the previous ones, began with attempts by the Southwestern Front to establish reliable communications with its armies. This time again from the 40th:

at Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0145 by 22 o'clock in 1941 on the combat operations and the situation of the troops of the front. SBD. T. 40.

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"Especially important

Commander of the 40th Army

Over the past two days, there was no contact with Shtarm 40. The measures taken to get in touch with her by radio were not successful. This led to the fact that the data on the situation of the army arrived very late and did not reflect the actual situation at the moment. Despite the special importance and significance of the operational position of 40A in this situation, neither Shtarm 40 nor the Military Council 40A clarified the full features of this situation, continuing to leave the front command in the dark about the true state of the army. Moreover, the more difficult the situation in the army became, the less reports about it began to arrive.

The military council of the front demands a resolute cessation of such phenomena and sets the task of organizing the submission of regular reports on the state of the army.

= Kirponos, Burmistenko, Tupikov"1.

Obviously, having finally understood that the 40th Army is a cut off piece, the command of the South-Western Front orders the 26th Army to transfer one more division to Romny:

"Especially important

Commander 26A

The general situation in the SWF in connection with the breakthrough of the enemy mechanized group at the junction 40 and 21A in the general direction of Romny requires the most rapid concentration of the necessary reserves to counter this group and destroy it.

The Military Council of the front places on you personal responsibility for the timely concentration of 289 infantry divisions to the loading stations and for their speediest departure from the loading stations.

Kirponos, Burmistenko, Tupikov"?.

1 Combat order of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front No. 00417 dated September 12, 1941 to the commander of the 40th Army on the regular and timely submission of reports on the situation of the army troops. SBD VOV.T. 40.

? Combat order of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front No. 00418 dated September 12, 1941 to the commander of the 26th Army on the

the concentration of the 289th rifle and 7th motorized rifle divisions to the loading stations. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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At this time, the 3rd Panzer Division, breaking away from its rear, continued to stagnate in Romny, accumulating fuel and ammunition for the next breakthrough to the south. To emphasize the importance of the moment, let's fast forward just a week. The battle in the cauldron had already ended, the Southwestern Front of the first formation had died, the Germans were preparing to attack Moscow. Horse-mechanized group P.A. Belov ... However, let's give the floor to Belov himself:

"In the last days of September, the weather was rainy. It was in our favor. Intelligence reported that the German tank group, which had broken through to the Shtepovka area, could not move forward due to a lack of fuel. And it was not so easy to bring fuel along washed-out roads. Such an advantageous moment should not be missed. I decided to attack the Germans and cut off the units that had broken through from their main body.

The Nazis, apparently, believed that we would not soon recover from the blow received, and did not expect our offensive.

In the meantime, sixteen kilometers north of Shtepovka, the 1st Guards Motorized Division of Colonel A.I. Lizyukov, which was supposed to be part of the neighboring 40th Army. Lizyukov agreed to take part in our offensive, visited my headquarters and clarified the situation. His division occupied an area convenient for a strike on the flank of an enemy grouping. We quickly agreed with Lizyukov on cooperation.

The offensive began in the early rainy morning of 30 September. The 9th Cavalry Division advanced from the east. It was supported by the 1st Tank Brigade. On the right flank, going behind the enemy, Lizyukov's infantry went on the attack. Our 5th Cavalry Division was advancing on the extreme left flank...

... The Nazis were squeezed in. For some time they still tried to shoot back from the attics and from the windows of the houses, but soon they began to scatter, throwing their weapons ... It was raining. Crowds of German Tsevs rushed in one direction, then in the other, and everywhere they were met -

whether our fighters. Thousands of corpses lay in the mud. Part of the hitle-- Rovitsev managed to get into the trucks. But the cars skidded and got stuck. Huge traffic jams formed at the exit from Shtepovka.

Having defeated the enemy in Shtepovka, our troops moved on. In a few days, we liberated more than twenty settlements, including the regional center Apollonovka.

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In these battles we defeated and completely annihilated the German 25th Motorized Division and inflicted a serious defeat on the 9th Panzer Division. Only the water Shtepovka found a grave for eight thousand German soldiers and officers. Our quartermasters were counting trophies. At that time they were very large. We probably captured the entire vehicle fleet of the 25th motorized division. In total, the enemy abandoned up to a thousand vehicles on the battlefield, lost sixty-seventy tanks, one hundred and fifty guns, and five mortar batteries. Fleeing, the fascists left the treasury of the 119th motorized regiment with all its cash.

The offensive against Shtepovka was carried out in the context of a general withdrawal of our troops and therefore was of great moral importance. The corps received a thank-you order from the Military

"this is the Council of the South-Western Direction, signed by S.K. Timoshenko and N.S. Khrushchev"!

However, back to September 12, to the history of the 3rd tank division

VISIONS:

"The weather is hardly getting better, the sky is overcast with clouds that go away only temporarily and release the sun for a short time. Since the rain subsides, it is now possible to deliver a sufficient amount of fuel, food and ammunition to Romny. Thus, every hour the condition of the troops improves. Already on the evening of September 12, Major Frank formed an advance detachment, which was to follow on the heels of the fleeing Soviets. This battle group includes: headquarters, 3rd battery of the 521st anti-tank battalion, 1st company of the 3rd motorized regiment - now commanded by lieutenant Lohse (T.oy\$e) - 1st company 1-reconnaissance battalion, 6th battery of the 75th artillery regiment, two R-P tanks of the 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment, two light anti-aircraft guns and one platoon of the 3rd company of the 39th engineer battalion.

Before dusk, the battle group set out from Romen, trampled on the weak Russian positions in the first acceleration and went 45 km to the south on a platoon! Near Mlyn, opposite Lohvitsa, at 21.15 the advance detachment reached the undamaged bridge over the Sula and thus cut off the Soviets' opportunity to withdraw beyond the Sula. Oberleutnant Lingk (3rd Battery of the 521st Fighter

| Belov P.A. Moscow is behind us. M.: Military Publishing House, 1963. S. 26.

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anti-tank battalion) was mentioned for this action in "Ergepya" (!. Lieutenant Melgoff (Moipoy) strikes with his sappers at the Stalin station, where he shoots 10 trucks. The enemy, having assessed the situation, did his best to drive away from crossing this weak German group. At night, in general, the Russians behaved calmly.

The Germans, in front of the lines of the 3rd airborne division of the 227th rifle division, also behaved calmly, but the data available to the Southwestern Front about the situation in Romny were very sketchy:

"The armies of the South-Western Front fought throughout the day in the Romensky, Koze Letsky and Kremenchug directions. The front was broken through by a mech by an enemy group in the Romen direction.

The enemy, having captured Romny, is spreading in tank groups to the south-southeast. On the front of the 38th Army, the enemy, having broken through the front of the 297th Rifle Division, is developing an offensive in the direction of Globino.

1. 40th Army.

Guderian's mechanized group (3rd, 4th and 10th md) continues to develop success in the south direction, while the enemy continues to concentrate mechanical units in the Glukhov, Putivl area, threatening to bypass the army's weakly covered right flank in the direction of Vorozhba and Sumy. The actions of the mechanized group against the nickname are supported by massive bomber aircraft.

During 12.9, according to reports from various sources (local authorities, VOSO and NKVD bodies), the enemy is spreading from Romna in small tank groups

south and east.

The 40th Army, from the moment the breakthrough formed, was divided into two parts. The position of the army units:

The detachment of Major General Chesnov (1500 people) holds the line along the southern bank of the river. Seim at the front of Tetkino, Glushets,

* "Evgelyai" - "The List of Honor of the German Army", in which the names of especially distinguished servicemen were entered, was established on the initiative of Brauchitsch in 1940. Since 1944, the figurants of the sheet were given special metal signs - a swastika in an oak wreath on the bow of the Iron Cross.

2? Sezsysme 4er 3. Rapheg-Omyup. Velt-BranbigE 1935-1945.

Negaizrerebebe vat Tgadiyupzuegfapa deg O\$yuop. Vest: Uetsav deg VisNpapd pia Soteg Vasme, 1967. \$. 177.

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Vshivka. Putivl is occupied by the enemy with a force of up to 50 tanks and infantry firebox.

293rd Rifle Division (150 men, 6 guns) defends the Vshivka-Nechaevka line.

Zvdk (1600 people) with 21 popes of the RGK defends the line of Khizhki, Zheldaki, Bondari. In front of the front, the enemy does not show activity.

227th Rifle Division (650 men, 23 guns) with 738th anti-tank artillery regiment of the RGK defends Bondari, Vyazovaya. The enemy in front of the front is also passive.

10 td! (11 tanks and 4 armored vehicles) with 5 ptabr had the task of advancing on the rear of the enemy in the direction of Romny. According to the report of the VOSO authorities, 10 tdv 11.00 12.9 Art. Ru bank, where, having connected with the 17th railway brigade of comrade. Orlova, continued to move towards Romny. (Data needs verification.) Communication with 10 tds 11.9 is lost.

2nd Airborne Forces defended at the line of Bakhmach TsP, Gorodishche, Palchiki. Since September 11, the army headquarters has no connection with the corps.

According to the report of the commander-40, parts of the army are having difficulty transporting ammunition and food.

The army is threatened by a bypass of the right flank by the enemy in the direction of Rylsk and Vorozhba.

Shtarm 40 - Belopolye.

September 13th. "As fast as possible - hit Lokhvitsa." "At night, in general, the Russians behaved calmly," the scribes of the 3rd Rapger-OtmYaop continue their story about the capture of Lokhvitsa. "But as the day began, they increased their pressure so much that Major Frank was forced to request urgent support by radio from the division. During the first half of the day, the division formed a battle group, which should rescue Frank's advance detachment and, moreover, even break through to Lokhvitsa. Oberst Lieutenant von Lewinsky was authorized to lead this group. The following military units took up their starting position in Romny: 3rd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment, with three R-P tanks added to it from the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment, 1st Battery of the 521st

1 After Konotop, the 10th Panzer Division and the 2nd Airborne Corps were cut off from the rest of the troops and the headquarters of the 40th Army.

2 Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0147 by 22 hours

September 12, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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anti-tank battalion, 1st company of the 394th motorized regiment, 2nd and 3rd companies of the 3rd motorized regiment, 4th battery of the 75th artillery regiment, 3rd company of the 39th engineer battalion and one quad anti-aircraft installation of the 6th battery of the 59th anti-aircraft regiment. Around 1300, reconnaissance aircraft reported that they were observing large enemy armored vehicles approaching our forward detachment. The pace of the battle group's march was immediately accelerated. The roads were already dry, so traffic was uninterrupted. As soon as the lead vehicles of Oberst Lieutenant von Lewinsky approached Mlyn!, the German "pieces" struck at a suitable enemy armored formation (most likely it was Semenchenko's 10th tank division and Orlov's 17th railway brigade. - Auth.). Around 16.00 our tanks and armored companies entered Mlyn and connected with the forward detachment.

The meeting between Oberst Lieutenant von Lewinsky and Major Frank took place in a local church. After a short discussion, both commanders came to a common decision: not to wait for the riflemen and artillerymen to move up slowly, but as quickly as possible - to hit Lohvitsa with all available forces. This decision was immediately notified to all commanders and chiefs. And soon after that, the tank, anti-tank and both armored companies were ready to move. Ignoring the danger, tankers, tank destroyers and gunners jumped out onto a long dam and reached all three bridges across the Sula south of Mlyn before the enemy realized the danger approaching him. German soldiers captured the bridges intact!

Now the Russians, from Lohvitsa, located just 1,600 meters away, open heavy fire on the newly captured bridgeheads. Especially dangerous fire comes from heavy anti-aircraft guns. However, major losses were avoided. Enemy guns took every single vehicle under fire, but could not prevent our soldiers from winning the southern bank of the Sula, cut by gullies.

Here, the terrain already made it possible to shelter vehicles. The rapid pace of advance led to the mixing of companies. The officers quickly put things in order, and the offensive continued. The closer the troops approached Lohvitsa

1 Mlyn is located 40 km south of Romen and only 2 km north of Lohvitsa.

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Yes, the more terrible was the enemy fire. Own tanks stop, shoot, rush again

ed; they are well supported by the self-propelled guns of both anti-tank companies. Thus, fighting for every meter, our forces reach the city. The eastern part of Lohvitsa was reached at about 17.00. But the enemy does not retreat, his resistance to attacking vehicles becomes even stronger.

. tougher. Machine guns are hammering from all sides and mortars are yapping, but the distinct voice of our guns is also heard! Half an hour later this part of the city was cleared of the enemy.

Just when the enemy has withdrawn, the first platoons of the 11th battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment arrive. Shooters are tasked with clearing buildings of enemy groups. The Russians are still holding out in the city and have anti-tank, anti-aircraft and infantry artillery in their positions. Our groups are unable to get out of the intersection in the center of the village. The enemy hit tanks and armored personnel carriers from a short distance. Since it was getting dark quickly, no one knew what was going on around him.

Around 1900 Oberst Lieutenant von Lewinsky withdrew his combat vehicles from Lohvitsa and ordered them to take up defensive positions in the ravines on the outskirts of the city. Only the arrows of Major Velmann (\\eltapp) remained in contact with the enemy and defended the captured areas of the city from his harsh attacks.

Far behind this advanced battle group, in the Romen area, were the main body of the 3rd Panzer Division. The defense of the division's concentration area was carried out by the 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment. In carrying out this task, Lieutenant Ruhl (B aB) with three R-Sh tanks and three armored personnel carriers set off early in the morning in the direction of Gavrilovka, as aviation had discovered enemy tanks here. However, it did not come to any contact with the enemy, so that the sappers could calmly set up a minefield in order to protect Romny from unpleasant surprises from this side. th

The operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front of September 13 reports on

TU of "our" guns - the voice is always "distinct", and that of "enemy" ones - it always "yapps" ...

2 Money Sezsysme 3. Rapgeg-R/Mzyup. Veĭ-Britmander 1935-1945. Negaizreverep ut Tgadiyuopzuetfapa 4er Vgyayuop. Veit: UePav deg Vispvapail Sashcheg Esmeg, 1967. 5. 178.

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the exit of the enemy's motorized parts to the communications of all the armies of the front. The situation in the offensive area of the 3rd Panzer Division was assessed as follows:

"1. 40th Army - during the day, no data was received on the position and combat operations of the units. |

2. 21st Army. According to the report of the commander of 21A, units of 3 kk, advancing in the direction of Bakhmach, Konotop, connected with units of 40A.
"... 1

In the same report, it is reported that the reserve of the front "289 sd - arrived in the Piryatin region of the 4th echelon, 1 is on the way, 2 is being loaded by Zolotonosha and rolling stock has been delivered for the remaining two. 7 honey on the march to the Priluki region. Priluki is the location of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. The headquarters of the front will move to Piriatin in three days. From here he will go to his death ...

As can be seen from this report, units of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, obviously those that were called a cavalry group in previous operational reports, joined up with the 40th Army. However, we are not talking about the fact that the 21st united with the 40th Army and the common front was thus restored.

The situation with the breakthrough of the 3rd KK through the offensive lines of the 3rd Panzer Division and other formations of the 24th Corps is not entirely clear. It looks like the cavalry broke through earlier than they should have. During the negotiations between Shaposhnikov and Timoshenko, who arrived to replace Budyonny as Commander-in-Chief of the YuZN, Timoshenko informed the Chief of Staff of the Young Staff that:

"The situation is developing for the worse ... Kirponos subjugated the Kuznetsov cavalry group, reinforces this group with two redeployed rifle divisions with the task of striking in the direction of Sambir."

The direction to Sambir is the direction to connect with the units of the 40th army located near Konotop. In battle, at the disposal of the headquarters of the South-Western Front on September 13, the commander of the 21st Army V.I. Kuznetsov was ordered: "To close the breakthrough at the junction of your army with the 40th army of the 21st army,

} Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0149 by 22 o'clock on September 13, 1941 of the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

th Negotiations of the Chief of the General Staff with the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction of September 13, 1941 on the situation in front of the front of the troops of the South-Western direction. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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ra 14.9 attack the enemy with the forces of 2 airborne troops, a cavalry group and at least one rifle division in the direction of M. Sambir, Saltykovo! However, as we already know, the cavalymen broke through on September 13 without the two divisions being transferred here from the Dnieper - the 289th and 7th.

On this day, the Southwestern Front paid special attention to the redeployment of troops to the headquarters areas and the organization of the rear:

- The 7th motorized rifle division of the 26th army was ordered: upon arrival in Priluki, take up defense with a front to the northeast between Kolesniki and Borshna ?;

- The 289th rifle division of the 26th army was supposed to

having concentrated in the Pyryatin area, take up defense at the line of Mitchenko, Kharkovtsy, Deymanovka, Velikaya Krucha with the front to the northeast and east³;

- from the Military Councils of the armies, "in connection with the breakthrough of the enemy's motorized mechanized units in the direction of Romny from the north and in the direction of Khorol from the south", it was required "by cruel measures to bring and maintain order in the rear institutions and bodies and to establish the uninterrupted functioning of the rear as a whole ... Do not allow the deployment of rear establishments beyond the demarcation lines of the armies ... Organize reliable protection both from the air and from the ground of all rear establishments and the entire rear as a whole "4.

September 14th. "Tank weather": cleaning Lohvitsa and throwing to Lubny. "A new day, September 14, brought a clear morning and sunny weather," write the Germans. - The morning one has not yet descended

1 Combat order of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 00422 dated September 13, 1941 to the commander of the troops of the 21st Army to eliminate the breakthrough between the 40th and 21st armies. SBD WWII. T. 40.

? Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00426 dated September 13, 1941 to the commander of the 26th Army to concentrate the 7th motorized rifle divisions in the area of Kolesniki, Priluki, Ladan. SBD VOV.T. 40.

3 Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00425 dated September 13, 1941 to the commander of the 26th Army to occupy the 289th Infantry Defense Division at the line of Mitchenki, Kharkovtsy, Deimanovka, Velikaya Krucha with the front to the northeast, east. SBD VOV.T. 40.

4 Operational Directive of the Military Council of the South-Western Front No. 00427 of September 13, 1941 on the organization in the functioning of army rear services and institutions. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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man from Sula, as the battle in Lohvitsa was resumed. Mayor Velmann, who could only let his riflemen sleep for a short time, now, throughout the day, had to clean the city. Both of his companies and the combat vehicles of the 3rd battalion of the 6th tank regiment allocated for this at about 0500 began attacks on known Russian pockets of resistance. What was not possible yesterday, has been achieved today. 3rd company of the 3rd motorized regiment under the command of

Hauptmann Peshke (RezsVKe) unexpectedly quickly stormed the city and captured the large northern bridge with a sudden raid! To the surprise of the German soldiers, 200 meters opposite, wheel by wheel, stood six unguarded heavy anti-aircraft guns. Shooters shouting "Hurrah!" rushed to the cannons and pulled the still sleeping Russians out from under their blankets! So quickly, on this truly sunny day, the undertaking to clear Lokhvitsa from the enemy ends. Combat vehicles of the 3rd battalion of the 6th tank regiment enter the city without hindrance at 10.30!

The 1st battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment passes along the bridge and with its 3rd company occupies the heights in front of Yashniki in the north of Lokhvitsa, at this time the 2nd company is fixed to the west of the city on the heights near Kharkovtsev. The 3rd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment is located in the southern part of Lokhvitsa and crosses the koborone. The remaining elements of the forward detachment are distributed in different directions in order to reserve Lokhvitsa for the Oberst Kleemann battle group, which, with the 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment and the 2nd battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment, arrives in the city around 10.20.

At the same time, the division orders the 6th Panzer Regiment to form a combat-ready patrol group, which should immediately strike further south and establish contact with the vanguard of the 16th Panzer Division, which had taken Lubny the day before?. Oberleutnant Wartmann (MaiVtapp), commanding officer of the 9th company of the 6th tank regiment, was authorized to carry out this enterprise. Only one R-Sh tank is at his disposal, the command vehicle of the regiment commander

1 Yashniki and Kharkovtsy are located 2 km from Lokhvitsa. Another Kharkovites are located near Pyriatyn. On September 13, the 16th Panzer Division Hube (1st Panzer Group Kleista) approached Lubny. Fighting in the city took place on 13 and 14 September. Between Lubny and Lokhvitsa - about 40 km.

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with a radio station and a small armored personnel carrier. Since the supply columns have not yet arrived, the required amount of fuel is drained from other vehicles. The patrol group totals 45 men, including Lieutenants Wartmann, commander of the 3rd company of the 6th Panzer Regiment Müller Gauf (Majeg-Natz), and war correspondent Huizinga (Neuzt?), who will survive this trip in a tank commander. Thus began that short episode in the history of the 3rd Panzer Division, which really proved the courage of the German armored forces in the summer of 1941. The now launched enterprise marked the end of one of the biggest encirclement battles in history!!

At the appointed time, the combat units set out on a campaign. Oberleutnant Müller-Gauff (Meg-NaiYY) is at the head of the group. The weather is sunny and clear, the roads are firm, and only

only in a few places do they pass near swampy areas. The correct weather - "rider's weather", or "tank weather" - appeared to us this Sunday. Soon the tanks and armored vehicles would pass the very front line of defense of Frank's advance detachment in the area of Iskovpy-Senchanskies and begin their journey across the wide, slightly hilly Ukrainian expanses, with the enemy lurking no one knows where and with what forces. Communication with the division can only be maintained by DIO radar. |

After 3 hours of march, the first village appears, which is left on the left. A Russian transport convoy appears on the road. As German vehicles approach, the Soviets abandon their wagons and flee into nearby sunflower fields. Enemy trucks cross the road behind the height. Machine guns spoke again. And then things go as in Lützow's Wild Hunt. The Soviets reappear. This time it is a huge column of batteries, convoys, construction battalions, limbers, wagons and tractors. There were also horse Cossacks and two tanks. Machine guns fired again. Firing on the move, our tanks crashed into the middle of this stream at high speed.

Oberleutnant Wartmann and his soldiers know only one thing: forward! His detachment is rolling further and further - along the hollows, with marshy lowlands, forests, fields and fragile wooden

| Sezsysme 4er 3. Rapheg-Omyup. Veith-Vgaepbige 1935-1945. Negaizzzebene wat Tma@yuopzuetapYa 4er P!\$1op. Weisht: Wayav a4er WisnNapashir Someg Allge, 1967, 5, 179.

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bridges. Close to Tishek! the column is crossing the Sula, and at the same time half of the road has been passed! Suddenly, radio communication with the division is cut off. But when the cars climbed up from the ravine, the connection resumed again. And far behind, in Romny, General Model and Major of the General Staff Pomtov will breathe a sigh of relief when they hear: "At 16.02 Luka is on you."2

For a long time the sun has become red-golden. The battle group came to a halt between a flat hill and stalks of bread. Through binoculars, the soldiers looked at the silhouette of the city, which stood out well against the evening sky. Clouds of smoke and burning hovered over the houses, artillery shots rumbled, machine guns crackled. Without a doubt, a few kilometers away, behind the Russian front, the shock detachment of Army Group South is fighting!

"Tanks ahead!" orders Oberleutnant Wartmann. The battle group sets in motion, goes around the ravine, shoots at the Russians who suddenly appear from the darkness, who scatter in fright. A stream interferes with progress, and the cars look for a place to cross it. Finally, the bridge is found. R-Sh of the chief lieutenant drives up to the bridge, but it is blown up. All of a sudden, some gray figures jump out, smeared with clay, overgrown with bristles, and wave, wave. These are the soldiers of the 2nd

companies of the 16th engineer battalion of the 16th tank division! The time is exactly 18.20.

The soldiers indicate the place where you can cross the stream. Oberleutnant Wartmann crosses it with his cars and turns towards Lubny. After a short time, he makes himself known to Major General Hube. And soon the tank of the 3rd Panzer Division with the capital letter "G" (Guderian) on its steel side stood next to the tank, on the side of which was the letter "K" (Kleist). The spearheads of both army groups closed! The Kyiv cauldron is closed!

The 3rd Panzer Division rallied its forces more closely during the day at Lokhvitsa, as it was sure that in such circumstances the Soviets would try to break out of the encirclement to the east?

1 Tishki is a village on the Udai River, near its confluence with the Sula. 2 Luki is a village 1.5 km south of Tishek, 9 km northeast of Luben.

3 Sezsysme er 3. Rapaeg-Omyup. Veit-Var4enbige 1935-1945. Negaizvereep wat Tgalyupzuetbapa eg Olm\$yup. Veit: Wayav 4er Wisnrapipe Someg Vsme, 1967. 5. 180.

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The city was surrounded on all sides by a strong enemy. To alleviate the situation a little, the sappers of the 39th sapper battalion are trying to advance on Luki in order to blow up the bridges over the Sula. This attempt was abandoned due to the presence of significant enemy forces. On the contrary, the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment achieved significant success in the afternoon while conducting reconnaissance in force in the direction of Stepakov!. Combat vehicles, having run into superior Russian tank forces, knocked out 3 tanks and one armored vehicle of the enemy, while losing one of their combat vehicles. The 3rd company of the 3rd motorized regiment for the protection of the battalion took up positions on the heights in front of this settlement.

On this day, the command of the Southwestern Front focused on solving several tasks.

The main thing, apparently, was considered to punch a hole to the east. The direction of the strikes of the 21st Army from the west and the 40th Army from the east was the Maly Sambor-Kokhanovka line. Maly Sambor is located 15 km southwest of Konotop, Kokhanovka is 8 km southeast of Konotop. The space between these settlements (20 km) was controlled by patrol groups of the 3rd Panzer Division - a strategically important road for the 3rd Panzer Division passed from Konotop to Romny and Lokhvitsa. If the 21st and 40th armies had managed to link up in this area, the Germans would have lost fuel and ammunition. And, on the contrary, on passing here with

east to west railroad could quickly bring reserves to the South-Western Front from the mainland - from Vorozhba and Sumy.

"To the right of the 40th Army, defending with the main forces on the occupied line of the river. The Seim, with its left flank on 14.9, strikes in the general direction of Kokhanovka, M. Sambur ... Take the 21st Army for defense and firmly hold the line of Grigorovka, Martynovka, Bilmachevka and further along the southern bank of the river. Oster, Krasny, Pechi, simultaneously fulfilling the task set on 14.9 by my directive of [3.9 No. 00422 (on the offensive

Obviously, Stepuki is a village 10 km northeast of Lokhvitsa. There could be units of the 21st Army and the remnants of the 10th Panzer Division of the 40th Army.

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on M. Sambor. - Auth.). Pay special attention to ensuring the right flank, allocating the necessary reserve for this! ", Kirponos ordered the 21st Army.

A similar order was given that day to Commander-40 Podlas:

"To the left, the 21st Army goes on the defensive at the line of Grigorovka, Bilmachevka, Krasny, Pechi, while the right flank continues to advance in the direction of M. Sambur ... The 40th Army, continuing to hold the occupied line of st. Tet cinema and further along the southern bank of the river. Seim to Zheldaki, Bondari, Vyazovoe, with its left flank go on the offensive in the general direction of Kokhanovka, M. Sambur, in order to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the gap between the 40th and 21st armies "2.

In the light of the memoirs of the chief of staff of the 6th airborne brigade of the 3rd airborne corps, who claims that from September 11 to 19 the corps was surrounded, and until September 17 had no connection with either the front or with his 40th army, it becomes unclear who could actually carry out the order of Kirponos. After all, if the units located east of Konotop were not replenished, then Lagutin's 293rd Rifle Division had only 150 people with 6 guns, while the 227th Rifle Division after the German breakthrough near Konotop had 650 people and 23 guns ... As for 3 th Airborne Forces, then on September 14 it was attacked by the Germans moving from the east, from the direction of Putivl (perhaps, the Great Germany Regiment or other parts of the 46th Panzer Corps). In the battle of the village of Kazatskoye, on the outskirts of the Lizogub forest, the 3rd Airborne Corps lost its last 8 tanks from the corps tank battalion of Major Krasovsky. On September 15, the corps commander colonel I.I. Zatevakhin ordered to strike at the communications of the Germans south of Konotop, just in the direction of Kokhanovka. However, judging by the story of I.A. Samchuk, they managed to defeat only the garrisons in the villages along the southern edge of the Lizogub

Combat order of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 00429 dated September 14, 1941 to the commander of the troops of the 21st Army To hold the Grigorovka, Bilmachevka, Pechi line. SBD VOV.T. 40.

Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00433 dated September 14, 1941 to the commander of the 40th Army for an offensive in the direction of Kokhanovka, M. Sambor. SBD VOV.T. 40.

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sa...! When this corps broke through from the encirclement in the direction to the east and southeast, the lead detachment of the 3rd Airborne Forces alone had 50 vehicles, there was also artillery in the corps. Having passed with continuous battles along the rear of the enemy for 90 km, the paratroopers went to their own. In other words, if the 3rd Airborne Command could take part in the offensive of the left wing of the 40th Army in the direction of Maly Sambor, then the probability of joining with the 21st Army would be high.

In the morning operational report of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on September 14, it was reported:

40th Army. According to fragmentary data received by radio, units of the army (Chesnov's detachment, 3rd Airborne Division, remnants of 293rd and 227th Rifle Divisions) fought on the same lines on 13.9. With 10 TD and 2 VDK communications doesn't have...

...38 army. Within 3 days, 38 from the sharm do not arrive until they are carried.

The next concern of the Southwestern Front, after securing the joints of the 40th, 21st, 5th and 37th armies, was to cover the headquarters.

The area, where the headquarters of the South-Western Front would soon be transferred, was to be defended by the 289th Rifle Division, which was subordinate to the 183rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment, a battalion of anti-aircraft machine guns and a battalion of MZA from the 3rd Air Defense Division? Z. When organizing the defense, special attention was paid to covering the eastern and southeastern approaches to Piryatin. It was in these directions that the 3rd Panzer Division of the Model was located.

On September 14, the tasks of the 289th Infantry Division were specified:

"[. The enemy, breaking through with large motorized units from the Konotop direction, captured Romny. Simultaneously

Samchuk I.A. Decree. op. S. 141.

2 Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0150 by 10 o'clock on September 14, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40. On September 12, at the site of the 38th Army, in the Kremenchug region, the Kleist tank group broke through the front and went towards Guderian's group.

3 Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00430 dated September 13, 1941 to the commander of the 289th rifle division for the defense of the Piryatin district. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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in the Kremenchug direction, breaking through the front of the 297th rifle division, mi crayons! Panzer units are spreading in a northerly direction, with advanced units in the Lubna area.

2. More to the left of 7 Motor Rifle Division 14.9 will occupy the Ladan, Borsh on, Kolesniki line for defense with a front to the east and northeast.

3. 289th Rifle Division, having occupied the line of Kru Cha, Deymanovka, Kaplintsy, Mechenki with the main forces for defense, part of the forces to cover the directions to the station. Grebenka2?, having taken the Aleksandrovka junction line for defense.

Pay special attention to covering all roads and under the mortars leading to Piryatin and Grebenka from the northeast, east-southeast, and establishing communication with the garrison of the city of Lubny "3.

A terrible, but not yet final, result of the day is contained in the Combat Report of M.P. Kirponos to the General Staff of the Red Army:

"... 40th and 38th armies - no reports were received. The planes did not return.

... 2Rarmiya does not have a stabilized front and retreats under strong enemy pressure ... The position of the cavalry group and 10 TD is being clarified ...

... the 5th Army ... Army units are extremely small (GVDK - 50 people) ...

...6. 289th Rifle Division occupied for defense the line of the Alexandrovka, Krucha, Deymanovka, Kharkovtsy, (claim) Sosnovka junction. Shtadiv - Piryatin.

The 7th Motor Rifle Division entered the Priluki area with two regiments to occupy the line of defense of Ladan, Borshna, Kolesniki. Stadiv - With bows ...

... During the day, the enemy continued to pull up new large reserves (columns of motorized mechanized units from 100 to 300 vehicles with tanks) in the Konotop, Kremenchug directions, as well as on the open flanks of the 5th Army.

... The front switched to fighting in conditions of encirclement and complete

| Everything was the other way around, Guderian, near Lubny, asked Kleist for help, motivating her by the fact that there was no more tank Kov left in the 3rd Panzer Division ...

There was an airfield in Grebenok, and a railway went through it. Lubny - Kyiv, Where the 37th army of A.A. was defending. Vlasov.

3 Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00431 dated September 14, 1941 to the commander of the 289th Infantry Division for the defense of the line of Krucha, Deimanovka, Kaplindy, Mechenki. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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intersections of communications. I am moving the command post to Kyiv, as the only point from where it is possible to command troops. I ask you to prepare the necessary measures to supply the armies of the front with ammunition by air.

Commander of the SWF Troops, Colonel-General Kirponos Member of the Military Council of the SWF Burmistenko

Member of the Military Council of the SWF Divisional Commissar Rykov
Chief of Staff of the SWF Major General Tupikov.

Guderian, on this tragic day for the Southwestern Front, visited Romny, Lokhvitsa and Model's 3rd Panzer Division:

"I continued my journey and drove into the city of Romny, through the streets of which festively dressed crowds of local residents were peacefully walking. After Pochep and Konotop, Romny was the most well-organized Russian city that I have ever been to. With the onset of darkness, I was already in Lokhvitsa at the Model. By this time, he managed to pull up here only one regiment from his division; the remaining parts of the division, due to the poor condition of the roads, were still far away. Model reported to me that large concentrations of Russians consisted mainly of rear units. Only individual units had sufficient combat equipment. The tanks available to the Russians, apparently, were assembled in the rear workshops and had the task of covering the retreat. In a huge cauldron in the Kyiv region, obviously, there remained units of five Russian armies - 21st, 5th, 37th, 26th and 38th.

September 15th. "The Kyiv boiler is completely closed!" "On September 15, the 3rd Panzer Division continued to lock Loch Witz. Here, in a large private house, Lieutenant-General Model equipped his command post. On this day, the rank and file of the propaganda company of Army Group Center arrived here,

to capture in words and images the historical

1 Combat Report No. 00435 of September 14, 1941, from the Commander of the South-Western Front to the General Staff of the Red Army on the position of the troops of the front. SBD VOV.T. 40.

2Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999, p. 295. Guderian did not name the 40th army, parts of which, the 10th division of the 2nd airborne division, also found themselves surrounded.

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existence is the meeting of the vanguards of the two army groups. They were cameraman Bashtanir (Vamasheg), who was filming for a film magazine, photographer Khabedank (NabeChapK) from the Wehrmacht magazine, and Fritz Luke (Epe Easke), columnist for the Berlin Local Bulletin. The latter later became the author of the only book so far about the 3rd Panzer Division: "Armored Wedge in the East"!, tells us the history of the 3rd Division ...

Here, in order to find out who the German military journalists were and how the soldiers and officers of the German combat units treated them, we will slightly break away from the history of the Model division and fast forward a few years, near Narva, to the location of the 502nd heavy tank battalion - battle she "Tigers". However, we will not part with the Model itself.

"I couldn't believe my eyes when Field Marshal Model jumped out of the car," recalled the commander of the Tigers unit, Otto Carius. - The High Command ordered Model, as they always did in hopeless situations, to go to the Northern Front to restore order. I reported what was required of me, and then a storm broke over me, the like of which you rarely see! Model's eyebrows twitched. I've seen this before on the Central Front. I was not even allowed to explain anything or say anything in response ... As for Field Marshal Model personally, he did not allow any compromises, but was indulgent towards the front-line soldiers, who adored him. For himself, he demanded nothing."

Otto Carius called one of the chapters of his book "Truth or Fiction?".

"One morning, a car from the radio broadcasting department of the propaganda company unexpectedly arrived at our place," he describes his meeting with journalists Otto Carius. - The mission of these people was to record how the defensive battles went on March 17th. It was supposed to pass as an "original recording" from the scene, made on a wax soundtrack ... I had to imitate the work of radio communications and give orders, as I did it at the entrance for a reason ... In certain places, the propagandist gave his own, a description of events prompted by his fantasy. In a realistic manner, he depicted how tanks burn, how they fire, how they get hit and how

. No.: original: "Pe\eyppas V," VeSteg GoKa|apge {veg5" and "PapegegKe! it Ozep".

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around the atmosphere of an open hell reigns. The second entry was finally met with approval... On the whole, we didn't like these propagandists. But at the same time, one cannot but admit that among them were amazing guys who were responsible for their work and, moreover, were good soldiers. But the exception proves the rule... A few days later we heard a propaganda report on a regular radio broadcast and were amazed at how good the noise of the battle had been edited in Berlin. We could hardly distinguish our voices because of the roar of shots, and for this reason we roared with laughter. After that, we never took reports from the front seriously!

"Major Baron von Ber (Vevg), commander of the 39th communications battalion, was appointed commandant of Lokhvitsa, Prince Mirsky was appointed translator. Along with all the military and administrative work, Major von Behr, on the very first day of his new activity, organized a canteen where the soldiers could eat without compensation - we continue to study the history of the 3rd Panzer Division. - Already on September 15, the following menu was offered: white cabbage soup with goulash and chopped tomatoes, compote and a pie!

Major Frank with his tank destroyers and other parts of his battle group defended the city from the southeast. He deployed his command post in Iskovtsy-Senchansky. Tank destroyers and skirmishers had to be very vigilant, because Russian groups from the north and west tried again and again to break through in this area. When one of these groups was stopped, were the quartermasters of the 21st Bolshevik Army among the prisoners? Shortly before noon, clouds of dust from moving tanks appeared in the east. The anti-tankers were already aiming at them, when suddenly white rockets soared into the air. The arrows of the 1st company of the 394th motorized regiment, located here, got up and ran towards the tanks. These were the lead vehicles of the 33rd Panzer Regiment (East Brandenburg) of the 9th Panzer Division, Lieutenant General Ritter von Hubitzki (EV shegu. Niysyu)). This division at 0745 took the bridges across the Sulu at Sencha. And when

1 Karius O. "Tigers" in the mud ": Memoirs of a German tanker. M.: CJSC "Tsentrpoligraf". S. 136. .

2In the original - "...4er 2. Piepdapeigtae deg 21. Bo|5sNem5i5sNep Appee".

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a young tanker, chief lieutenant, appeared before Frank - the Kiev cauldron was completely closed !!

Meanwhile, the 3rd Motorized Regiment (Oberst von Manthoyfell) expanded its security area to the north and east. At the same time, the 2nd company of the 3rd motorized regiment occupied the bridges near Yashnikov?. Own positions were extended to the northwest. Meanwhile, the 394th Motorized Regiment, which was moving between the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, set off in the direction of Pryluky.

The 1st reconnaissance battalion (Hauptmann Zirfogel) presses on the enemy at the eastern edge of Chernukh3. However, the Russians dodge and try to break through in the direction of Zhdany. The division sends by radio the companies of the 3rd motorcycle battalion (Major Pape) under its command, which can intercept these enemy forces. When, at about 1300, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment (Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski) also intervenes, the Russians finally retreat to Melekhi.

Small patrol and strike groups of all the assigned units of the division travel that day in all directions in order to follow the movement of the enemy and protect the division from unpleasant surprises. During this undertaking, Oberfeldwebel Kretschmar (Kgesli tag), head of the department of administration (communications) of the 1st company of the 3rd motorized regiment, managed to meet with a group of non-commissioned officer Baudein (Vatsdet) from the 16th reconnaissance battalion 16 th Panzer Division. Thus, a third solid connection was established on the eastern edge of this large Kyiv pocket!

The night passed relatively calmly, except for the fires, which flared up more and more in the west.

| The Piryatinsky group of the South-Western Front, led by Kirponos, was just trying to break through in the direction of Iskovtsy and Sencha, in fact, through the lines of the mobile defense of two German tank divisions.

2In the original - Lazs K. 10 km northeast of Lokhvitsa is the village of Yakhniki, and 3 km north of Lokhvitsa is the village of Yashniki.

3 The village of Chernukhi is located 30 km east of Pryatin, the village of Zhda NY is 20 km east of Chernukh. Between them is the village of Melekhi. In the direction of Pryatin - Chernukhi - Melekhi - Zhlan - Sencha, units of the 5th Army tried to break through, and later - the headquarters of the South-Western Front and the 5th Army.

3 Sezsysme 4er 3. Rapeg-GUMyup. Ve! t-Vgapdepbig 1935-1945.

egaizrevebept wat Tgad!Shuoplzuefapa 4er Om\$yuop. Veit: Wayav 4eg

Visppapashlya Swieg Vse, 1967. 5. 181.

On this significant day for the Germans, Guderian continued to be in Lokhvitsa and its environs:

"I spent the night ... in the school building in Lokhvitsa ... The school was in a solid building and was well equipped, like all schools in Soviet Russia, which were almost everywhere in good condition. A lot has been done for schools, hospitals, orphanages and sports grounds in Russia. These institutions were kept clean and in perfect order.

Early on the morning of September 15, I visited the advance detachment of the 3rd Panzer Division, commanded by Major Frank; the day before, this detachment pushed back the Russians in the area of Lokhvitsa to the west and during the night captured the enemy infantry, which was advancing in 15 vehicles. From the observation post of Major Frank, located near Lubna, the area was very well visible, and it was possible to observe the movement of Russian transport columns from west to east. However, this movement soon- re us was suspended. In the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Motor Rifle Regiment, I met Model, who reported to me his plan for further actions. In conclusion, I visited a number of units of the 3rd Panzer Division and talked with the commander of the 6th Panzer Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Münzel. On this day, Münzel had at his disposal only one T-TU tank, three T-PSh tanks and six T-P tanks; thus, the regiment had only ten tanks. This figure gives the most visual representation of how much the troops needed to rest and put in order. These figures also testify to the fact that our brave soldiers did everything in their power to fulfill the task assigned to them!

Perhaps the most realistic assessment of the quantitative forces of the enemy was given by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, who, in a conversation with M.P. Kirponos. back on September 11, said that in the columns and accumulation of tanks discovered by aerial reconnaissance north of Romen, there were no more than thirty or forty tanks themselves. Such a number of tanks could only be in both tank divisions of the 24th army (motorized) corps - in the 3rd and 4th.

Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 296.

s Negotiations B.M. Shaposhnikov and M.P. Kirponos on the night of September 11 are given in the book: Isaev A.V. Boilers of the 41st. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know. Moscow: Yauza; Eksmo, 2005, p. 161.

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16 of September. "The number of captives is growing hourly." "September 16 at about 05.00 Russian 169th Infantry Regiment! suddenly pressed on the rear guard line passing in the Romen area. Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalsky, having collected his tanks, moved towards the Russians. Later the battalion attacked and

in the afternoon he occupied Melekhi, where the arrows-motorcyclists of the 3rd motorcycle battalion took up the defense. The 10th company of the 6th tank regiment withdrew and departed through Voronki to the north to help the 1st reconnaissance battalion, which was attacked by superior enemy forces.

Rifle brigade? with both regiments organizes enhanced reconnaissance in a westerly direction. At the same time, the 3rd Motorized Regiment maintains contact with the 4th Panzer Division on the right, while the 394th Motorized Regiment remains in the area east of Piryatin. The number of captives is growing hourly; many Russians surrender voluntarily, others only after a fierce struggle. The 1st battalion set up a place for collecting prisoners in Lokhvitsa, where it was registered: in the morning - 400, in the evening - already 2000 prisoners "3," the 3rd tank began counting the "trophies".

On the same day, on the morning of September 16, the commander-in-chief of the southwestern direction, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, whose headquarters was near Poltava, summoned I.Kh. Bagramyan. In the presence of a member of the Military Council of the YuZN N.S. Khrushchev, Timoshenko ordered Bagramyan to break through on a high-speed bomber to Piryatin and give Kirponos an oral order to withdraw. When exactly, on the 16th or 17th, Bagramyan flew to the headquarters of the South-Western Front and transmitted this order, not sanctioned by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, is not entirely clear.

1 What kind of regiment, we could not find out. The 86th Rifle Division of the Western Front at the beginning of the war included the 169th Rifle Division. Theoretically, he could be in the 21st or 13th armies, and therefore on the paths of the Model division.

2 3rd motorized brigade, which included the 3rd and 394th shelves.

3 Sezsyshe 4er 3. Rapgeg-Om15yup. Ve lt-Vtap4depfige 1935-1945. Negaizrevebept wat Tgadi! yuopzuefapYa eg O1mzyup. Weish: Wayar 4er Vislvapashi? Sosheg V syuer, 1967. 5. 182.

I Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. Kyiv: Politizdat Ukraine, 1988. S. 294.

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Baghrmryan himself writes that it was not possible to fly out on the 16th due to bad weather. They flew out the next day - September 17th. However, in the flight book of the crew commander of the 230th high-speed bomber regiment, Pavel Filippovich Simonov, who flew with Bagramyan across the front line and landed at the already mined airfield in Grebenka (12 km south of Piryatin) under fire from Soviet anti-aircraft guns, it says: " September 16, 1941. Flight Poltava - Piryatin. Special mission." Bagramyan himself quotes this entry in the pilot's logbook. About the arrival of Bagramyan in Grebenka on the 16th,

and not on September 17, the commander of the Air Force of the 5th Army,
N.S. Skripko: |

"By the evening of September 16, all aircraft, both serviceable and defective, but capable of taking off, were relocated from the encirclement area to alternate airfields located outside the ring. To check the organization of sending people by air, I arrived at the Grebenka airfield at dusk. .

There was no night launch and no radio communications. The commander of the air base, who was on the airfield, reported that, according to the order received from the headquarters of the Air Force of the front, he had mined the airfield, using high-explosive air bombs for this, and that if there was a real threat of a breakthrough by the Nazis, he was ready to destroy all important objects.

They had not yet laid out a line of fires for a night launch, when an SB bomber plane landed on the airfield. On it arrived from the headquarters of the southwestern direction, Major General I.Kh. Bagramyan with an urgent assignment to the commander of the front!

"We called Bagramyan to the headquarters of the southwestern direction," N.S. wrote in his memoirs. Khrushchev, - they figured out the situation, suggested that he immediately fly to the location of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front to Kirponosui and gave verbal instructions (since he could fall into the hands of the enemy). There were no written documents with him. The instructions were: break through the encirclement!"².

Bagramyan, for unknown reasons, confused the date of departure

¹ Skripko N.S. For targets near and far. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1981. S. 137

r Khrushchev N.S. Time. People. Power: Memoirs. Book. 1. S. 335. 306

(and, accordingly, arrival) to the headquarters of the SWF. Timoshenko showed cowardice, passing the order to Kirponos orally. And Khrushchev, claiming that the order was given orally, "since he could fall into the hands of the enemy," simply lied. Nobody prevented Khrushchev and Timoshenko from transmitting the order or its confirmation by radio. It was on September 16, the day Bagramyan was sent to the encircled headquarters of the SWF, that Timoshenko gave the following orders to Kirponos and the armies of the Southwestern Front:

"Particularly important

On the radio

Commander of the Southwestern Front

Copy: Chief of the General Staff

I see from your reports and inquiries that you have in fact gone over to passive resistance. Until now, you have not created shock groups to fend off enemy breakthroughs.

I order:

1. Create an attack group consisting of at least two or three divisions with artillery for operations in the direction of Romny.

The second group to have the direction of Lubny.

2. To parry an enemy strike from the Kozelets area, use part of the forces from the KiUR defense.

After the defeat of the enemy's Romny grouping and the restoration of the front of the 40th Army, Belov's mobile group, together with the 5th Cavalry corps will be sent to defeat the Kremenchug group.

Timoshenko, Khrushchev, Pokrovsky.

"Owls. secretly

Commanders 40, 38

Commander of the cavalry mechanized group

Commander of the 5th cav. corps

Copy: Chief of the General Staff

Commander of the Southwestern Front

Headquarters YuZN No. 106 09/16/41 20:00 15 minutes.

Card 500 000

Tank and motorized enemy troops, breaking through from the areas of Konotop and Kremenchug, came out rear

. Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the South-Western Direction No. 0369 dated September 16, 1941 to the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front on the creation of shock groups of troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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ty of the Southwestern Front and are trying to advance eastward.

The task of the 40th, 38th armies, the cavalry-mechanized group and the 5th cavalry corps is to actively prevent the encirclement of the troops of the Southwestern Front and prevent the enemy from any advance to the east.

I order:

The 40th Army, consisting of 227th, 293rd Rifle Division, Airborne Forces and detachments of General Chesnov, held the occupied line.

Active actions in the direction of Romny to assist Belov's cavalry-mechanized group.

(...)

Horse-mechanized group! with the 19th air division, continue the offensive in the direction of Romny with the task of destroying the enemy that had broken through from the Konotop region and closing the flanks of the 40th and 2nd armies. Upon completion of the task, be ready to act south in cooperation with the 5th Cavalry Corps

catfish

(2:

Timoshenko, Khrushchev, Pokrovsky?

September 17th. What order to follow while the Germans are building up strength? Tymoshenko's verbal order to withdraw from the South-West Front, which was delivered by Bagramyan to the headquarters of the South-Western Front in Piryatin on the evening of September 17, of course, confused Kirponos. He immediately requested the Headquarters:

"To Comrade Stalin, personally.

Copy: To the Commander-in-Chief of the YuZN comrade Timoshenko

Commander-in-Chief Timoshenko through the deputy. early The headquarters of the front gave an oral instruction: the main task is to withdraw the armies of the front to the river. Psel with the defeat of mobile groups in the directions of Romny, Lubny. Leave a minimum of forces to cover the Dnieper and Kyiv.

The written directives of the Commander-in-Chief do not at all give instructions on the retreat of the bunks. Psel and allowed to take from the Kyiv UR

! Belov's cavalry-mechanized group consisted of 100 tanks (see: Vladimirsky A.V. In the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June-September 1941, M.: Military Publishing House, 1989. S. 291).

? Directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Southwestern Direction No. 0383 of September 16, 1941 on measures to counter the encirclement by the enemy of the troops of the Southwestern Front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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only part of the force. There is a contradiction, what to do? Count-

I conceal that the withdrawal of front troops to the river. Psel is correct

vii must be left completely KIUR, Kievir. Dnieper. We urgently ask for your instructions.

Kirponos, Burmistenko, Rykov, Bagramyan.

Sometimes Kirponos is accused that, having received a verbal order, he had to immediately leave the encirclement, and not demand confirmation of the Headquarters. But how could the commander of the front take on the responsibility, which he had refused before his very eyes as a marshal who enjoyed Stalin's confidence more - the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction!

The tragedy of the loss of time also consisted in the fact that just at that time the Germans ran out of steam, stopped the attack on Pryatin, engaged in reconnaissance, replenishment of supplies and sealing the encirclement:

"The landscape shows itself from the most beautiful side. High hills with forests, cornfields and sunflower fields look great. The target for September 17 is the Udai River, the history of the 3rd Panzer Division tells us. - The 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment is supporting the 3rd motorized regiment in the advance to Belotserkivtsi? and Antonovka. Both settlements are reached in the afternoon, and a guard line is established on the river. At night (from September 17 to 18. - Auth.) The division ordered to suspend the attack on Pryatin. The reports of the pilots showed that large enemy forces were gathering on the western bank of the Udai, and the presence of approximately 1,500 vehicles was established in the city alone³. Your own strength is too small to rush at the enemy. Thus, our guards on the east bank of the river are only watching the continued movement of the Soviets. Maybe just tight

'
Report of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 15788 of September 17, 1941 to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the withdrawal of the troops of the Nar. Psel. SBD WWII. T. 40.

2In the original - Ve]ohegko\Ka. Located 18 km northeast of

"Pryatina.

3 Regularly, the Pryatin area was defended by only one 289th rifle division of the 26th army. The rest of the units are mainly the rear, headquarters and protection of the headquarters of the retreating troops.

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here the batteries of the 75th Artillery Regiment manage to strongly interfere with this movement, "says the history of the 3rd Panzer Division. However, its located north of Pryatin

units managed to cut off the 289th Rifle Division from the column of the Military Council of the front, when it moved from Piryatin to the east - to Chernukhi.

Guderian also speaks of a pause in hostilities in this sector:

"On September 17, we agreed with the Kleist Panzer Group to replace the 3rd Panzer Division with the 25th Motorized Division so that this Panzer Division could finally put its materiel in order!"

The situation with Soviet armored vehicles was no better. The tank commander eloquently told us about how the tanks of the 40th Army of the Southwestern Front, which remained outside the encirclement and was supposed to help Belov's cavalry-mechanized group to restore the elbow connection between the 40th and 21st armies, were used. group of the 40th Army, Major Oparin:

"Commander of the 40th Army

EXPLANATION ON THE USE OF TANKS

In accordance with your combat order No. 015 dated 15.9.4] at 1:10 am, I became subordinate to the commander of the 293rd Rifle Division, brigade commander Lagutin.

On September 16, 1941, according to the order of the [commander] of the 293rd Infantry Division, I went on the offensive from the eastern outskirts of Viktorinovka in the direction of Buryn with the further task of advancing in the direction of mark 136.3. At 1600 hours on 16 September 1941, having crossed the attack along the indicated course, I encountered 4 mortars, 3 anti-tank guns and up to an infantry battalion on the way. Destroyed alive to a company of infantry, 3 anti-tank guns, 3 mortars and fired at 5 tanks in the Buryn region, the detachment returned to the Mikhailovka region.

On this day, my tanks had no losses.

Returning from the attack at 19 o'clock, I immediately received an order to attack on the right flank a group of machine gunners and 2 counter-

, Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 297.

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tank guns. To accomplish this task, I sent two tanks. Having completed the task, the tanks returned back, and one of the tanks had a wedged turret.

A few minutes after the two tanks left, I

received an order from brigade commander Lagutin to send two tanks to Uspenka, from where 34 calves and a motorized infantry column [of the enemy] allegedly passed. With these tanks, the head of reconnaissance of the KI DIVISION was sent.

With the arrival of the rest of the tanks from the battle, I received an order to repeat the attack. In total, on the first day of the battle, the tanks took part in four attacks and spent ten motorcycle hours each. The tanks arrived in the assembly area at 02:00 on 17:09:41.

At 0900 hours on 17 September 1941, I was ordered to cross the attack in three directions and with an additional two tanks along the road. I think that this use of tanks is completely illiterate, which I informed and categorically objected to brigade commander Lagutin and Major General Chesnov, but they confirmed the order, and I was forced to carry it out, despite the perniciousness of such crushing.

After this order, the division reconnaissance captain and the battalion commissar came out with the tanks, who, at the first shots from the enemy, abandoned the tanks and came with a report to the division commander about the actions of my tanks.

The headquarters of the 293rd Rifle Division, having no data on the enemy, incorrectly used both tanks and other troops subordinate to it and did not try to obtain accurate information about the enemy, relying on tanks, as a result of which [sent] one T-34 tank against 24 medium and small German tanks and an anti-tank defense system in the direction of the Burytsky state farm. The tank was destroyed by a direct hit by several shells on the motor group of the tank. To the left | km there was a second tank, [which] had heavy damage. His fate is unknown to me. —

Damage inflicted on the enemy as a result of battles.

Destroyed: mortars - 9, anti-tank guns - 4, tanks - 4, armored vehicles - 2, infantry - up to a company.

Our losses: KV tanks - 1, T-34 tanks - 1.

It is not known where are: | Kvi 1T-34.

Wounded: average commander - 1, Red Army soldiers - 4. Kill

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then - 3. 3 combat kits and 2 refills of burning che-lubricants were used up. .

Conclusion. I believe that the task assigned to me by the commander of the army was completely carried out by the tanks. Incorrect use of tanks without connection with the infantry alone did not give the proper result in battles 16-18.9.4 | G.

The commander of the tank group, Major Oparin!

September 18-19. The end is near. The 3rd Panzer Division, not risking a strike inside the encirclement, continued to improve its positions:

"Our own forces were still too weak to drive the Soviets out of Piryatin. Is that why the 6th Tank Regiment was ordered—together with the 119th Infantry (Motorized) Regiment? attack towards the south. Immediately after noon (18.09. - Auth.), Both regiments begin operations with a front on 3 sides. Before dark, they manage to clear the forest on both sides of T5spray\Ka3 together. At the same time, numerous columns of enemy trucks, including multi-staff vehicles, were destroyed.

On that day, the most tense situation for the Germans was not in the area of the encirclement of the Piryatinsky group of our troops and headquarters, but on the outer front of the ring in the Romen area, where Guderian became a witness to an attempt to release the encircled people:

"On September 18, a critical situation developed in the Romny region. Early in the morning the noise of battle was heard on the eastern flank, which in the course of the following time became more and more intensified. Fresh enemy forces - the 9th cavalry division and another division together with tanks - advanced from the east to Romny in three columns, approaching the city at a distance of 800 m. From the high tower of the prison, located on the outskirts of the city, I had the opportunity to observe well, as the enemy advanced, the 24th Panzer Corps was instructed

1 Report from the commander of the tank group to the commander of the 40th Army, dated September 19, 1941, on the combat operations of the tank group as part of the 293rd Infantry Division. SBD WWII. T. 33.

2 This regiment was part of the 25th Infantry (Motorized) Division of Army Group South.

3 It was not possible to identify this settlement on the map.

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E. []

Peso AE Orrubne E Sm

A

pH Position at 18.9141 District

_Romny-Putivl Sversky \$: 3

Mursya

belesrod
about © Dgtyrma

Harnovo

Cherkasy in

Kiev cauldron on September 18, 1941 (according to Guderian).

repel the enemy's advance. To accomplish this task, the corps had at its disposal two battalions of the 10th Motorized Division and several anti-aircraft batteries. Due to superior enemy aviation, our aerial reconnaissance was in a difficult state. Lieutenant Colonel von Barsevish, who personally flew out on reconnaissance, with difficulty eluded the Russian fighters. This was followed by an enemy air raid on Romny!. In the end, we still managed to keep the city of Romny and the advanced command post in our hands. However, the Russians continued to throw up their forces along the Kharkov-Su we road and unload their Sumy and Zhuravka. To repulse these enemy forces, the 24th Panzer Corps transferred here from the area

'
Romen used the 19th Soviet air division.

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some parts of the SS division "Reich" and the 4th Panzer Division!, which had proceeded here through Konotop and Putivl. The threatened situation of the city of Romny forced me on September 19 to transfer my command post back to Konotop.

P.A. himself Belov, the commander of the cavalry-mechanized group, talking about this attack on Romny, relates it to September 19:

"The corps was given the 1st Guards Rifle Division of General I.N. Russiyanova, 1st and [29th tank brigades. On September 19, our cavalry-mechanized group launched an offensive with the main forces in the area of the city of Romny in order to make a hole in the ring of enemy troops that surrounded the Kiev group, or at least divert part of the enemy forces from the encircled Soviet troops.

But the direction of attack was chosen poorly. The horse-mechanized group had to strike where the large forces of the 2nd tank group were concentrated.

py Guderian - 24th and 48th tank corps.

The city was defended by a motorized division and infantry divisions of the Germans. At night, the dismounted cavalymen of the 9th Crimean division managed to break into the suburb of Romne - Za Soulye. A fierce battle ensued. By morning, the fascists had also transferred a tank division here, numbering several hundred combat vehicles. Under pressure from the enemy, our troops retreated from the city and began to gain a foothold on a new frontier.

1 The enemy of these units was the 21st Army. Obviously, it was this weakening of the boiler that allowed the management of the 21st Army, headed by its commander V.I., to break out of it. Kuznetsov.

s Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 298.

3 The failure also lies in the fact that there were no more Soviet troops strictly to the west of Romen. They retreated to the south, to Piryatin, and there was simply no one to strike a counter blow at Romny. Belov's group, with its hundred tanks and strong air support, could not only "at least divert part of the enemy forces from the encircled Soviet troops." but also to break through a stronger front than the Germans had near Romen. Belov clearly underestimated the success of his group. The group completed the task, the encirclement was actually broken. And it's not Belov's fault that there was no one behind this ring.

4 There was only one tank regiment in the German tank divisions. With a complete set, which is excluded in the period described, this regiment could have 150-200 tanks. There were 100 tanks in Belov's group (see: Vladimirsky A.V. In the Kiev direction. P. 291).

5 Belov P.A. Moscow is behind us. M.: Military Publishing House, 1963. S. 23

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The history of the Soviet cavalry dates the attack on Romny to September 17:

"On September 17, the 9th and 5th cavalry divisions of the 2nd Cavalry Corps attacked the enemy in the direction of Romne. The enemy could not withstand the onslaught and was forced to retreat! Further, in the text, a passage already cited by us from Guderian's book is quoted.

We no longer have written documents from the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the 5th and 21st armies located next to it with an assessment of the situation on September 18-19. Obviously there aren't any. It was also not possible to find the radiograms that were transmitted from the encirclement in the Piryatin area before the moment of the destruction of the radio station. The last radio message known to us from the 5th Army was sent at 17.15

September 19 from the village of Kruchi near Piryatin itself. Who sent a request for help and said that the radio was surrounded, we also do not know - the headquarters of the 5th army at that moment was no longer in Kruchi, but much to the east - in Gorodish.

On September 18, with a report on the situation of our encircled troops, Colonel Ryazanov escaped from the cauldron in an airplane. Perhaps this was the SB on which Bagramyan flew into the cauldron, or - one of the Po-2 remaining at the disposal of the front. Ryazanov's information was immediately transferred to the General Staff:

"Wait one minute, let's talk Art. Pokrovsky.

Hello, comrade General Pokrovsky (Chief of Staff of the YuZN. - Auth.). R

Hello, comrade Gromov (officer of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff. - Author). Pokrovsky says.

I ask you to report to Comrade Vasilevsky that today Colonel Ryazanov flew in from Kir with diarrhea. On the map, the colonel depicted something like this:

The enemy penetrated the areas of the following points...

' Soviet cavalry: Military history essay. AND I. Soshnikov, P.N. Dmitriev, A.S. Arutyunov and others. M.: Military Publishing House, 1984. S. 181.

? The last written order for the 5th Army was issued on September 14 (Vladimirsky A.V. Decree. Op. P. 286).

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...According to the report of Colonel Ryazanov, the ring around Piryat is not shrinking at a fast pace, and as if, when he flew away at 4 o'clock today, the area immediately adjacent to Piryatyn was shelled with mortar fire. Piryatyn is packed with disorderly crowds of people...

...According to Colonel Ryazanov, the Military Council of the Southwestern Front is organizing a strike in an easterly direction. I have
All.

T. Pokrovsky, have they received any instructions regarding CIUR?

I do not have these data, but according to Colonel Ryazanov, the Military Council of the South-Western Front issued an order to withdraw troops from KIUR.

Did aviation work today?

Yes, it worked. Now the headquarters of the Air Force is busy summing up.

The weather was satisfactory, now it's getting worse, it's drizzling. ^

At night, after all, aviation tasks were abandoned. All.

Position at the junction with the South?

There is no new data compared to what you have already been informed. All".

Unfortunately, the commander of the aviation of the 5th Army, N.S. Skripko, informing us about the fate of his last aircraft, says nothing about Ryazanov's flight:

"A significant number of pilots and crews who did not have aircraft remained in the air regiments of the 62nd bomber and 16th mixed air divisions. Due to frequent movements, the rapid development of events at the front, they did not have time to send them to the rear. I turned to General F.A. Astakhov (commander of the Air Force of the South-Western Front. - Auth.) with a request to request from the commander of the Air Force of the South-Western direction, General F.Ya. Falaleev 4-5 transport aircraft for the removal of pilots from the encirclement. This could have been done on the evening of September 16 from one of the airfields closest to Piryatin - all dirt roads had already been cut by fascist tanks.

I soon received an answer from Kharkov that the planes would be at the Grebenka field airfield, southwest of Piryatin, and not

'
Report of the Chief of Staff of the High Command of the South-Western Direction to the Operational Directorate of the General Staff on September 18, 1941 on the operational situation on the front of the direction. SBD VOV.T. 40.

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slowly conveyed the order to the commanders of the air divisions on the selection and timely transfer of people, and he entrusted the leadership of the reception of transport aircraft to the commander of the 16th air division, General V.I. Shevchenko...

... By the evening of September 16, all aircraft, both serviceable and defective, but capable of taking off, were relocated from the encirclement area to alternate airfields located outside the ring. To check the organization of sending people by air, I arrived at the Grebenka airfield by dusk...

They had not yet laid out a line of fires for a night launch, when an SB bomber plane landed on the airfield. On it arrived from the headquarters of the southwestern direction, Major General I.Kh. Bagramyan with an urgent assignment to the commander of the front. Since the SB plane was returning to its airfield without a general, I took advantage of this and sent several fighter pilots who were stationed in the cockpit and in the bomb bay.

With the onset of night darkness, four-engine TB-3 bombers appeared. Fires were lit on the ground, and several green rockets were fired. However, the ships made several circles over the airfield and left without landing. Also left and appeared after Li-2. The pilots obviously doubted the possibility of landing. We could not get in touch with them and, after waiting two hours, sent the pilots in motor vehicles to Piryatin, where they joined the column moving east...

... Not far from our headquarters, at the edge of a young forest, just in case, I put in shelter the surviving 6 U-2 aircraft of the communications squadron. The cars were well camouflaged.

On September 17, artillery and mortar fire was heard north of Piryatin in the afternoon. To clarify the ground situation, he sent two U-2 aircraft along different routes. 30 minutes later one of the planes returned. The pilot reported that they were fired upon by German motorcyclists!. Since the crew was flying low, the navigator was seriously injured by fire from the ground. It turned out that our infantry was retreating to Piryatin and was fighting small groups of enemy infantry. The second plane, which took off in a northeasterly direction, did not return - apparently it was shot down.

. Here was the 3rd motorcycle regiment of the 3rd tank division.

zi

I suggested to General Astakhov that four serviceable U-2s be used before it was too late to take the Military Council of the Southwestern Front out of encirclement at night. Soon Astakhov informed me that the commander of the front, General Kirpo nos, and members of the Military Council decided to stay with the troops and share their fate.

Then, on my order, the pilots, together with the technical staff, flew to the Akhtyrka airfield. I, along with the headquarters of the 5th Army and the South-Western Front, remained surrounded!

I.Kh. Bagramyan.

"So, on the night of September 18, almost all the armies knew about the withdrawal order. Of course, the decision taken was far from ideal. After all, he had to be received in such a complex and far from clear environment.

Colonel Zakhvataev (Bagramyan's deputy, sent with the order to leave the encirclement in the 21st Army of V.I.

commands of the front to Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov. The commander of the army immediately assigned tasks to his corps. Having crossed the river Udai north of Piryatyn, they had to make their way to the east, keeping the direction between Romny and Lokhvitsa. Kuznetsov, together with the army headquarters, decided to follow the 66th Rifle Corps in mounted formation.

Early in the morning of September 18, an army command column led by Generals Kuznetsov, Gorlov and divisional commissar Kolonin, under the cover of rifle units, overcame the fierce resistance of the motorized infantry of one of Guderian's tank divisions (obviously, the 4th. - Auth.) and, having forced the river, rushed to the Lakes. During the day in the Belotserkovtsy area, near deep beams, the enemy again blocked

1 Skripko N.S. For targets near and far. M.: Military Publishing House, 1981. S. 138.

? Belotserkovtsy are closer to Piryatin and to the south of the Ozeryany-Andreevka-Galyach breakthrough route. Between Ozeryany and Andreevka there is a village called Belogorilka. Perhaps we are talking about Belogorilka, and not about Belo Tserkovtsy.

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dil path, so I had to organize a circular defense. With the onset of darkness, the army commander led the units to break through. Illumination rockets turned night into day. The enemy opened heavy fire from machine guns, mortars and guns, but this time they managed to break through.

Zakhvataev in this battle was thrown from a horse by a mine explosion. When he regained consciousness, he saw that he was lying among the corpses of people and horses. We could hear German soldiers moving across the field. From time to time there were machine gun bursts and people's cries: the fascists finished off the wounded. Zakhvataev was mistaken for dead, and this saved him. When the Nazis left, Zakhvataev, having gathered the rest of his forces, hobbled to the east. Soon he met the commander of the anti-aircraft division, senior lieutenant Chaev, and one Red Army soldier from the guard squadron of the army headquarters. After a long ordeal, they made their way

his.

Lieutenant General Kuznetsov, having overcome all obstacles, nevertheless withdrew a group of his troops from the enemy ring. This was facilitated by the strike of the 2nd Cavalry Corps of General P.A. Belov, reinforced by tank brigades of the Stavka reserve. Cavalrymen and tankers swiftly attacked Romny, where Guderian's headquarters were located.

Bagramyan himself, until Kirponos appointed him senior rearguard group, left the encirclement along with the headquarters of the Southwestern Front of the 5th Army:

"The conditions for getting out of the ok-

weapons of the heavily depleted troops of the 5th Army. General Potov failed to organize a general withdrawal of the army troops in the direction of Lokhvitsa: the enemy pressed too hard. Parts of the 15th Rifle Corps were pushed back to the south and forced to be led by General K.S. Moskalenko to break through on his own. Parts of the 31st Rifle Corps of General N.V. Kalinin tried to clear the way for the Military Council and headquarters, but on the Udai River they could not overcome the strong defenses of the 4th German Panzer Division. The army administration was forced to join the second echelon of the front headquarters located in this area and turn south with it, to Piryatin ...

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In any case (or Belotserkovtsy, or Belogorilka) it was already a zone of the 3rd Panzer Division.

I Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. S. 306.

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... The Military Council and the headquarters of the front set off on the night of September 18th. It was decided to break through Lokhvitsa. For greater maneuverability, the front control was divided into two echelons. The author of these lines followed in the first echelon, which included the Military Council, the main part of the headquarters, the political department, the heads of the armed forces and services. From the village of Verkhoyarovka! headed for Piryatin, where there was a bridge over the river Udai. In the second half of the night we approached the river. Enemy aircraft bombed the crossing, it took a lot of work to maintain order. Having crossed the river, the headquarters column, under the cover of units of the 289th Infantry Division, Colonel D.F. Makshanova passed Piryatin and headed for the village of Chernukha, but before dawn she was attacked by German tanks from the north and cut off from the rifle units. I had to change direction. We turned into a clearing on a local road that ran along the left bank of the Uday River. They moved under bombardment and artillery fire. The Nazis repeatedly tried to throw us into the river, but all their attacks were repulsed. Here we lost a lot of vehicles: some were destroyed by shells and bombs, some we put out of action ourselves in order to make the column more compact and combat-ready.

On the morning of September 19, we reached the village of Gorodishchi, located at the confluence of the Uday and Mnoga rivers. The front commander ordered a stop in order to put the column in order, clarify the situation and outline a further plan of action. In this village we were joined by a column of headquarters of the 5th Army. She followed under the cover of the remnants of the 31st rifle corps of General Kalinin.

In Gorodishchi they counted their forces. It turned out to be about three thousand people, six armored vehicles of the guard regiment and several machine-gun anti-aircraft installations? Enemy aviation does not

put us at ease. Fortunately, the losses were minor.

" A village, 2 km northwest of Pyryatin. The headquarters of the South-Western Front was
le of this village.

2 "The column of the Military Council of the front had the following materiel: 5-7 armored vehicles of the NKVD guard company of the front headquarters, 4 anti-tank guns and 5 quadruple machine guns. There were no tanks," according to the Certificate of the GUK commission of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR "On the death of the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos and other generals in September 1941 in the Poltava region" dated January 1-1, 1944 (News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No. I (310). P. 192).

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Most of all, we were saddened by the death of the radio station - it was destroyed by a bomb explosion. The last thread that connected us with the armies and the headquarters of the commander-in-chief was broken.

In one of the huts, Kirponos gathered the leadership, who ended up in Gorodische. General Tupikov reported the situation. The enemy is on all sides. Along the southern bank of the Udai River, at the mouth of which we are, the Germans are strengthening their defenses with their front to the north; the eastern bank of the Mnoga River is occupied by tank and motorized units of Guderian; to the north and northwest of us, all large settlements are also captured by the enemy.

After this disappointing information, silence reigned. He was interrupted by General Kirponos:

One thing is clear: we need to break through. It remains to be clarified in which direction.

Now I don't remember who suggested that in the evening we cross the river Mnoga near the holy place and reach Lohvitsa overnight. General Tupikov strongly opposed this:

This is what the Germans expect from us. They must have prepared an ambush at the bridge. In my opinion, we should go upstream and cross the river at Chernukh, twelve kilometers to the northwest of here.

He was supported by General Potapov:

We have already seen that the Germans do not leave a single bridge across the rivers unattended. The breakthrough at Chernukh is beneficial in that it will be sudden for the enemy. In addition, there are fords there, so the bridge will not need to be captured.

Stopped at this offer!. It was decided to create three battle groups: the lead one, which was supposed to clear the way for the front headquarters column, and two on the flanks. Go-

the fishing group was to be commanded by General M.I. By tapov. I was ordered to take under my command a company of the NKVD

1 But it turned out the other way around. The German battle group approaching Gorodishche involuntarily provoked the encircled to a premature attack, which ended in a successful breakthrough at the junction of the 3rd Panzer Division and the 25th Infantry (Motorized) Division. The Germans, alarmed by this, reinforced the southern flank of the 3rd Panzer Division along the Mnoga River. These actions of the 3rd TD coincided with an attempt to break out of the encirclement of the headquarters of the front and the 5th Army, which ended in tragedy for the encircled. :

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with the task of covering our entire column from the enemy with rear.

...He built his army. One hundred and fifty fellows - you will be amazed: brave, fit. I, perhaps, was the luckiest of all - I had a real combat-ready detachment at my disposal. I also took with me most of the officers of our operations department and formed a department of administration.

Silently walked around the ranks, peering into the faces of the Red Army men and commanders. People are tired, they should rest at least a little. But there is no time. I explain the problem. I warn you that it will be difficult.

"Noah, I believe that each of you will not disgrace the honor of a Soviet soldier.

When I fell silent, a young Red Army soldier standing opposite me with his head wrapped in blackened bandages said:

"Don't worry, Comrade General, we won't let you down."

A murmur of approval passed through the ranks. At this time, the adjutant of General Kirponos ran up: the commander called me.

Ordering the detachment to disperse and prepare for the upcoming battle, I hurried to the center of the village. Kirponos, Burmistenko, Rykov and Tupikov stood in a circle of generals and officers. Burmistenko quietly, calmly said something to his comrades ...

...I reported to the commander that I arrived at his call.

"Comrade Bagramyan," he said with unusual haste. - A large detachment of fascist motorcyclists came out of Melekha. Having crossed the Mnoga River, he shot down our units that occupied those heights, - the commander pointed to a hilly ridge that stood out sharply a kilometer to the east, - and is about to break through here. Slowly deploy your squad and attack the enemy. Your task: to seize the ridge of these heights, capture the bridge across the river and

move to Sencha. Do it!

Well, it turns out everything has changed. We will make our way to Sencha, and in the first echelon - my detachment ... I remembered yesterday, when the Nazis pushed the front headquarters column from the units of the 289th Infantry Division that were ahead of us. Fearing that this would not happen today, I say that if the attack of my detachment is crowned with success, the beam of the main forces

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stay close to us. The commander waved his hand impatiently:

— Good, go, comrade Bagramyan.

I noticed that the commander had never looked so tired and dejected.

I run to my squad. Having lined up people and explained the new combat mission, I quickly take them out of the outskirts. In the bush they turned into a chain. The Hitlerovnas, seated on the hills, opened fire. But we kept moving. Seeing us, people rise from the ground. These are the fighters of the units driven out from the hills by the enemy. Overjoyed, they pour into our chains. The squad is growing like a snowball. I hear a loud cry:

Comrades, the general is with us! Forward!

Votmy and on top of the hill. What the bullet did not do, the bayonet and butt complete. A lot of Nazis died. We captured 40 prisoners, several mortars and motorcycles. We send all this to Yurodish, and we ourselves hurry to the river. Luckily, the Nazis did not have time to blow up the bridge. He is in our hands. It's already dark, but haystacks are burning all around. This is an excellent reference point for our main forces. But they are slowing down. I am sending a military technician of the 2nd rank Stepanov to report on the results of the battle and that we are following, as ordered, to Sencha.

In the meantime, replenishment is coming to us. General Alekseev, head of the fuel and lubricants supply of the front, and colonel Rogatin, head of the security of the rear of the front! brought a group of border guards with them. Soldiers and commanders from various rear establishments come up one by one, two by two, three by three. But the headquarters column is still missing.

Late at night they approached the village of Iskovtsy-Senchansky (Yuskovtsy)². Despite the darkness, they quickly orientated themselves according to the road signs, which the Nazis, with German meticulousness, managed to put up at almost every intersection. Stopped to pull up and lead in by

¹ Colonel Rogatin commanded one of the breakthrough detachments, which consisted of two platoons. The 1st platoon, under the command of the senior lieutenant of that GB Oksenya, consisted of special officers; 2nd platoon, consisting of red army

The soldiers of the commandant's company of the headquarters and the border guards guarding the Military Council were commanded by major-border guard Shiryaev.

- Obviously, this refers to the current village of Iskovtsy. The village of Yuskovtsy is located north of Lokhvitsa, outside the zone of the described events.

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row squad. While Alekseev and I were doing this, the officers of the operational department went around the huts. Having learned that not the Germans, but the "Red Army" raided the village, the hiding residents poured out into the street, vying with each other began to regale the fighters with various food.

One of the commanders of the operational department returned, sent to communicate with the headquarters of the front. He brought unexpected news: no one is following us. He met fighters who broke through the enemy barrier from Gorodish. They unanimously declare that none of ours is left there, all the cars have gone to the west. I can't understand anything. But we are ordered to move to Sencha, and we will go there. It is possible that the headquarters of the front follows a different path there. He cannot pass the Sencha: there is a bridge across the Sulu. On this tricky river with a wide swampy floodplain, there are bridges only in Senchei Lokhvitsa. But to meddle in Lokhvitsa is madness - such a large settlement is probably clogged with enemy wars

scam.

Before dawn, our detachment broke into Sencha in the western part of the village on the move. There were no Germans. But as soon as we approached the bridge, a hurricane of machine-gun and artillery-mortar fire struck from the other side. I had to lay down. I advise you with Alekseev and Rogatin. We decide to attack. It is necessary to seize the crossing and the whole village and hold them until the front headquarters column arrives. The fire does not subside, but the fighters on my command rise and run onto the bridge. At this time, German tanks appeared. Shooting from cannons and machine guns, they rushed to our shore. We didn't even have fuel bottles. I had to leave the village. It became clear that we could not take it. Let's try to get around.

We split the squad into two parts. General Alekseev led his group to the north, and I to the south, to the small village of Luchka. Both groups will prepare improvised means for the crossing and will wait until morning for the approach of the headquarters column.

Before dawn, having lost all hope of meeting with the headquarters of the front, we crossed the river in boats. A local resident led us along tangled and swampy paths through a swampy floodplain. We safely crossed the highway and hid in the cops of wheat!

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In the same section of the breakthrough, near Yurodische itself, with a group of General Alekseev, V.S. Petr rov! - Lieutenant of the 231st Corps Artillery Regiment of the 5th Army:

"Many years have passed since then, but the events, the initial beginning of which was the loss of Chernigov, continue to attract the attention of many people — participants in the war and a wide range of civilian readers — and cause conflicting opinions and rumors ...

... The system of operational leadership of troops has exhausted its capabilities. The resistance has waned. The supply was cut off. The consumption of ammunition and fuel was not replenished. Motors stalled, tanks, vehicles, guns stopped. Relative troop mobility has dropped to zero.

The organizational and staffing structure fell into decay. There were no parts or connections. Countless columns on the roads were on fire, and thousands, tens of thousands of people wandered past in a crowd. No one set tasks for them, no one hurried them, no one set a deadline. They are on their own. Extraordinary condition, no shackles. If you want - go, if you want - stay in the village, in the yard that you liked.

The ring of encirclement was shrinking every day. Dive bombers howled, bombs exploded. All routes to the east are intercepted, tanks are on the hillocks, barriers of motorized infantry.

The troops of the Southwestern Front did their job in the great hour of the war and left the stage...

... The ancient settlement is a small village spread over a meadow. Two or three streets. To the left is a forest, a cone-shaped height with steep slopes. Local name "White"...

... General Alekseev, undoubtedly, belonged to the number of those people whom nature, in its primitive generosity, endowed in equal measure with appearance and fortitude. Tall, slender and strong, bright eyes, in the features of his face - candor and firmness.

I don't know whether General Alekseev carried out the order of the commander of the troops or went around people, knowing their condition, prompted by his own consciousness. He was attracted by participation, the inner need to support the other, inherent in any

'
Subsequently, V.S. Petrov will become twice Hero of the Soviet Union, lieutenant general of artillery and candidate of military sciences.

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dynam high soul!. Together with the general there were several senior and senior commanders. I remember one - the general-mayor in the clothes with the old insignia on the buttonholes - rhombuses instead of stars. He did not take part in the conversation and, apart from the signs, did not differ in any way from those around him ...

...September 19, from 16.00 to 18.00...

I looked around the area. Below, at the foot of the Belaya Hill, on the banks of the river Many, dense thickets spread. To the right, vegetable gardens, huts, a small embankment led to a bridge across the river. To the east there was a vast flat plain with two long haystacks, they rose in the middle of the distance between the coastal thickets and the road, which ran one and a half to two kilometers. Further - a hillock, two or three huts.

On the road, about a kilometer from the haystacks, stretching from southeast to northwest, is a German column: in the head are 5 tanks, 19 vehicles, about two dozen motorcycles, in the tail is a 4-gun 105-millimeter battery^{2?}.

1 According to the searches that Petrov was engaged in after the war, "by the time of the encirclement, there were two infantry generals in the troops of the Southwestern Front - Major General Alekseev L.N. and Major General Alekseev I.I. One of them played an outstanding role in the events that took place in Gorodishche on September 19, 1941 in the afternoon. According to Bagramyan, I.I. Alekseev led one of the groups of the 26th Army, which was leaving the encirclement in the Orzhitsa region. It is likely that L.N. Alekseev was near Gorodishche. But that General Alekseev, who was next to Bagramyan, near Gorodishche, according to the latter, held the position of head of the supply of fuel and lubricants to the front, that is, he was hardly an infantryman. As for Alekseev I.I., after leaving the encirclement, he was repressed: "He confessed that during the enemy's offensive in September 1941, due to the criminal leadership of the troops, he lost control and, succumbing to panic, withdrew from command. As a result, the assigned tasks were not completed and the units were surrounded by the enemy. Instead of organizing the withdrawal of troops from the encirclement, he left them to the mercy of fate, and on September 22, 1941, he surrendered to the Germans, and then in October, while being transferred to Poltava, he fled from captivity. Being in captivity, he was repeatedly interrogated by German officers. He denies his connection and recruitment by German intelligence, stating that he was taken prisoner, dressed in civilian clothes, and they allegedly did not know that he was a general and commander of the Red Army and that this circumstance allegedly gave him the opportunity to escape from captivity. Returning from captivity in October 1941, Alekseev showed defeat among the command staff and staff of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, declaring that the country's resources were depleted, it was useless to continue the war, since the Soviet Union would inevitably be defeated, it was better to make peace with Germany, sacrificing the territory that they captured, "the investigation file reported. These "cases" finally finished off the command staff of the South-Western Front, who managed to escape from the boiler.

2? Typical composition of a battle group of a German Panzer division in 1941. Small, powerful, mobile, radio-equipped, with aviation support.

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...18.00...

... General Alekseev advanced along the line, counted the ranks.

"...your platoon," General Alekseev called one of the commanders.

Their number was decreasing. The general did not stop. Someone pushed me, and I ended up next to the general.

"...this is your platoon." He turned to me.

...Platoon. There were people in front of me. Five rows of six people each. A lieutenant colonel, next to the quartermaster with a sleeper, not a single lieutenant, the most junior in rank is a senior lieutenant.

The building froze in alarming silence. The general retired to the right flank, appointed platoon commanders.

I stood facing "my platoon" and saw what was happening behind the line. Behind the garden, on the banks of the river Many, in the thickets, vehicles with quadruple machine guns occupied positions. No less than ten or fifteen.

By 18 o'clock the general finished his calculation and returned to the middle of the front. Silence reigned. Only from across the river came the rumble of engines in the German column.

— Comrade commanders and chiefs! You stood at the head of the troops and held back the furious onslaught of the enemy for three months. Only at the cost of diverting forces from the main strategic direction did he manage to gain the upper hand ... The armies of the Southwestern Front were surrounded. But no one will succeed in subordinating our will! We will continue to fight and fight as a warrior should when he swore allegiance to the Communist Party and the Soviet government... I lined you up to announce the order of the front commander... to attack the enemy column. In addition to the infantry, there are several guns and tanks in its composition ... Others attacked them on horseback!, we attack on foot ... and put them to flight! The general fell silent and moved along the line, peering into the faces. Then he returned to the middle and, raising his voice, finished: - I will lead you ... direction of attack ... haystacks ... see? And further ... the buildings of a farm on a hillock ...

| "Apparently, the general had in mind the episode from the time of Hitler's attack on Poland," Petrov explains these words in the notes to his book. It is more logical to assume that Alekseev was talking about the deblocking strikes of the Belov and Kamkov groups.

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... Behind the vegetable gardens, tall, dense thickets began. Somebody's platoon ran in front of me in a column of four, and mine behind me. Right and left, thousands of people.

The water flashed. River Mnoga, a footbridge is thrown from the bank. I went out to the water when the 105-mm battery fired the first salvo. Shells streaked through the air. At the same instant, a hot wave of explosions lashed out. The shells exploded behind.

And suddenly whistle, crackle and rattle. The people became embarrassed, began to look around, and threw themselves on the ground. The movement has slowed down. I remembered the quadruple machine guns. They started firing. Behind the cries: "Get up, go ahead!"

People were jumping into the water. Balancing, I stepped on the slippery boards of the bridge. Heads stuck in the water, weapons raised. A new line broke. The boards slipped out from under my feet. Water jets hit my face, something lifted me from a height and threw me into the water.

I surfaced, howling shells. The German battery switched to rapid fire. Explosions rumbled, smoke swirled. Flashes of blasting grenades flashed overhead.

The attackers blocked the river from shore to shore. Shells were bursting. My feet touched the bottom. Many are wounded and killed. Brown water turned red:

My platoon! People caught branches, climbed ashore, looking for shelter. Some poured water out of their boots. There was an unimaginable crack. Quadruple machine guns did not stop firing for a moment.

- Forward! .. - a command was heard. The colonel raised his weapon and pointed in the direction of the haystacks. Platoon leaders! Without stopping ... running ... - and disappeared into the smoke of the gaps.

Behind them ran seven or ten commanders, it seems, "my platoon." And on the sides in bulk - fifty, one hundred, two hundred, three

a hundred people.

Machine-gun bursts lashed out in the opposite direction. Whistle in the ears. The bullets poked into the ground. To the right, in clouds of smoke, shots of 105-mm guns sparkle like lightning. Shells with a deafening howl drill through the air. Ricochets passed under my feet, the earth rose, explosions rumbled.

Towards, to the right of the haystacks, groups of German infantry were advancing. Splashing fiery points of automatic bursts ...

... The captain fell nearby, throwing away his hand with the SVT rifle.

I intercepted her, caught her green uniform in the slot, pulled the trigger. The store is empty. The deceased has a pouch on his belt. I ran the shop. He ran, shot, the shutter was stuck in the rearmost position.

Quadruple machine guns poured fire into the field in front! People moved in a chain, one and a half to two kilometers at the front. All of them had pistols, carbines, rifles, the main fire support was provided by a dozen and a half quad installations, five or six dozen machine guns, which did not stop for a moment.

Hundreds, thousands of people are running in a frenzy, their faces are distorted, as if the masks of the dead ... An artillery captain, a major in bintah, a political worker with an asterisk, a lieutenant with black artillery buttonholes. The bodies are bent, the movements are elastic and swift ... they raise their weapons, shoot without stopping, fixing their eyes forward, where the flashes of the machine gun are splashing

comrade

Attacking chains moved uncontrollably. The right flank, led by the general, bypassed the firing positions. Some of the people lay down under the gaps at the very trunks. The center, which was led by an infantry colonel, left behind a haystack, pulled ahead. And only the left flank, which held the direction of the tanks, lagged behind, divided into two parts.

The oncoming fire weakened. Shots and explosions from 105-mm guns still rumbled in the field, but they were already firing at the defense itself.

The German infantry lay down. Distance 400-500 meters. The whistle of bullets intensified. The infantry began to turn back in separate groups. There was a powerful cry: "Hurrah!"

And to the right a flat cloud of smoke was spreading, lightning flashed again in a zigzag, and the roar died down. Gun crews fled to the tractors.

Quadruple machine guns sent continuous bursts. German vehicles turned under a shower of bullets, picking up

"

It is possible that there really were more quadruple installations than the five that were part of the column of the headquarters of the South-Western Front - there were units of the 3rd Air Defense Division in Piryatin: the 183rd anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a battalion of anti-aircraft machine guns and a battalion of MZA, which were subordinate to the defending Piryatin of the 289th Infantry Division of the 26th Army (see: Combat Order of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00430 dated September 13, 1941 to the commander of the 289th Infantry Division for the defense of the Piryatin area. SBD WWII. Vol. 40). In addition, the encircled people had vehicles with twin aircraft ShKASs installed on them.

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whether speed. They are burning. Three ... four ... The road is fifty steps away, the smell of gasoline is still in the air ... the dust has not subsided. In Greek

Chihe abandoned motorcycles, the bodies of the dead. Bending to the steering wheel, the motorcyclist froze on the turn. The other lies with his arms outstretched, face down on the ground.

Finally I can stop. Quiet, you do not hear the arrows. Nobody screamed. Legs are aching. Dry throat. Mok ray clothes aggravated the movements.

Approached, staggering, commanders. My comrades! Death was still wailing in my ears, and triumph shone on their faces. The enemy has fled!

There were five people left from "my platoon" ...

... Behind, against the background of the setting sun, the conical height Belaya was clearly outlined. In the east the fields turned pink. Groups of people wandered up the slope. To the south, in the direction of the village of Okop, a foot column was moving. Many of those who took part in the attack remained in the area of the destroyed position of the 105-mm battery. |

I sat down on the motorcycle seat. Someone opened a pack of trophy cigarettes. Everyone smoked. Where did the tanks go? No one knew. |

All of my recent subordinates are older than me. My commanding mission has come to an end. Where to go? Everyone was occupied with the question.

Where is the general who led the attack? asked the gunnery captain. - He was the leader. Need to take a look...

...Everyone seems to be in the same condition. Apart from the German foot soldiers and the torches above the gun barrels, I don't seem to remember anything. I saw tanks firing to the left of the haystacks, infantry running away in disarray... Motorcycles were turning around, the cars were picking up speed. Three or four, engulfed in flames, are burning in a buckwheat field.

The 105-mm battery fired at least one hundred to one hundred and fifty shots. The smoke of explosions still spreads near the haystacks, in the field, and stretches towards the river, hiding the thickets and the foot of the Belaya height - the last command post of the 231st KAP

... The attack cost the regiment dearly. The units operating in the direction of the tanks lost, according to the lieutenant, half of their strength. In the field there are many wounded ...

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...Dawn glimmered... The huts of the western outskirts of Sencha appeared. On the roadside, around the corner of the clover field, surrounded by senior commanders, stood General Alekseev, who had organized yesterday's attack. The commanders of the passing units came to him, reported the name, their number and return

went into formation."

Huts. Outskirts of Sencha. The high dam, paved with gray cobblestones, hummed under the feet of many hundreds of people. On the sides we are deaf - corner to corner - fences. The head units went down. There is a swamp, a river, a long wooden bridge, a strip of meadow, on the eastern bank there is a hillock overgrown with shrubs and trees.

The shores, immersed in sleep, were silent. There is not a single person on the street. The morning roosters sing, the barking of dogs is occasionally heard.

The distances shortened, and the column, curving, slowly approached the bridge. The head units reached the bridge and moved on. A loud measured step is heard. No one expected an insidious ambush.

The 231st KAP was on the dam. The height of the embankment reached 5-6 meters. The silence was suddenly broken by gunfire. On the east bank, the bushes were shrouded in smoke. Tanks!

In the moments that followed, the movement continued. Two tanks, rumbling along the flooring, came out to meet them. Machine-gun bursts were constantly whipping from the thickets.

The regimental commander turned to face the formation and shouted: "Logies"

The bullets often clicked, striking sparks from the stones, and scattered around. The regiment commander rose on the pavement, separated the formation with a movement of his hand and gave the command: "Jump everyone from the dam!"

I was in the second row and saw what was happening on the bridge and to the right of the dam. Many people were killed or wounded. The tanks were advancing without slowing down. The lead one stopped in the middle of the bridge, fired a shot and began to back away towards the second one, who fired from a place. Three armored transporters were walking in the thicket, they were firing from machine guns. On the cobblestone are the bodies of the dead.

Jump down ... and I plunged into the swamp. A veil before the eyes. Bullets spray water on the surface of the bumps. I wanted to hide, but instead of bumps there was mud, water lilies.

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The lead tank, without stopping firing, stopped on the opposite side. The second one came up. From the embankment, the armored cars continued to water the swamp with their bursts. No salvation. Liu Di began to shoot with pistols and rifles.

If the swamp was inaccessible to tanks, then the machine gunners from the opposite bank looked right through it and, after shooting, hit people of their choice, one after another.

It may have been two or three minutes. The crackle of machine-gun fire did not subside. Screams and groans were heard from all sides. Tanks growl on the dam. The body stiffens in cold water. It started to rain.

It makes no sense to remain in the swamp, to wait indifferently for death. Everyone understood this. But anyone who got up was immediately pierced by bullets.

And yet people jumped up, here and there, running... and falling. One was in place, the other managed to overcome a dozen or two steps. Someone shouted in mortal fear, the queue splashed mud in the face. I looked around. Behind the swamp there is a wattle fence, huts. No... I don't want to wait. Come what may!.. The one who is destined to die... but if luck doesn't change, I'll leave... How many are there? A short distance ... and finally - shelter.

On the left, someone made an attempt to get up. Did the bullets whistle low? He screamed and fell silent. The next minute the same thing happened on the right... The machine gunner fired without a miss.

No! I don't want to delay any longer! We need to act. I'm ready. Let the gunner shoot...

"Attention!.. To everyone who hears... two hundred paces behind... huts... run in zigzags... I go up in a count of three... I start counting... ra...a... s..., D...va..., three!

My legs sank, water was gushing in, and death was howling over my temples... Out of the corner of my eye I saw them running. Eight, seven... six... four... three. Short queues give way to long, uninterrupted...

..Surveying the nearby area in the east and south causes sad thoughts. The enemy occupied the opposite bank of the river throughout the monitored area. Our column moved, in all likelihood, without marching guards and fell into a trap. In front of the bridge, to the right of the dam, in the swamp and thickets, pinned down by machine-gun fire, at least two or three hundred people were waiting for their fate. Daytime. The chances of salvation are slim."

b Petrov V.S. The past is with us. Book. 2. Kyiv: Politizdat Ukraine, 1989: pp. 321-338.

In addition to the two army versions of the breakthrough, Bagramyan and Petrov, there is also a version of the special department of the Southwestern Front. The information that will be discussed was published by V. Kramar with an explanation: "The material was prepared according to the memoirs of Major General of the KGB of the USSR Mikhail Belousov, in 1941 a senior commissioner who left the encirclement as part of a platoon of special officers. He ended the war in Austria, from 1946 to 1958 he worked in special departments of the KGB of the Baltic Fleet.

that, the Baltic, Primorsky, Carpathian and Kyiv military districts. From June 1958 - Head of the Special Department of the KGB for the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, from July 1962 to August 1966 - Head of the Special Department for the Kyiv Military District.

On July 17, 1941, the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense (military counterintelligence) was reorganized into the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, headed by Viktor Abakumov, V. Kramar tells us. The former head of the Third Directorate, Brigadier Commissar Anatoly Mikheev, who, on the orders of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Lev Mekhlis, had previously dealt with the case of the commander of the Western Front, Pavlov, was, at his personal request, sent to the post of head of the Special Department of the Southwestern Front.

After the connection of the tank divisions of the Model and Kleist, events developed as follows:

"On September 14, after the connection of German tank troops near the Romodan station, the front headquarters, the Military Council and the Special Department were surrounded. In this situation, Mikheev ordered the formation of three battle groups from the employees of the department located in Priluki and one company of the security battalion. The first - seven people led by himself - remained with the Military Council of the front; the second - the entire operational staff of the department - must follow with the headquarters; the third - auxiliary divisions of the department - with the rest of the troops. Instructing subordinates, Mikheev recalled the requirements of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense to leave the encirclement not alone, but in large detachments, with battles, as a result of which the enemy would be inflicted losses in manpower and equipment.

The second group, having crossed the Mnoga River, advanced to the village of Gorodishche, where, as it turned out, the Military Council was already located. On the evening of September 19, by order of Mikheev, the operatives gathered in a maple grove on the southern outskirts of

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villages. The head of the Special Department, who came out of the ranks of 62 Chekists, announced the following:

- The Military Council decided to use the last opportunity to get out of the situation. To do this, he organizes a breakthrough detachment consisting of two platoons: the first - from you, the Chekists, and the second - from the Red Army commandant company of the headquarters and the border guards guarding the Military Council. I appoint the senior lieutenant of that state security Oksenya as the commander of a platoon of special officers. Major Shiryayev, the border guard, has been appointed commander of the second platoon, and Colonel Rogatin, head of the rear guard troops, will command the entire detachment.

The combat mission of the platoon of special officers was personally set by the chief of staff of the front, General Tupikov, who ended the briefing with the words:

- If you manage to break through the German encirclement of the village, then the Military Council will follow you, and if you lay down your heads here, then the Motherland will not forget you.

Okseni's platoon attacked the German submachine gunners, located on the hillside, and destroyed them in about twenty minutes. About an hour later, after crossing Mnoga and advancing three kilometers to the village of Melekhi, a platoon of special officers joined up with Major Shiryayev's platoon. Do you count the losses? Both divisions lost ten people killed, both attached armored cars went out of action. Two border guards were sent to the Military Council with a report from them that the way from Gorodische was clear. In the evening, the detachment continued to move in the direction of the village of Sencha. On September 26, exhausted by crossings and numerous skirmishes with individual German barriers and columns, a platoon of 18 Chekists, after crossing the Psel River, went to the location of the 5th Cavalry Corps.

Unfortunately, no information about the actions of the Okseni and Shiryayev platoons from 20 to 26 September is given in the material. But in more detail it is told about Mikheev himself, who was in the column of the Military Council of the front:

"After receiving reports that the route was free, the Military Council soon departed from Gorodishche, but was forced to stay until midnight at the crossings in the villages of Zagrebelye and Voronki due to a malfunction of the bridges. But then General Kirponos somewhat changed the direction of movement, deviating west from the route followed by the special officers. Why this decision was made is not known for certain. One can only assume that the commander at the same time

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typical tasks assigned to them by two more large detachments - General Potapov and General (future Marshal) Bagramyan - to break through and capture the bridges across the Sula River.

Having quickly caught up with the column of the headquarters and rear units of the 5th Army, led by General Potapov, the group of the Military Council caught the dawn on September 20, west of the Dryukovshchina farm.

September 20th. A trap in the Shumeikovo tract. "On the night of September 20, strong enemy units once again break through in the sector of the 25th infantry (motorized) division and try to escape through Melekhi to the northeast," the history of the 3rd division reports, possibly about Alekseev's groups breaking through at Gorodishche, Bagramyan and the Special Department of the SWF. - The threat to the southern flank of the 3rd Panzer Division, which arose as a result of this breakthrough, was to be eliminated by means of a counterattack. Major Frank was immediately thrown here with his 521st anti-tank battalion and parts of the 3rd motorcycle battalion. Near Velichkovshchina, these forces run into an enemy who is attacking in the north.

ro-east. Immediately, the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment (Oberst Lieutenant Münzel) appears on the battlefield, which, together with the 9th Tank Division, attacks the enemy in | | km northeast of Melekhov. However, the Soviets evade encirclement and go towards Zhdanov. Now the 3rd battalion of the 6th tank regiment, together with the remnants of the 3rd motorcycle battalion, strikes on both sides of the Yuskovtsy-Melekhi road? in the direction of height `1603, knocks out the Soviets from here and forces them to Dryukovshchina, into the local groves and ravines. Here the 1st battalion of the 33rd tank regiment surrounds them with its own forces.

1st company of the 3rd motorcycle battalion (Hauptmann von Ko

1 Kramar V. Counterintelligence officers go into battle first // Independent military review. 2004. August 27. No. 32.

2 a5Ko\tu-Maessh. Obviously, they mean Iskovtsy, which are located near Dryukovshchina, and not Yuskovny, which are located north of Lokhvitsa - much further than the area where the headquarters of the South-Western Front was killed.

3 Height 160 is located 400 m south of the Shumeikovo tract near Dryukovshina.

4 Sezsmе 4er 3. Rapneg-R/m5yup. Ve \t-Vgapdepbigya 1935-1945. Negaizrerebebe vat Tgadyupzuetapa 4er Om 51yup. Weisch: Uenav 4er Visprapana4ipyа Someg Vsmeg, 1967. 5. 182. s

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Henghausen) and the 3rd battery of the 521st anti-tank battalion (Ober-Lieutenant Lingk) attack Dryukovshchina frontally. Despite considerable resistance, they managed to penetrate into the settlement, push back the Russians, destroy 2 guns and 6 reconnaissance vehicles and take a large number of prisoners. After the motorcycle arrows took a closer look at the Red Army, it turned out that they had captured the artillery commander of the 5th Soviet Army, Major General Sotensky! with his headquarters!

The main forces of the enemy are in both copses and can no longer be driven out by an offensive before evening. Only the 2nd Battalion of the 75th Artillery Regiment (Oberst Lieutenant Welemann) lays fire volleys on the forest.

Guderian, describing the events of September 20, is laconic:

"On September 20, we achieved insignificant success on our eastern flank, the 3rd Panzer Division, against which the headquarters of the Russian 5th Army was located, continued to fight in the pocket area; To the south, the 25th motorized division operated, on the site of which individual units of the enemy managed to break through the encirclement.

Since September 13, we have captured 30,000 prisoners. On 20 September I visited the 46th Tank Corps. General Vietinghoff reported to me about the difficulties that have occurred during the last days in the conduct of hostilities south of Glukhov. The cadets of the Kharkov military school under the command of their teachers fought especially bravely on the side of the Russians. The need to overcome minefields and bad weather delayed the course of hostilities.

Bagramyan found out about the fate of the column of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front after leaving the encirclement: "In Gadyach we tried to find out about the fate of the headquarters column, from

W: original - \$5eip\$K1. The head of artillery of the 5th Army was Major General V.N. Sotensky. Shot by the Nazis in captivity.

2 Obviously, it was these volleys that killed Kirponos. 3 Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 300.

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which we missed. But no one could say anything definite. Later, when we met with my deputy lieutenant colonel I.S. Glebov and other comrades at the front headquarters, sad details became known. First of all, I asked Glebov why the front headquarters column lingered in Gorodishchi and did not follow our detachment. Glebov looked at me in surprise:

"Did General Kirponos not warn you?" After all, he was counting on a demonstrative attack by your detachment in the direction of Senchi only to divert the attention of the enemy. In the meantime, the convoy was supposed to move north and cross Mnoga near the village of Voronki ...

(So here's the thing... No, I couldn't be offended by Kirponos for hiding his plan from me. with all his strength, as if he were acting in the direction of the main attack.)

Further, Glebov said that the beginning was successful. Hidden but passed along the right bank of Many, captured Voronki and crossed the river. At dawn on September 20, we found ourselves at the Dryukovshchina farm, about fifteen kilometers southwest of Lokhvitsa. Here, in the Shumeikovo grove, we stopped for a day.

There were more than a thousand people in the front headquarters column, of which 800 were officers. Colonel General M.P. was still with them. Kirponos, members of the Military Council of the Front M.A. Burmistenko, divisional commissar E.P. Ry-

kov, Major General V.I. Tupikov, D.M. Dobykin, A.I. Da Nilov, V.V. Panyukhov, commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov, members of the Military Council of this army, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev, Brigadier Commissar E.A. Kalchenko, Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General D.S. Pisarevsky, head of the veterinary service A.M. Penionzhko and other comrades. The column was followed by 6 armored vehicles, 2 anti-tank guns and 5 quadruple anti-aircraft machine guns.

The grove was cut by a ravine. Transport and people spread out along its edge. Fighting vehicles took up positions at the edge. Unfortunately, the lack of organization of the detachment still made itself felt. The defense was occupied only by the guards of the Military Council of the front, which was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Glebov, and the guards of the headquarters of the 5th Army, led by Major Vladimir

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skim. Many officers scattered around the huts of the farm to wash, get food and get some rest.

And the Nazis have already discovered the headquarters of the front that disappeared at night. When the morning mist cleared, the scouts reported that German tanks were coming from the east and northeast. When the stragglers who were from the south-west reported that enemy motorcyclists were approaching from this direction and tanks.

Twenty minutes later the enemy attacked the grove from three sides. The tanks fired from cannons and machine guns, followed by submachine guns. Rare shots from our cannons were woven into the thunder and crackle - there were few of them, and we had to take care of every shell. The tanks broke through to the eastern edge of the grove. Officers, armed with grenades and bottles of gasoline, came to grips with them. Two enemy vehicles caught fire, the rest rolled away. s

The commander, members of the Military Council of the front, generals Tupikov and Potapov began to deliberate how to proceed further: to sit in the grove until evening or break through right now. But then a new attack began. The German infantry, which had arrived in cars, immediately turned into a chain and moved into the grove under the cover of tank fire. When it reached the edge, surrounded, led by Kirponos, Burmistenko, Rykov, Tupikov, Potapov and Pisarevsky, rushed to the counterattack. The Nazis could not stand hand-to-hand combat and retreated.

In the counterattack, General Kirponos was wounded in the leg. He was carried in his arms to the bottom of the ravine, to the spring. The wounded and seriously shell-shocked Commander Potapov was also brought here. His combat chief of staff, General Pisarevsky, heroically fell on the battlefield.

Divisional Commissar Rykov and General Tupikov, together with Lieutenant Colonel Glebov, walked around the edge. Talked to people, encouraged them.

At about half past seven in the evening, Kirponos, Burmi Stenko and Tupikov, in the circle of commanders, discussed the options for a breakthrough, which was planned to be carried out after dark. At this time, the enemy began an intensive mortar attack. One mine exploded near the commander. Kirponos clung to the ground without a groan. The comrades rushed to him. The general was wounded in the chest and head. He died two minutes later. The commander's adjutant, Major Gnenny, with tears in his eyes, removed the Gold Star and orders from the general's tunic.

At night, Tupikov led the Vataka people. Suddenly, without a shot

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la, they rushed to the enemy. While the bewildered Nazis came to their senses, many of our fighters and commanders fought their way through. After long ordeals, they went out to their own. Among them were Generals Dobykin, Danilov and Panyukhov, Lieutenant Colonel Glebov and our other comrades. General Tupikov was not with them - he died in a shootout near the Ovdievka farm, two kilometers from the Shumeikovo grove!

According to the special officers who left the encirclement, the events in the Dryukovshchina-Shumeykovo region unfolded in this way:

"Having quickly caught up with the column of the headquarters and rear units of the 5th Army, led by General Potapov, the group of the Military Council caught the dawn on September 20, west of the Dryukovshchina farm. During daylight hours, Kirponos ordered the detachment, which consisted of about 800 people, to take cover in the Shumeikovo tract in order to continue the breakthrough at night. But, as soon as the morning fog began to dissipate, a German reconnaissance aircraft appeared over the tract, and an hour and a half later, from the direction of Lokhvina, a dozen German tanks and a dozen or two vehicles with infantry approached. The Germans surrounded the tract in a dense ring and opened machine-gun and artillery-mortar fire on it. By order of Kirponos, the staff commanders, political workers and security officers who were with him began to regroup units to repel the attack of the Nazis.

Those who led their units first in the counterattack - Mikheev's adjutant, lieutenant of state security Pyatkov, junior lieutenant of state security Goryushko, head of the Special Department of the 5th Army, captain of state security Belotserkovsky, chief of staff of this army, General Pisarevsky - died. Goryushko swung a grenade at the tank, but did not have time to throw it, as he was mowed down by a machine-gun burst. Pyatkov was seriously wounded in the stomach and remained on the battlefield for some time, but when threatened with capture by the Germans, he shot himself. Commissar of State Security Mikheev, divisional commissars Rykovi Nikishev, generals Potapov, Tupikov and Kirponos also raised people into battle by personal example. The head of the Special Front Department was wounded, and the front commander was killed.

Faced with fierce resistance, by evening

the enemy stopped attacking. Survivors at night, not

| Bagramyan I.L. Thus the war began. S. 325.

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losing hope of a breakthrough, they organized themselves into several small groups and got out of the tract. The group of General Tupikov moved in a northerly direction, but, having traveled only a kilometer, near the Ovdievka farm, they ran into a German ambush in the dark. During the ensuing skirmish, the chief of staff of the front was also killed. Mikheev's group, consisting of Yakunchikov, a member of the Military Council of the 5th Army, divisional commissar Nikishev, the head of the Special Department of one of the divisions of this army, senior lieutenant of state security Storozhenko, and three Red Army soldiers from the security platoon headed east. We walked very slowly. Mikheev leaned on a stick, dragging his wounded leg. The head was bandaged. Yakunchikov had been suffering from severe pain in the region of his heart for several days. They wanted to carry him, but he refused and went on his own!

September 21. The last attack on Shumeikovo and clearing the area. "As soon as dawn breaks, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Panzer Regiment (Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski) and the 3rd Motorized Flying Battalion (Major Pape) attack the Roshi, while the 521st Anti-Tank Battalion and the 2nd th battalion of the 6th tank regiment close the area.

After a 5-hour struggle, the stubborn Russian resistance was broken. The Soviets must acknowledge significant losses. Our own losses, fortunately, are not great. Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski was wounded in this battle. Hauptmann von Kohenhausen's (Sospeppatsep) arrows-motorcyclists record a brilliant catch. As the soldiers combed the woods looking for those who had hidden, a young, immaculately dressed officer confronted them from the pit. In his buttonholes were golden stars and two small gilded metal tanks. This is the Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Soviet Army, General

Kovnik Potapov2.

At noon on September 21st, this special mission of the von Lewinsky battle group was completed. Thanks to the destruction of the enemy, the 25th Infantry (Motorized) Division is freed from its cramped position! Captured officers

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2 It was the commander of the 5th Army, Major General of the Tank Forces M.I. Potapov. He will receive the rank of colonel-general after the war, when he returns from captivity.

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they are immediately transferred further - to Giltsy!, where the division command post has been located since September 18. The diary of the reconnaissance department records interrogations of prisoners in the following sequence: the commander of artillery of the 5th army, the quartermaster, the communications lieutenant and his wife, 2 Slovak spies? Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Army, Adjutant to the Commander of the 10th Tank Division³, Major General of the Air Force with his daughter", Commander of a Rifle Regiment, Commander of Artillery of the 193rd Rifle Division, Commissars of the 9th Tank Brigade and the 2nd Tank Corps, etc. .

The battle in the western part of the Kyiv pocket is coming to an end after the German forces have dealt deep blows to it from all sides. It was a special and difficult struggle that all the troops had to endure. The Russians tried by all means to escape from capture. From time to time, in order to withstand the pressure of the Russians from different sides, the troops of the division had to fight, becoming in a square. The diary of junior intern Dr. Türk (Tshk, 394th Motorized Regiment) reports: "This is a picture of horror. Human and horse corpses are mixed with machines and devices of every kind. There is an ambulance with electric lathes, drilling machines, etc. I've never seen anything like this before. Sanitary transports with tools... Heavy anti-aircraft guns, guns, howitzers, tanks, trucks, cars. Partially stuck in a swamp, partly driven into houses and

1 Giltsy is a village 30 km east of Piryatin.

2 Okom speech, it is not clear. Perhaps these were people from the special school of the intelligence department of the 5th Army in Chernigov, where groups were trained to work in the enemy rear (Kuznetsov G.A. The land of the unconquered. Chernigovshchina. 1941-1945. Chernigov, 1995. P. 16). It could be people from the special school of the NKVD of the BSSR under the leadership of A.P. Matveeva, who worked from August 17 to August 24 in Repki, Chernihiv region: "The first set of cadets were police officers and non-operative members of the NKVD - 13] people. All students were natives of the western regions of Belarus and had "family and other ties" there (according to Igor Valakhanovich, senior researcher at the accounting and archival department of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus, candidate of historical sciences). Since Repki were in the zone of the 5th Army, the NKVD special school could withdraw with the army and be surrounded.

3 To the commander of the 10th TD K.A. Semenchenko (1896-1965) managed to get out of the encirclement. At the end of the war, he was commander of the armored forces of the 2nd Baltic Front.

4 It was the wounded deputy commander of the 62nd air division, Major General G.I. Thor and his adopted daughter Diana. Hidden in one of the huts, they were given to the Germans by a traitor Red Army soldier. Thor was shot by the Nazis in a concentration camp.,

trees that fell off the slopes, crashed into each other or burned ... "The Russian Army Group" South-Western Front" ceased to exist. Its commander-in-chief, Colonel General Kirponos, member of the Military Council Burmistenko, and Chief of Staff of the 5th Army, Major General Pisarevsky, are dead. The number of prisoners is incalculable. The 394th motorized regiment registered approximately 9,000 people on September 18–22, of which 2,100 were only for the 2nd company (Ober-lei tenant Dr. Lotz). The 1st battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment took 1,345 during the same period, 3rd Panzer Division as a whole - 18,000, XXMU army (motorized) corps - 31,000 prisoners!.

The division had to clear the Lokhvitsa POW camp in order to free it for the newcomers. The 2nd company of the 3rd motorized regiment was sent on September 21 to escort the first 8,000 caught Soviets to Romny.

The editors of the Zvezda Priirtyshya newspaper, informing the author of this book about the fate of the commander of the 10th Panzer Division Semenchenko, also sent an excerpt from the occupation newspaper Lokhvitskoe Slovo dated December 3, 1941. The note, which was called "In the valley of death", reported that in Shumeikovo there were "almost 500 top commanders of the Red Army. They tried on their own to find a way out of the encirclement. Among this group of generals, commissars of divisions and corps were the well-known general of the tank troops Potapov, the commissar of the corps Borisovich-Muratov, the author of valuable scientific works. The attempts of the generals to break out on a dark night were in vain ...".

"We walked very slowly. Mikheev leaned on a stick, dragging his wounded leg, - V. Kramar talks about those who managed to escape from the Shumeikovo tract. - The head was bandaged. Yakunchikov had been suffering from severe pain in the region of his heart for several days. They wanted to carry him, but he refused and walked on his own. The morning of September 21 found this group two kilometers southwest of the village of Iskovtsy, Senchansky district. Here, on the field, in shocks, and it was decided to wait for the evening. But soon German tanks appeared on this field and began to iron shocks. The tanks were chasing people and races running out from under the dugouts.

1 Money Sezsyste 3. Rapgeg-Rmop. Velt-Vgapdepiite 1935-1945. Negaizrevebep wat Tgadi! opzue veil 4er Otmzyup. Weisch: Veyaz deg Wispbap pi Soshcheg E scher, 1967. 5. 183.

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shot them. Nobody had a pomegranate. Mikheev and his comrades tried to hide in a nearby ravine, but the tank pursued them all the way to the cliff... The head of the special department of the front was thirty years old!

September 22-27 and beyond. The battle in the pocket has not yet ended, but the 3rd Panzer Division began preparations for a march on Moscow: "As early as September 20, the Panzer Group ordered the withdrawal of the tank regiment so that it would not be exhausted in the intricate forest struggle, and refresh it for new operations. The 6th tank regiment, with the 521st anti-tank battalion and the 3rd company of the 39th engineer battalion assigned to it, left Lokhvitsa on September 22 and on the same day reached Talalaevka, 50 km away. A team to receive 35 new tanks, under the leadership of Lieutenant Shefler (Zsve eg), is sent to Gomel. The 3rd Motorized Regiment, the 75th Artillery Regiment and other units of the division also left the enemy on September 22 and 23, and only the 394th Motorized Regiment remained in the Lokhvitsa area until September 24. All parts of the division are deployed in the opposite direction and again go to the north. Basically, along the same route, the same roads along which they moved south. The main forces of the 3rd Panzer Division arrive that day at their new quarters in the area of Krolevets and Glukhov.

The battle around Kyiv is over. It will go down in the history of World War II as the largest encirclement battle. The operational report of the OKW dated September 27 reported the capture of 665,000 prisoners, 884 captured and, accordingly, destroyed tanks, and 3,718 destroyed guns.

The 3rd Panzer Division, with its bold raid through Novgorod-Seversky towards Lokhvitsa, made an important contribution to the formation and proud success of the pocket. More than 3 months ago, the march began. The division lost during this period: 264 officers and 4111 un ter-officers and privates. This is 27% of the total strength of the division as of 22/6/1941.

On September 22, 1941, the division reported the results of its three-month continuous use:

Captured: 43,381; captured and destroyed:

| Kramar V. Counterintelligence officers go into battle first // Independent military review. 2004. August 27. No. 32.

? Talalaevka is a village in the Chernihiv region, north of Lokhvitsa.

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"7 Osheelodna

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Kiev cauldron on September 23, 1941 (according to Guderian).

408 tanks, 56 armored vehicles, 738 guns; 140 anti-aircraft guns, 515 anti-tank guns, 265 mortars, 1137 machine guns, 2825 trucks and 102 cars, 20 motorcycles

cycles, 158 tractors; 89 were destroyed, 96 were shot down and 64 aircraft were captured; and also: | trolley; 7 passenger cars, 25 railroad tanks, 439 freight wagons, 18 locomotives, 4 railway echelons! etc."

A few days later, on September 29, in the Glukhov area, the 3rd Panzer Division will be attacked by Katyushas and attacked by dogs with mines mounted on their bodies. However, that's another story...

'
Originale - "E1zepbayp268e".

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16 RAMLEK-OGUTTOM

Short story'. The 16th Panzer Division was formed in November 1940 on the basis of the 16th Infantry Division. The main stages of the combat path: 1940 - Romania; 1941 - Balkans, Dubno, Zhitomir, participation in the Uman encirclement, Nikolaev, participation in the Kiev encirclement, Taganrog; 1942 - Taganrog, Kharkov, Stalingrad; 1943 - death in the Stalingrad cauldron. |

The 16th Panzer Division of the second formation in 1944-1945 took part in the battles in the area of Cherkassy, Vinnitsa, Bobruisk, the Vistula and the Oder. Capitulated partly to the Soviet, partly to the American troops.

In 1941, the 16th Panzer Division included: one tank regiment (about 140 tanks), one motorized rifle brigade (consisting of two motorized rifle regiments, two battalions per regiment), and a tank division. artillery regiment, anti-tank battalion, reconnaissance, motorcycle rifle, sapper and communications battalions:

- Rap2eg-Kezitepe 2 (two battalions);

- Zspsykhep-Vprade 16 (ZsVitep-Kegitepe 64 and Zspoep Vevitepi 79);

- ANShepe-Vezitepi 16 (three divisions);

"

The main German source we relied on: Io/apya I. Sezsysme 4er 16. Rapeg-Omuyuop 1939-1945. Negaizvevebep vot CategayspaysBipa 16. Rapeg-ipd 1pamepe-Om1yup. Kategadepn IE\egk E.U. UePaE Nap\$. Neppia Rodgip. Wad Matzpeit. Vet, 1958.

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- Rapgetsageg-AMeyipe 16; — Al
pil8\$-AMePipr 16; - Rucheg-
WaaShop 16;

- KgadzNihep-WaaShop 16; -
MasiisShep-Ame! Ypres 16;

During the period of participation in the Kiev encirclement, the 16th Panzer Division was commanded by Major General Hans Valentin Hube. The division was part of the 1st Panzer Group Ewald von Kleist (Army Group South, Field Marshal von Rundstedt).

Commander of the 16th Panzer In 1914, in one of the battles, to the Hans-Valentin division, the platoon commander was Lieutenant Hube Hube. (born 1890) lost his arm. In 1934

he was appointed commander of an experimental motorized battalion, and in 1935, commandant of the Olympic Village. For the battles in Ukraine in 1941, Major General Hube was awarded: the Knight's Cross (strike near Staro-Konstantinov on July 7) and Oak Leaves (the capture of Nikolaev and the Kiev Cauldron). In January 1943, Hube refused to comply with the Führer's order to take off by plane from the Stalingrad cauldron. Was exported from

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there by SS men from Hitler's personal guard. He died in a 1944 aviation accident. "Hube earned himself a reputation as a steadfast, fair, not devoid of common sense commander ... The soldiers called him Man ... Hitler called him one of the three greatest commanders that the Second World War gave ... 1

The history of the 2nd Panzer Regiment of the 16th Panzer Division is somewhat older than its divisions. The regiment was formed in 1935 and provided the first military and political actions of Hitler: the accession of Av-

Commander of the 2nd Panzer
Regiment Rudolf Sikenius
(Kidoy Zleskepti5).

stria and the Czech Republic. Participation in the Polish campaign, the 2nd
Tank Regiment entered the Second World War. In 1940 he took part in battles against
the French and the British. Here, in France, the first purely tank battle of the 2nd
Panzer Regiment took place. Here

1 Mitcham S., Muller J. Commanders of the "Third Reich" / Per. English

Smolensk: Rusich, 1995. S. 166. 347 ,

The commander of the battalion of
medium tanks of the 2nd tank regiment of the
16th tank division, Count Hyacinth
Strachwitz (Nuagiy ZtasvI?).

however, a raid by his own "tspuk" almost
completely destroyed his
headquarters ...

On the eve of the campaign against
the Soviet Union, the 2nd regiment
consisted of 2 companies of medium and
4 companies of light tanks. In total, the
regiment had: 45 R-P tanks, 23 R-
Shs tanks with 37-mm guns, 48 R-Sh
tanks with 50-mm guns, 20 R-! U
tanks and 10 armored commanders.

ski machines.

During the respite, which the
regiment received after the capture of
Nikolaev and before the encirclement of
the troops of the South-Western Front,
the combat capabilities of the regiment would
whether increased due to inclusive
niya in the ammunition for short-
barreled guns of tanks P-\

new cumulative shells. These shells made it possible to penetrate the armor of
Soviet tanks from a distance of 800 meters. The organizational improvement of the
regiment was the reduction of all R-P tanks into

two companies.

The commander of the 2nd tank regiment during the Kyiv battle

nia was oberst lieutenant
nant Rudolf Sikenius (Kidoř
Zl1esKetl\$). After the First World
War, whom he knew as
an infantry lieutenant,
Zickenius got a job in the police.

In 1938, he resumed military
service, immediately starting
with a tank reconnaissance
battalion. Obviously, this is
somehow

Sikenius (ZZesKepi \$) and Strachwitz responded to his actions

(Ztasv\u?).

vigilance in the police. In

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In the second half of the war (1943-1945), Zickenius commanded the 16th Panzer
and 263rd Infantry Divisions, rose to the rank of Major General and was killed at the
end of April 1945.

The battalion of medium tanks in the 2nd Panzer Regiment of the 16th
Panzer Division was commanded by Count Hyacinth Strachwitz (Nuakhiy
Zgasl\7), a native of an Upper Silesian noble family. During the First World War,
Strachwitz was a lieutenant of the Horse Guards Corps, received the Iron Cross
1st class and was captured by the French. In 1935 he was enrolled in the
reserve of the 2nd tank regiment, and in 1940 he retaliated for captivity - he surrounded
the French barracks with four of his soldiers and forced the surrender of 100 French

call.

A few days after the start of the war with the USSR, Count Strachwitz received
his first of 13 wounds and in August 1941 was awarded the Knight's Cross.

The Germans believe that Strachwitz destroyed 270 Soviet tanks near
Kalach within 48 hours, about 300 Soviet tanks near Pervomaisk, 100 Soviet tanks in
just one hour with four Tigers, 150 Soviet tanks in 5 days in the area of Belgorod and
Prokhorovka. In addition, Strachwitz participated in the failed assassination attempt on
Hitler in 1943. Awarded with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds.

At the end of the war, as a lieutenant general in the reserve, he surrendered
to the Americans, and after the captivity he worked as an adviser in Syria. Died in 1968.

The situation on the fronts and the initial position of the 16th Panzer Division on the eve of the Kyiv operation. June - September 1941

“After a 7-month stay abroad (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary. - Auth.), the 16th Panzer Division was back at home! It was a big event! 12 days of peace! Vehicles, weapons and property have been repaired, Wolfgang Werten, author of the history of the 16th Panzer Division, tells us. - Special teams have arrived with new heavy weapons for mounted shooting! and new crossing and bridge facilities. The wives and brides of many soldiers visited the quarters of the division in the Sudetenland...

| Perhaps they mean 150 mm, 280 mm or 320 mm reactive mortars.

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But already in mid-June 1941, it was time to say goodbye. On a tedious, stop-and-go march, the 16th Panzer Division crossed the German-Polish border... Some soldiers from the former 4th Motorized Rifle Regiment recognized the villages and roads along which they had passed in September 1939. The graves of German soldiers also reminded of the battles of that campaign. Many more villages were destroyed, teams of Jewish women equipped with shovels were clearing the rubble...

Division followed division, anti-aircraft guns pointing their muzzles into the hot summer sky, messenger cars darted between field airfields; 1,300 combat aircraft were at the ready. And there was no such village, and there was no such grove in which our troops would not be. 81 infantry divisions, 17 tank and 15 motorized divisions, 9 police and security divisions concentrated on strategic bridgeheads!. Where should they go next?

... In December 1940, the OKW approved the Barbarossa Option:

... Army Group Center destroys the enemy in Belarus, then deploys its strong motorized units to the north and, in cooperation with Army Group North, defeats Soviet forces in the Baltic states, then: the capture of Moscow!

Army Group South (Field Marshal von Rundstedt) with its 6th and 17th Armies and von Kleist's Panzer Group on the inner flanks of these armies makes its way forward to Kiev in order to quickly and deeply envelop the enemy's flanks; cuts it off from the Dnieper with a blow to the south, surrounds and destroys it; then occupies the economically important Donbass...

... Not the fact of the attack, but only its timing could remain hidden from the Soviets and facilitate this invasion ...

However, the warriors did not believe in war with Russia. Official slogans spoke of a demonstrative focus on

"the current as "the most significant camouflage before landing in England," and indeed, did not Hitler declare that he would never fight on two fronts?

In the areas of deployment, there was a feverish preparation for the start of the operation. Masking and blackout! Observation posts guarded tactically important places, combat platoons stood ready to meet enemy paratroopers; pa-

' This corresponds to the data of B. Müller-Gillebrandt cited by I. Pykhalov: by June 22, 1941, there were 98 infantry (including security), 17 tank and 14 motorized divisions near the borders with the USSR (Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005, p. 262).

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As early as June 17, 1941, the Russian Air Force mint was issued to each company. Field Marshal von Reichenau!, visiting the 4th company of the 2nd tank regiment, where his son served as a lieutenant, announced before the company meeting that on June 22 Soviet Russia would be attacked. And even after that, no one believed that this would be the case in reality.

As can be seen from the history of the 16th Panzer Division, the Germans did not particularly hide the movement of their troops to the Soviet borders and their concentration in the border areas. Our memoirists, and after them researchers, often take credit for the fact that we allegedly discovered this secret concentration, reported this to Stalin, and he did not believe us, they say.

An old Jewish man, in whose apartment A.I. Pokryshkin, just on the day when the Germans were given a brochure about the Soviet Air Force - June 17 - told the future Hero three times that on the morning of June 22 Germany would attack the USSR The Novyas live in Bucharest and everyone knows it there...¹

The problem with the defeats that some of the Soviet fronts suffered in the initial period of the war is not Stalin, nor is it that he did not believe in Hitler's suicidal decision to throw Germany into a war on two fronts. Well, who, being in a sober mind, would believe in such a thing! The problem of defeats is largely due to the attitude of some of our military commanders towards the fulfillment of their military

th debt...

Pavlov, Kuznetsov and German commanders of the corresponding ranks... The Germans, without hiding the concentration of troops, were engaged in disinformation and covered up their "tactically important places". Kuznetsov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, "not succumbing to provocations," also covered "tactically important places." More

Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau, Commander of the 6th Army, was born in the family of a diplomat in 1884. In December 1941, he was appointed commander of Army Group South and issued an order to exterminate Soviet prisoners of war and Soviet citizens. He died of a heart attack in Poltava in January 1942. The 6th Army after Reichenau was led and led to death in Stalingrad by Friedrich Paulus.

2? veyep I. \$. 42.

3 For more information about the conflicting information and disinformation that our intelligence, including Sorge and the Red Chapel, transmitted to the Center, see the book: Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2005. S. 227-274.

s Pokryshkin A.I. Know yourself in combat. M.: DOSAAF, 1986. S. 18. 351

In addition, Kuznetsov, although he did not trust the reports of the Navy intelligence, but, as it should be for any military leader, he took measures to protect the fleet in case of a surprise attack. It is quite obvious that the slogans "Do not succumb to provocations" and "Do not open fire" do not at all mean "Do not mask headquarters and planes." The operational duty officer at the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, on the night of June 21-22, captain of the 2nd rank N.T. Rybal ko, after he failed to darken the city in the prescribed ways, simply ordered to turn off the switches at the power plant! Who, what Stalin and what Mekhlis prevented our hero aviators from dispersing their planes through the nearby bushes? Moreover, the order to mask airfields, military units, parks, warehouses and bases, the order to disperse aircraft was given to the western military districts as early as June 192. But why the extra orders? All official duties of military personnel are described in the relevant charters ...

About how the course of the war could have changed if the commanders of aviation units had fulfilled the elementary statutory requirements, we can assume from the history of the 16th Panzer Division, which on the night of June 22-23, not yet approaching the Soviet border, suffered its first loss:

"On Sunday, June 22, 1941, at 03.30, the offensive began. It was the first anniversary of the French capitulation-

`tion! Bomb-filled squadrons of the Luftwaffe moved east, tank columns started their engines. Everything was done more calmly and more experienced than at the beginning of the campaign in France.

The 16th Panzer Division was divided into 5 marching groups, which were led by: Ziekenius (Oberst Lieutenant, commander of the 2nd Tank Regiment), Reimann (Keltapp, Oberst Lieutenant, commander of the 16th Motorcycle Battalion3), Zinkel (71pKe |, hauptmann, commander of the 3rd division of the 16th artillery regiment), Wagner (oberst, commander of the 16th mo-

Torized Rifle Brigade, consisting of the 64th and 79th

| Kuznetsov N.G. The day before. Chapters from the book // Moscow. 1988. No. 5. S. 173. ?
Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. Minsk: Belarus, 1988. S. 100.

3 In the 16th Panzer Division, unlike the 3rd, the motorcycle battalion was not part of one of the motorized regiments. In 1942, the 16th motorcycle battalion was merged with the 16th reconnaissance battalion.
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motorized rifle regiments), Kontzen (Sotgigep, major, supply regiment).
During the day, marching groups advanced behind the 11th Panzer Division!,
which was the vanguard.

All the vehicles were lit with the white letter "K" - the sign of the Kleist tank group. The hot sun hung over the open roads. Through the swirls of dust, the cars drove east. The grain in the fields was already the size of a man...

...Russians! Bombs! Explosions tore apart the night, vehicles were on fire, ammunition was exploding, the road was blocked. Despite the fact that it has already been reported about the destruction of 1000 aircraft on the ground, but nevertheless, even if only a 2-kg bomb, but they were dropped on tightly closed columns by "ratami" and "Martin" bombers?. The supply columns suffered the greatest losses. Forward, only at night! ..

... On the fourth day after the speech, June 25, the main forces of the division entered the Russian land "...3

After participating in a bloody tank battle in the area of Verba and Dubno, where Soviet mechanized corps were destroyed, after the Uman pocket, in which the 6th and 12th armies of the Southern Front were destroyed, "the 16th tank division approached Nikolaev :

"Major von dem Mark, with six people from his headquarters, made his way to the town hall and around 13.00 hoisted the German military flag on the water tower in the city center. On the way back, the major, adjutant, and orderly were killed by a direct hit from an anti-tank gun...

... The next morning (August 17. - Auth.), the companies, together with the Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler"⁵, began a systematic combing; when attacking an anti-aircraft artillery firing position, the tank regiment once again suffered heavy losses:

On August 23, 1941, the 11th Panzer Division took part in the capture of the bridge and bridgehead near Okuninovo on the Dnieper, which was one of the tragic factors that led to the encirclement of Soviet troops.

? The German names of Soviet aircraft left over from the time of the Spanish war: the I-16 fighter - "rata" and the SB high-speed bomber - "martin".

3 Ennjen I'. Or.si. 5.43.

4 These armies from the beginning of the war were part of the Southwestern Front. They were transferred to the Yuzhny shortly before their death in the Uman cauldron.

th SS Division - a special military formation, which is smaller in number than an infantry division, but very well armed and motorized.

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5 tanks of the 1st company were destroyed!. After that, 23 tanks out of 140 remained in the division.

Soon the city was cleared of the remnants of Russian troops. He looked hopeless: destroyed, burning houses, corpses of Russian soldiers on the roads, civilians were engaged in robberies in the alleys...2

... The division's new command post was located in the building of the Dynamo club.

The division took thousands of prisoners and rich booty. A 35,000-ton battleship, a 10,000-ton cruiser and 2 submarines were under construction in dry dock; 65,000 tons of grain were found in the elevators.

The capture of Nikolaev was a great success... The soldiers proudly looked back at the path traveled by the division: the battles at Verba and Dubno, Stalin's line at Lyuban, near Monastyrishche and Pervomaisk were victorious... There were no front lines and no stages for the soldiers. The enemy was in all countries of the world, and he was destroyed with lightning speed as soon as he appeared. If in France the unwritten law of noble struggle still existed, the Russians did not know it. They fought not only boldly and stubbornly, but also cruelly and cunningly, and the soldiers of the 16th Panzer Division had to orient themselves on the same combat methods.

These words from the history of the 16th Panzer Division cannot be left without comment.

How did the war in the West differ for the Germans from the war in the East? It was distinguished by goals that were, back in the 1920s, determined by Hitler in his Mein Kampf. France like

1 Grape shells from our 100 mm anti-aircraft guns tore the turrets off the German tanks. The last three buckshot shots from 107-mm hull guns of the 231st cap of the 5th Army destroyed two German tanks in the Piryatin area.

2 The first robbers of Soviet cities taken by the Germans were

peasants from neighboring villages. On hundreds of carts and on foot, they rushed to the burning ruins and loaded everything they could find there. A vile, but quite justified phenomenon - not to leave good to the Germans... ships "Tiger", "Leopard", "Lynx", "Jaguar", 6 submarines of type "C" 1X-bis and XY!

series, the heavy cruiser Sevastopol, the light cruiser Sverdlov, the destroyers Excellent, Trained, Desperate, Sociable, and a cargo ship

"Razin".

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thought Hitler, had to be defeated because she could strike at the rear of Germany after Germany attacked the USSR. However, Poland was to be the first German victim, since it could hit the rear of the Germans after their attack on France. As for the USSR, the goal of the war was by no means "the destruction of the world's first state of workers and peasants" and by no means the "enslavement of peoples" ...

However, let's give the floor to Hitler himself!:

"Chapter Hu. Eastern orientation or Eastern policy.

I consider it necessary to subject Germany's attitude to Russia to a special analysis. And this is for two reasons.

1. This problem is of decisive importance for Germany's foreign policy as a whole.
2. This problem is the touchstone on which, above all, the political abilities of our young National Socialist movement are tested; on this touchstone we test how, in fact, we are able to think clearly and act correctly.

(...)

We must free ourselves from all traditions and prejudices, we must find the courage to unite all our people and move along that road that will free us from the current crampedness, give us new lands and thereby save our people from the danger of either dying altogether or to be enslaved to other peoples.

(2)

I would also like to dwell here briefly on the question of how justified our demand for new lands is from the moral point of view. This is necessary because even in the so-called populist circles all sorts of sweet talkers try to prove to our people that

as if the goal of our entire foreign policy should be only the correction of the injustices that were inflicted on the German people in 1918. If this is corrected, then we Germans need nothing more and we will be ready to receive everyone and everyone in fraternal embrace .

In this regard, I consider it necessary, first of all, to note the following.

The demand for the restoration of those boundaries that exist

| Neg A. Met Katre. 355

wali before 1914, is political nonsense and, moreover, one that, in its scope and consequences, is tantamount to a crime.

(...)

The demand to return to the frontiers of 1914 fully corresponds to the narrow horizons of our bourgeois world. The flight of the mind for the future of this world is not enough. He lives only in the past, and most of all in the recent past.

(...)

The borders of 1914 have no significance for the future of the German nation. These frontiers did not adequately secure either the gains of the past or the interests of the future. These frontiers would not provide our people with true internal unity and would not guarantee them sufficient food. These frontiers are completely unsatisfactory from a military point of view and would absolutely not give us the ratio between us and other world powers (more precisely, truly world powers) that we need.

(...)

Before God, we will be pure because people, as you know, are generally born on earth in order to fight for their daily bread, and their position in the world is determined not by the fact that someone gives them anything, but by that they will be able to fight with their own courage and their own intelligence. Before future generations, we will be justified by the fact that in our formulation of the question, each drop of shed that blood will pay off a thousand times. The current generations, of course, will have to sacrifice the precious lives of many of their sons, but on the other hand, on the lands that we conquer, future generations of peasants will bring into the world new strong generations of the sons of the German people and this will be the justification of our sacrifices. The statesmen who will assume responsibility for carrying out the policy we propose will not be accused by history of having thoughtlessly sacrificed the blood of their people.

(...)

After all, those lands on which we live now did not fall to us as a gift from heaven, but went to our ancestors in a hard struggle. So in the future, we will get new territories not as a result of a gift from the scribblers of the indicated type, but only as a result of a hard struggle with weapons in our hands.

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(...)

We all now understand that we still have a very big and difficult struggle with France ahead of us. But this struggle would be completely aimless if all the aspirations of our foreign policy were exhausted by it. This struggle with France can and will only make sense insofar as it provides us with a rear in the struggle to increase our territories in Europe.

(...)

Our task is not colonial conquest. We see the solution of the problems facing us only and exclusively in the conquest of new lands that we could populate with Germans.

(...)

The task of our movement is not to be an advocate for other peoples, but to be the vanguard of our own people.

(...)

In no case will we take on the role of defenders and policemen of the notorious "poor little peoples." Our role is that of the soldiers of our own people.

(...)

The situation is that either Germany will be a world power or there will be no such country at all. In order to become a world power, however, Germany must certainly acquire those dimensions which alone can ensure her proper role under present conditions and guarantee the life of all the inhabitants of Germany.

We National Socialists quite consciously put an end to all pre-war German foreign policy. We want to return to the point where our old development stopped 600 years ago. We want to stop the eternal German drive to the south to the west of Europe, and we definitely point the finger in the direction of the territories located in the east. We are finally breaking with the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-war period and consciously moving on to the policy of conquering new lands in Europe.

When we talk about the conquest of new lands in Europe, we can, of course, have in mind primarily only Russia and those border states that are subordinate to it.

Fate itself points to us with a finger.

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(...}

Our task, our mission, must be, first of all, to convince our people that our future goals are not to repeat any effective campaign of Alexander, but to discover the possibilities of diligent work in new lands that win us the German sword.

We make one reproach to old Germany: in the field of foreign policy, she always swayed like a pendulum, trying at all costs and at any cost to maintain peace, and in fact only spoiled relations with everyone. But we never reproached old Germany for refusing to continue good relations with Russia.

I confess openly that already before the war (before the First World War. - Auth.) I thought that Germany would have acted much more correctly if, having abandoned the senseless colonial policy, the creation of a navy and the strengthening of its world trade, she entered into an alliance with England against Russia. If we were able in time to abandon attempts to win universal influence for ourselves and concentrate on an energetic policy of conquering new lands on the European continent, this would only benefit us.

I do not forget all the impudent threats with which pan-Slavist Russia has dared to systematically shower Germany. I do not forget the repeated trial mobilizations to which Russia resorted for the sole purpose of infringing on Germany. I cannot forget the moods that prevailed in Russia already before the war, and those fierce attacks on our people, in which the Russian big press, which enthusiastically treated France, was exhausted.

Based on what Hitler wrote, we have no choice but to state:

1. World War II is entirely Hitler's initiative. Both the "Munich Conspiracy" and the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" are natural attempts to avoid war on the part of future victims of Hitler's aggression.

2. Nazi Germany was the aggressor. And her attack on the USSR was not preventive.

3. The main goal of the World War II started by Germany was to seize the lands of the peoples of the USSR in favor of the Germans. It was not planned to use us as slaves on this earth.

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The liberation and protection of the "poor little peoples" from the Bolshevik and Moscow "yoke" was also not planned.

4. Therefore, the Second World War was for us - the peoples of the USSR - the Great Patriotic War.

5. If we could find Stalin's plan for a preventive war with Germany, this would largely justify Stalin in our eyes.

6. Based on the fatal goals of the war for us on the part of Germany, all our victims and all our methods of waging war, including detachments and penal battalions, were justified.

7. "Ignorance of the law does not free..." – therefore, regardless of whether Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad professors and students read "Mein Kampf" or not, their death under the caterpillars of German tanks at that critical moment when the state anti-German "mail" was short, was justified.

8. The aggressor's claims that in a war of physical destruction and expropriation of lands the victim fights "incorrectly" cannot be accepted for consideration by mentally healthy people.

But back to the history of the 16th Panzer Division, which lost 84% of its tanks from June 22 to August 17, 1941:

"Many comrades have died. Only the 64th mechanized rifle regiment, with a combat strength of 2394 people, lost 269 people killed, 714 wounded and 19 missing, in total - 992 people! It was more than one third!

While the 16th Panzer Division was fighting in the area of Nikolayev, other formations of the Kleist Panzer Group captured the entire territory along the Dnieper from Cherkasy to Zaporozhye and crossed the river at Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk; [..A.N.2 pursued the Russian units that had fled from Nikolaev in the Kherson region.

Army Group South's first objective - to break through with tank wedges to the Dnieper and surround the Red formations located to the west of the river - was achieved. The first phase of the campaign in Russia in the south was completed.

| no ennjen I'. Or. si. 5. 61. | 2
Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler".

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It must be clarified here that during the first phase of the war, all three army groups - "North", "Center" and "South" - achieved their goals only geographically. The main task - to destroy the Soviet troops - was not fulfilled by any of the army groups. Further, the historian of the 16th division himself says this:

"The Russians suffered heavy blows, but the armies of his southern front! were not significantly broken. As far as the Dnieper, they retained the connection of their troops, and only in some places there were signs of disintegration. They again and again delayed the advance of the enemy, were immune to human and material losses, and parts of their troops left the boilers.

The German Army Group Center, advancing north of the swamps of Pripyat to Smolensk and Minsk, right up to the Desna, surrounded 40 divisions in the Bialystok-Novogradok region, took Smolensk on July 16, defeated the Russian armies between Orsha and Vitebsk and Gomel.

Army Group North cut off and destroyed the Russian armies in the Baltic and began to encircle Leningrad.

Nevertheless, Hitler was only conditionally satisfied with the successes on the fronts. A lot of time was shaded, but even the first serious signs of the collapse of the Red Army were not observed anywhere. Behind the Dvina, Desna and Dnieper were fronts ready for defense.

By the third decade of August, these fronts were still really standing. However, after August 23, the 6th Army of Reichenau, striking north of Kiev in the zone of the 37th Army of Vlasov, captured the crossing near Okuninovo on the Dnieper, and after on August 25, the 2nd Army of Weichs and the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderia they hit the right flank of the Southwestern Front from the north, the situation began to deteriorate sharply.

By September 10, 1941, the troops opposing each other were on the line: Leningrad - Ilmen - Seliger - the Yelnya region - the region west of Bryansk and further south along the Desna to the Seim. Along the Seim and Desna, the front line turned west, towards Chernigov, and from Chernigov, along the Desna, towards Kyiv. From Kyiv, the front line went along the Dnieper to Kherson and the Black Sea.

' Those. Southern and Southwestern fronts.

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The southern part of this line, from Bryansk to the Black Sea, was occupied by the troops of the Bryansk, Southwestern and Southern fronts. From Bryansk to the south, to the Seim, was the Bryansk front of Eremenko. On its left flank, providing a junction with the Southwestern Front, the 13th Army occupied its defense lines. Further, to the south along the Seim to the west, was the line of the 40th Army of the Southwestern Front. But the Desna, to the west, almost to

Chernigov - was the 21st Army, which had retreated here from Belarus, transferred first from the Central Bryansk, and then to the South-Western Front. Further, along the Desna to Kyiv, whether the 5th and 37th Army were standing. South of Kyiv, along the Dnieper, to Kremench, ha - the 26th and 38th armies of the SWF. South of Kremenchug, beyond the mouth of the Vorskla, began the strip of the Southern Front, on the right flank of which, at the junction with the Southwestern Front, was the 6th Army of the second formation under the command of Malinovsky.

By September 10-11, the 40th Army of Podlas was already cut off from Kuznetsov's 21st Army by the troops of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, and the elbow contact of the South-Western Front with the Bryansk Front was lost. All other northern armies of the Southwestern Front were also cut off from each other. The 21st Kuznetsova from the 5th Potapova - by the troops of the 2nd Army of Weichs. The 5th Potapov from the 37th Army of Vlasov - by the joint efforts of the 6th Army of Reichenau and the 2nd Army of Weichs.

However, the southern armies of the Southwestern Front still held together: the joints between 37A Vlasov, 26A Kostenko, 38A Feklenko, as well as between 38A South-Western Front and 6A of the Southern Front were still controlled by Soviet troops. But, unfortunately, they were precisely controlled, and not reliably covered up ...

"Already on September 9, a tense battle was going on all day in the sector of our right neighbor (i.e., the 38th Army. - Auth.), 20 kilometers northwest of Perevolochnaya," wrote the commander of the troops of the Southern Front D.I. Ryabyshev, who shortly before that was the commander of the 38th Army of the Southwestern Front. - As the reconnaissance of the 28th cavalry division established, from the right-bank village of Derievka, the enemy tried to force the Dnieper at the Baguli farm, but by the end of the day he did not achieve his goal. Scouts discovered a large concentration of enemy troops on the left bank of the Dnieper in the zone of our neighbor on the right, near the village of Grigoro-Brigadirovka. Moreover, scouts did not detect our troops either in Sokolki or in the Lakes

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roared. We did not know where the troops of the 38th Army (our right neighbor) had gone. By this time we had no connection with the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. Commander of the 6th Army of the R.J. Malinovsky was ordered to take up defense with one regiment of the 28th Cavalry Division along the eastern bank of the Vorskla from Khandoleevkka to Perevolnaya. Keep the rest of the 28th Cavalry Division in reserve in the village of Tsarichanka and conduct reconnaissance of the enemy on the western bank of the Vorskla in the area from Temnovka to Khandoleevka inclusive ...

... 1 On September, the headquarters of the South-Western Direction notified us that the enemy had broken through the defenses of the 38th Army south of Kremenchug and captured a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, where he had concentrated, presumably, up to five German infantry divisions. On the afternoon of September 12, the headquarters of the direction reported that the enemy from the Kremenchug-Derievsky bridgehead had dealt a strong blow with the Kleist tank group north of Kremenchug,

broke through the defenses of the 38th army. Mobile formations of the enemy rushed in a northerly direction to the rear of the main grouping of troops of the Southwestern Front. Against the right flank of our front, the German command advanced behind an elephant, consisting of small units that tried to force the Vorskla River near Perevolochnaya, but, having met a strong rebuff from units of the 273rd Infantry Division, went over to the defensive on its right bank!

On the eve of those tragic events that led to the breakthrough of its defense lines and the closing of the troops of the Southwestern Front into the encirclement, the 38th Army defended the eastern bank of the Dnieper from the mouth of the Sula to the mouth of the Vorskla (Perevolochnaya). This line of defense of the army was divided by the river Psel, the mouth of which is several kilometers below Kremenchug. On August 31, and not September 9, as Ryabyshev writes, the left bank of the Dnieper, between Psel and Vorskla, was captured by the Germans, who quickly created a powerful bridgehead here.

"A truthful and open person, Feklenko (the new commander of the 38th Army. - Auth.) Immediately admitted that this time the enemy had outwitted him. Shortly before capturing the parade ground on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, between the Psela and Vorskla rivers, the Germans landed a large landing force on the island of Kroleviya near Cherkassy (just above the mouth of the Sula. - Auth.) and managed to create

1 Ryabyshev D.I. First year of the war. M.: Voenizdat, 1990. S. 85-86. 362

give the impression that it is here that they are preparing to cross the Dnieper, using the island as a springboard for a throw, - I.Kh. Bagramyan, who was at the command post of the 38th army and its 304th rifle division just those days. - Therefore, a significant part of the army's forces (three divisions out of seven) were pulled into this area. The rest of the formations took up defense on a broad front. And in recent days, Feklenko transferred his only reserve division to Cherkassy. The enemy took advantage of this. He chose the weakest place for the strike - the Dnieper bank between the rivers Psel and Vorskla, where one rifle division held the defense on a front of 54 kilometers. On our side, there was only one rifle regiment on the forcing site. And the enemy only in the first echelon threw up to two infantry divisions. General Feklenko did not have any reserves nearby. In the first two days, only the units of the 300th Rifle Division and units of the 34th Cavalry Division of Colonel A.A. Grechko, transferred to the army from the reserve of the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction. The commander of the rifle division, Colonel P.I. Kuznetsov tried to maneuver his forces, to transfer something from other sectors. But to do this in conditions when he had to defend a very wide front was almost impossible. Taking advantage of their numerous superiority in numbers and dominance in aviation and artillery, the enemy pushed our subunits back from the shore. When they came here

units of the 5th cavalry corps and the 304th rifle division sent from the reserve, the enemy troops who crossed over, managed to firmly gain a foothold in the captured bridgehead. By the time we arrived, there were already about five enemy divisions on the left bank of the Dnieper. They were opposed by our two rifle divisions and a cavalry corps, which suffered significant losses from fascist aviation on the way. It was clear that these forces could not eliminate the enemy bridgehead. It was necessary to bring up new troops, tanks, artillery with a sufficient supply of shells...

... The start of the counterattack was scheduled for the morning of September 8th. Of the troops of the 38th Army, the 5th Cavalry Corps with the 34th Cavalry Division and four rifle divisions were to participate in it. The Commander-in-Chief allocated three newly formed tank brigades and several aviation brigades from his reserve.

POLKOV...

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... The commander decided to inflict two blows on converging directions. One - by the forces of four rifle divisions along the left bank of the Psel River to Koleberda. The other one is on the left flank of the army, on the Purubai front, Ozery - to the flanks of the rear of the enemy who has entrenched on the bridgehead, with the simultaneous exit to his crossing. This task was assigned to the 5th cavalry corps, reinforced by the 3rd and 142nd tank brigades and the 47th tank division, which had only about 30 combat vehicles ...

...Despite the forced marches, the newly arrived army formations and units did not have time to go to their original areas. The front commander had to reschedule the offensive.

While we were preparing a counterattack on the left flank of the army, the enemy crossed the Dnieper south of Kremenchug. The German infantry division that had crossed was supported by units from the previously captured bridgehead. And here Kremenchug was defended by only one regiment of the 297th Infantry Division. The forces were too unequal. The city was in the hands of the enemy. Having sent another infantry division here, the enemy tried to develop an offensive to the north. Persistent counterattacks of units of the 297th

In the rifle division of Colonel G.A. Afanasiev, he was stopped north of Kremenchug.

Having received a report on September 9 that further advance of the enemy in this area had been reliably stopped, Feklenko again switched all his attention to preparing a counterattack on the left flank of his army. The command of the front did not expect serious danger from Kremenchug either. Having received information from reconnaissance that a reconnaissance battalion of the 9th Panzer Division had been identified in the area of the Derievsky bridgehead, it assumed that the main forces of General Kleist's tank group would also come here. It is here that the shock group of our 38th Army will give them battle. Know vra-

ha, as we will see later, there were completely different plans ...

... In the afternoon (September 12. - Auth.) General Feklenko called and asked me to urgently return to his command post. Here I heard bad news. While we were trying to clear the bridgehead at Derievka, General Kleist secretly moved his tank and motorized divisions to the Kremenchug area. On the morning of September 12, they fell on one of the regiments of the 297th Infantry Division, cut through its front and rushed north, in the general direction of Khorol. In the zone of their offensive, we had very few forces. And of course,

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it was not difficult to guess that Kleist rushed towards Guderian, whose advanced units by that time were already far south of Rom...

... In a word, we were not able to timely open the concentration of Kleist tanks in the Kremenchug area and could not therefore determine the area where they would strike. It was, of course, a big mistake. Now two of the four German tank groups that existed on the entire Soviet-German front were already irresistibly rushing to the rear of the main forces of our front!

The official assessment of the events preceding the breakthrough of the Germans in the sector of the 38th Army reared the South-Western Front, and without introducing post-war data into it, is contained in the operational reports of that time:

"The southwestern front was broken through in the Konotop direction by the enemy advancing to the south, his advanced motorized units reached Gaivoron and Romny in the afternoon. In the Nezhinsky, Chernihiv and Kozeletsky directions, the troops are conducting containment battles. In the Kremenchug direction, our units went on the offensive.

1. 40th Army. There are no exact data on the position of units of the 40th Army, the Enemy is developing an offensive of 4 TD with one motorized division to the south between Bakhmach and Konotop and 3 TD in the direction of Glukhov, Vorozhba.

Army units hold Konotop and Bakhmach until 1000, preventing the expansion of the breakthrough between the indicated points. There are no new data.

According to the report of the chief of staff of the army, up to 90 enemy tanks were destroyed in the battles from 6.9 to 9.9.

2. The 21st Army is conducting containment battles on the entire front, making private counterattacks in separate sectors. The enemy in the former grouping is developing the offensive, especially at the junction between the 21st and 40th Armies and between 21A and 5A.

(...)

3. The 5th Army is engaged in heavy fighting, being part of the forces surrounded and part of the forces under the influence of superior enemy forces from the front ...

... 45 and 62 sd continue in separate groups with the help of

: Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. Kyiv: Politizdat Ukraine, 1988. S. 275-282.

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soup of improvised crossing means and swim across to the east. bank of the river Gum. Artillery and tractor materiel were torn up and destroyed.

No divisional losses were reported.

... The 193rd, 195th and 215th divisions under the command of Major General Nesmelov continue to fight in the encirclement in the area of Slabino, Capricorns, making their way to the bunker crossing. Gum...

(...)

5. 26th Army - the same position (this army, occupying defense along the Dnieper below Kiev, was between the 37th and 38th armies; the line of defense of the 26th army ran approximately along the line: above Pereyaslav Khmelnytsky, east of Kanev, east Cherkasy, the mouth of the Sula. - Auth.).

6. 38th Army, defending the 97th rifle division and the 37th cd east. bank of the river The Dnieper on the front of Naleski, Gradizhsk (this is between Kremenchug and the mouth of the Sula, at the junction with the 26th Army. - Auth.), The rest of the units are fighting the enemy on his Kremenchug-Derievsky bridgehead. The left group of the army went on the offensive at 8.00.

97 sdi 37 cd - the position is unchanged. The enemy led artillery. and mortar fire in the direction of Gradizhsk.

297th Rifle Division, fighting stubborn battles with the enemy, who was trying to spread in the direction of B. Kahnovka, by the end of the day occupies the former line (this line was Kremenchug proper, where Kleist's tank formations, including the 16th Panzer Division, will break through to the north. - Auth.).

The left group of the army (212 md, 300, 304 and 199 sd, 5 kk, 47 and 1] td, Zi 142 brigade) - as of 10.00. 300 rifle divisions slowly moved forward. 304 sd had no promotion. 34 cd successfully moved forward, pushing the enemy back. 14 cd took Dobinevka, 47 d occupied the eastern half of the Lake.

Parts of the 5th kk occupied Prosyanykovka.

By this time, reconnaissance detachments were occupied by Kishenki and Perevolnoye. No new data on the results of the offensive saw.

Shtarm 38 - Ocheretovatoe. CP of the left group - Kobelyaki!

As you can see, in the area between Sula and Psel, where the Kleist breakthrough will occur, there was not only the 297th Rifle Division of Colonel G.A. Afanasiev, but there are two connections

1 Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0143 by 22 hours on September 10, 1941 on the military operations and the situation of the front troops. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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38th Army - 97th Rifle and 37th Cavalry Divisions. The command post of the left group of troops of the 38th Army, the one that struck at the enemy in the Kremenchug-Derievsky bridgehead, was, according to Baghramyan, not in Kobelyaki, but in Kozelshchina, which is located 25 km west of Kobelyak. Ocheretovatoe, the location of the headquarters of the 38th army - a village near Semenovka - lies literally on the route of the breakthrough of the Kleist group. Member of the Military Council of the 38th Army N.K. Popel writes that the KL and the army headquarters were in Globino - this is south of Ocheretovaty and also in the path of Kleist's tanks. Popel gave the following characterization to the commander of the 38th Army: "Major General of the Tank Troops Nikolai Vladimirovich Feklenko is a sociable person, easy to deal with, popular among commanders. True, it seemed to me that one had not yet matured to command the army "...

Rest in front of the boiler. For the 16th Hube Panzer Division, in contrast to, for example, the 3rd Panzer Model, the battle to encircle the Soviet troops in the Kyiv area began with a long rest:

"The second phase of the campaign was beginning," writes the historian of the 16th Panzer Division Wolfgang Wertner (U\NouWhNoan2\enBen). - Brauhich and even the OKW wanted to strike at Moscow with powerful forces in order to defeat the Russian military forces. However, Hitler on August 21 ordered to attack again on the northern and southern flanks, take Leningrad and unite with the Finns, capture the Crimea and the Donetsk region and at the same time cut off the oil flow from the Caucasus. Only after this was Moscow to be attacked. This is a fatal decision! determined the further path of the 16th Panzer Division: to continue the offensive across the Dnieper.

On August 22, an order was given to Army Groups "South" and "Center" to destroy the enemy forces located in the Kyiv region. On August 25, the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group (Guderian) of the Army Group Center began "the most powerful operation of the campaign

"Given the real potential of the Soviet Union, which was not revealed by German intelligence before the war, any decision by Hitler would be fatal. In this situation, "more fatal" was the decision not to turn troops from Moscow to the south, but their turn to Moscow after the Kiev cat -

la. Thus, Hitler lost the opportunity to reach the Volga and Baku oil as early as 1941. From this point it would be possible to bomb the Urals. True, the Stalingrad cauldron would have taken place then in the 41st.

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nii" - an offensive in a southerly direction. But the 1st Panzer Group (Kleist) continued to hold the rifle at their feet. The personnel of the 16th Panzer Division spent their time repairing weapons and vehicles. For a long time he was deprived of the opportunity to engage in personal hygiene and care for clothes, so swimming in the Nikolaev liman and in the waters of the sea was an excellent thing. The boats obtained by the resourceful sappers of the vyakhtennaya harbor, suitcases with music seized at the airfield, fruits found in underground glaciers miraculously compensated for the losses of the last, filled with deprivations of battle days.

But a few days later, the 172nd Infantry Division and the 16th Panzer Division were sent north through Novy Bug to the Kirovograd region.

After a well-deserved rest, strict service began again. The tanks were repaired and reduced to two battles!; Gradually, the division was brought to full operational readiness. The field kitchens organized banquets, and jokes came to life against the background of the pleasures received. On beautiful Indian summer evenings, the soldiers gathered near their tents, and at 7 pm, when Lily Marlene's "In front of the barracks, in front of the big gate" was heard after the signals of the Belgrade radio station, the soldiers drained their glasses. Letters continued to come from home and revived memories and hopes. It was the 17th day of rest, autumn, the enemy had not yet been destroyed, and the soldiers were impatiently surprised at such a long wait. And when, finally, on September 8, the order to march came, the soldiers took it with relief.

At the same time, tank formations of the Southwestern Front were also preparing for battle. The new 142nd and 3rd tank brigades were sent to the 38th Army, which was defending the southern flank of the front, which were to take part in a counterattack against the Germans at the Kremenchug-Derievsky bridgehead.

When the Commander-in-Chief and a member of the Military Council of the South-Western Direction got acquainted with one of these brigades, a Report flew to Headquarters with the following content:

1 battalion of medium and battalion of light tanks. ? Shepfep
I'. Or. si. 5.63.

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"Particularly important

Moscow

To the Supreme Commander Comrade Stalin

Today, 7.9, the 142nd tank brigade of the newly formed Ryazhsk arrived in Poltava. As a result of verification, together with Comrade Khrushchev, the combat readiness of the brigade is reported:

The connection is formed by gathering people of different parts. On the KVIT-34 tanks, 50% of the crews have not previously driven this vehicle. A number of commanders are assigned literally to the process of loading. 45% of the entire staff were not in combat. Anti-aircraft gunners did not shoot at all.

Such methods of formation, in our opinion, are not caused by the situation. On the fronts there are shelled and tested tank formations without materiel! It would be more expedient to provide these formations with materiel than to form prefabricated ones.

Budyonny, Khrushchev, Pokrovsky?

Unfortunately, the distance, the Psel River and an error in assessing the actions of the Germans reliably separated the 142nd and 3rd tank brigades of the 38th Army from the breakthrough site of the German Kremenchug and did not allow these brigades to be used for instant counteraction.

11 September. Exit to starting positions.

"On September 11, the hour came for the 16th Panzer Division. By this time, Guderian, inflicting a deep blow - 250 km - from the north, took Romny, and on September 12 reached Lokhvitsa; and now, from the south, in order to encircle about 50 Russian divisions, the Kleist armored group rushed to meet Guderian, writes the historian of the 16th division. - The subdivisions of the division, stretched out in long ribbons, went to the Dnieper in tedious forced marches. Officers and privates

1 Kostenko's 26th army, which had to engage in battle with the Kleist tank group, included the 57th, 60th and 91st tank battalions, as well as the 37th motorcycle regiment - all these units were in Piryatina without material part (see: Combat order of the commander of the troops of the 26th Army No. 0032 dated August 30, 1941 for defense along the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. SBD VOV. T. 40).

. Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction No. 0300 dated September 7, 1941 to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the combat readiness of the 142nd Tank Brigade. SBD WWII. T. 40.

took turns driving cars. Near Pavlish, south of Kremenchug, the division crossed the river on a 700-meter floating bridge. It was the Dnieper, its waters flowed widely and majestically! The Russian pilots tried again and again to bomb the bridge."

By this time, by September 11, the Southwestern Front had already collapsed. No, the structure of the front, its armies, headquarters, divisions still existed and fought. However, this structure was no longer a single organism controlled from one center.

The loss of elbow and information communication between the northern armies of the South-Western Front is indicated by the Combat order of Kirponos by the commander of the troops of the 5th, 21st and 40th armies dated September 10:

"Recently, I have not achieved not only clear interaction between your armies, but also the maintenance of continuous communication. Communication between your armies is established on a case-by-case basis...

... The Military Council of the Southwestern Front orders:

1. Take all measures to establish uninterrupted communications, clear interaction and elbow communication between the armies.
 2. Eliminate the gap that exists between the 5th, 21st and 40th, 21st armies ...
- "2

The next day, a similar order was given to the commander of the troops of the 37th Army, A.A. Vlasov:

"The group of troops of the VV / Vam? 3 army, operating in the direction of Kozelets, in terms of its composition and strength, is quite sufficient not only to resist, but also to destroy the enemy located against it.

The military council of the front demands decisive action from this group of troops in order to destroy the enemy group that is breaking through and establish close communication with the left flank of the 5th Army.

Kirponos, Burmistenko, Tupikov "".

1 Almost according to Gogol.

? Combat order of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 00403 dated September 10, 1941 by the commander of the troops of the 5th, 21st and 40th armies on maintaining interaction and communications between the armies. SBD WWII. T. 40.

from entrusted to you.

4 Combat order of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front No. 00416 dated September 11, 1941 to the commander of the 37th Army to establish contact with the left flank of the 5th Army. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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-> Ziyuyul op 1 Zeretfeg 1941

—— Zmkmül Cat 2-10 Zertliet 1941

..... "-- Epetu rovyuth op 9 Zeryutbet 1941 (goal OKN then)

The position of the 1st Panzer Group Ewald von Kleist before the start of the operation
(according to Fagate).

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It was no better with the southern, 38th army of the South-Western Front, in the
sector of which the tank units of the troops of the Army Group South were already
prepared for a breakthrough:

- September 6 (Operationsvodka of the headquarters of the South-Western
Front No. 0135): "38th Army - no reports received"; |

- September 7 (Operative summary of the headquarters of the South-Western
Front No. 0137): "38th army - there is no data on the position of the units. At 11.00
the army headquarters was bombarded by enemy aircraft. Communication node
destroyed. 17 people were killed, 25 wounded";

- September 8 (Operative report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front
No. 0139): "38th Army - during the day, no data was received on the position of units
and combat operations of the 38th Army";

- September 11 (Operative report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front
No. 0145): "38th Army. There is no information about the fighting and the position of
the units of the left-flank group of the army. Right-flank units - 97 rifle divisions, 37
cdi 297 rifle divisions - position unchanged ";

- September 11 (Combat order of the Military Council of the South-Western
Front No. 00415 dated September 11, 1941 to the commander of the troops of the
38th Army to organize communications): moment it

the communication was extremely poor. Radio communication was not used at all. The command and control of the troops was broken. This led to the fact that the headquarters of the front was completely deprived of the opportunity to receive timely information about the situation of the army. This shows the lack of attention on the part of the Army Military Council to these issues.

The military council of the front demands:

1. Organize regular reporting on the situation.
2. Pay special attention to the establishment of communication in the link of the shtarm, tripod.
Kirponos, Burmistenko, Tupikov.

12-th of September. Front breakthrough.

"At dawn on September 12, the division took up its starting position on a small bridgehead, joining its right flank with the 9th Panzer Division," writes Wolfgang Werten. —

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The division had the task of blocking the main railroad leading eastward from the resulting cauldron. It was the Kharkov-Poltava-Lubny railroad.

After a strong artillery preparation, the infantry of the X Corps began the attack. At 0900, tanks also moved forward in three echelons: the 1st battalion, the 2nd battalion and the 2nd tank company, with the 1st battalion of the 79th regiment in vehicles; behind them - the 2nd Battalion of the 79th Regiment in vehicles and the 64th Regiment of the Wagner Combat Team!. Having overtaken the infantry, having defeated the enemy and his artillery, the division entered the enemy rear communications. Tank sleep ranks rumbled apart in the middle of his transport columns. The enemy did not even have time to defend himself somehow. Rolling back columns were blown up, tanks, guns, wagons remained lying to the left and right of the road for 40 km. The black banners of the fumes of burnt-out fuel from the engines rose into the sky.

Enemy resistance was negligible. In the afternoon of September 12, the tank regiment [th battalion of the 79th motorized regiment with the 1st division of the 16th artillery regiment reached Semyonovka (6 km south-west of which the headquarters of the 38th Army was located. - Author .) and at dusk - Karpichi2?. Here the battle group stood in the car. 60 kilometers left behind. The 64th Motorized Rifle Regiment stood in a square around Yarosha.

September 13th. Passage to Lubny.

"At 06.30 the offensive was continued. But now the Russians knew about the intentions of the Germans and used aviation against the head of the 16th Panzer Division. Protection by German fighters was foreseen in advance, and they swept the air cleanly. The vanguard of the division, leaving Khorol on the right, reached the eastern bank of the Sula south of Luben. 120 km have been covered. Khorol continued to be with the enemy; long columns of Russians left

, Wagner was the commander of the 16th Motorized Rifle Brigade, which consisted of the 79th and 64th Motorized Rifle Regiments and was part of the 16th Panzer Division.

? Model's 3rd Panzer Division from Guderian's group reached Mlynov near Lokhvitsa at that time. Between Mlynov and Karpikha about 80 km.

3 "Stand in a square" - 1vele - can also be translated as "to take up all-round defense."

4 Yeepiel I'. Or. si. \$. 64. .

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from the city to the northeast. At about 2:00 p.m., the "pieces" attacked the eastern part of the city, the advance of the 64th motorized rifle regiment was stopped, and its battalions were pulled up to Lubny.

At the same time, tanks, riflemen and sappers of the 3rd company of the 16th sapper battalion seized the bridge over the Sula with a surprise attack and, under the cover of a smoke screen, penetrated into Lubny to create a bridgehead on the western bank. Now the resistance has increased. Civilians rushed at the tanks with incendiary bottles, Molotov cocktails, fired from windows and attics. Throwing bombs "ground "things"? The 8th company of the 64th motorized regiment howled in the air and detonated with deafening clicks in the barracks of the city. Finally, resistance in the area died down. A Russian armored train that appeared on the flank was destroyed by tanks and sappers. However, in the swamp at Sula and even at the bridges, the Russians still

huddled.

Then the division commander stopped the offensive, leaving only one side of the river as a military outpost. The front line of defense of most of the division was organized on the eastern bank of the Sula, where the Russian field defenses with the front to the west turned out to be very useful. The line of defense began at Tishki, 15 km northeast of the city, and stretched through Grebishche, Berezotocha and Peski along the river bank.

On September 13, a group of headquarters of the Southwestern Front, which was located at the left command post of the 38th Army in Kozelshchina (or in Kobelyaki), received permission to depart for the headquarters of the South-Western Front. In this group was the head of the operational department of the front headquarters I.Kh. Bagramyan, who left us a picturesque

The 164th Motorized Rifle Regiment was the third echelon of the 16th Panzer Division, providing its flanks and rear. Since with the departure of the Soviet troops from Khorol the danger to the rear communications of the 16th division was eliminated, the 64th regiment was transferred closer to Lubny.

b Obviously, we are talking about 150-mm mines of the German "Katyushas". Our soldiers called these 6-barreled rocket launchers "vanyushas" and, for the characteristic sound when firing, "skripons". The short firing range and weak fragmentation effect of this weapon was compensated by a powerful shock wave and a strong psychological effect.

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a picture of what was happening on the right, eastern, part of the path traveled by the 16th Panzer Division:

"Since the 38th Army on September 12 received an order to stop the offensive, the presence of representatives of the front command here lost its meaning ...

... On the morning of September 13, it was handed over from the headquarters of the commander-in-chief - we are allowed to leave for the headquarters of the front.

Soon Volsky (Head of the Armored Directorate of the South-Western Front. - Auth.), with the officers accompanying him, and with his assistant Major Savchuk and Senior Lieutenant Ilya Bokhorov, my adjutant, got into the car and headed for Reshetilovka, where one of the forward communication points of the headquarters was located commander in chief. We hoped to find out how we could get through to our own. Parsegov (chief of artillery of the South-Western Front. - Auth.) and Lozovoy-Shevchenko (Deputy Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front Air Force. - Auth.) were supposed to join us several
Later.

The roads were followed by disparate subunits, wagon trains detached from their units, rear establishments. The situation, as is often the case when retreating, no one really
knew.

Not far from Reshetilovka we came across the convoy of the 297th Rifle Division. We learned from one of the commanders that cars from the headquarters of the 38th Army began to arrive in Reshetilovka. This surprised me greatly: after all, the headquarters, according to our information, was cut off by Kleist's troops, along with the right-flank divisions of the army. How did he end up here, on the left bank of the Psel River? Bagramyan said. .

Reshetilovka, which he managed to reach, is located 40 km north of the left command post of the 38th Army. The army headquarters was in Ocheretovaty, near Semyonovka, 70 km west of Reshetilovka. In addition to these seventy kilometers, covered by the headquarters of 38A at a speed that Hube would envy, between Ocheretovaty and Reshetilovka there were troops of Kleist, the Khorol and Psel rivers.

"In Reshetilovka, we had difficulty finding a point of contact for the headquarters of the commander-in-chief. Here we were upset: all the roads along which one could reach the headquarters of the front had already been intercepted by the enemy. , - we continue to read Bagramyan. - We were given an order from the commander-in-chief of the direction - to linger in Reshetilovka until further notice and engage in guidance

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order in the troops leaving the encirclement and the organization of defense by these forces. We immediately begin to carry out the order. General Volsky went to the area where two tank brigades, transferred from the left flank of the army, were to be concentrated, and I began to look for the headquarters of the 38th Army. They pointed me to a hut on the outskirts of Reshetilovka. Here I found the Chief of Staff of the 38th Army, Major General Vitaly Nikolaevich Symbolokov. In the thirties, we studied at the Academy named after M.V. Frunze. But I had to temporarily forget about the old friendship. I rather severely began to try to find out why the headquarters was separated from its troops. Symbolokov said that the headquarters did not leave the encirclement alone. Together with him, the 297th Rifle Division, led by Colonel G.A., broke through. Afanasyev and part of the forces of the 37th Cavalry Division, Colonel G.M. Roitenberg. The rest of the Cavalry Division and the 97th Rifle Division of Colonel F.V. Maltseva, as it turned out later, retreated to the right bank of the Sula River and took up defense there. On September 13, the front commander subordinated them to the commander of the 26th Army.

The general said that the most difficult thing in leaving the encirclement was the crossing of the Psel River.

- There are no means of crossing, and the Germans have firmly captured all the bridges. We have a convoy of cars and a supply. What to do here? We decided to capture the crossing by night attack. And did you capture it? The enemy raged, but we held the bridge until the last fighter passed. And then they blew it up.

Now the army headquarters is organizing defense along the Psel River, but so far there are very few forces. Symbolokov was able to put up only small barriers to the village of Velikaya Bogachka, and then the front was interrupted. Thus, the direction to Poltava from the northwest remained open. The headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the direction and the commander of the 38th Army are taking all measures to patch up the gaps in the front line.

We discussed how best to deploy troops. After that, the permission of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko left for the headquarters of the direction, located near Poltava. There I will be acquainted with the latest operational summary. She was gloomy. I was shown a report from Kirponos to the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief. It ended with the words:

"The front switched to fighting in conditions of encirclement and complete intersection of communications. I'm moving the command post to

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Kyiv, as the only point from where it is possible to command troops. I ask you to prepare the necessary measures to supply the armies of the front with firearms with the help of air transport.

My heart ached. Opportunities to get to the headquarters of the front became less and less!

According to N.K. Popel, a member of the 38A Military Council, it turns out that the Germans, having broken through the defense lines of 38A and rushing towards Lubny, even broke into the location of the right command post and army headquarters:

"Once, when I was in the army, German tanks and motorcycles broke into the army command post in Globino. At the headquarters there were only a few armored vehicles and an anti-aircraft division. However, Symbolokov did not lose his head. He firmly led the people and led the headquarters without losses to the new command post - to Kobelyaki, which, by the way, soon also found themselves in the zone of artillery shelling "2.

After the breakthrough of the Kleist tank group and the 16th tank division of Hube in the direction of Kremenchug-Lubny, on the western side of this breakthrough was the 26th Army of Lieutenant General Felor Yakovlevich Kostenko ("Honest, hardworking, strong-willed and courageous man ... Kostenko turned 45 years old when in 1940 he was appointed commander of the army cavalry group, which was later reorganized into the 26th army ... He was highly appreciated for 'firmness and accuracy in carrying out the decisions of the command'")³. What was the position and composition of the 26th Army in those days, about which Bagramyan, still in the state of affairs at the beginning of August, wrote: "Poor 26th Army! For a long time, more than a month, the Headquarters will rely on its small divisions as an inexhaustible reserve!

Unfortunately, just at the moment of breaking through the front in the sector of the 38th Army, two divisions were once again withdrawn from the 26th Army. The remaining units were engaged in regrouping,

. Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. Kyiv: Politizdat Ukraine, 1988. S. 292-294.

2 Popel N.K. At a difficult time. M.; St. Petersburg: Tega Eapiasis, 2001, p. 263.

3 Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. S. 53.

4 Ibid. S. 247.

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posed with the need to occupy the defense lines of divisions descending to Priluki and Piryatin:

"The 26th Army on the night of 11 to 12.9 withdraws 7 msdi 289 sd from the front line for loading onto the railway. transport: 7 msd - Boris pol, Baryshevka; 289 sd - Zolotonosha.

301st Rifle Division replaces units of the 7th Motor Rifle Division and occupies the defense at the front (claim.) Protsev, Rudyakov, Yashniki, Andrushi.

The 159th Rifle Division replaces the left-flank units of the 301st Rifle Division and takes up defensive positions at the Andrushy-Leplyava front.

264th rifle division replaces 289th rifle division, occupying the defense front of Kaleberd, Bubnovo, Kedinova Gora.

The 196th, 116th Rifle Division and two battalions of the 97th Rifle Division are defending the Cherkasy combat sector on the front (claim.) Kedinova Gora, Naleski, having a consolidated detachment on the island of Korolevich.

In front of the army front, units 294, 132, 94 and 68 of the enemy front are defending.

Shtarm 26 - Birlovka.

6. 38th Army. There is no information about the fighting and the position of the units of the left flank group of the army.

Right-flank units - 97 rifle divisions, 37 cdi 297 rifle divisions - position unchanged.

Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front Major-General Tupikov
Military Commissar of Front Staff Regimental Commissar Solovyov For the Chief of the Operations Department! Colonel Zakhvataev?

The 7th motorized rifle and 269th rifle divisions, named in this document, had to urgently leave for the Priluk and Pyryatin area in order to defend the rear of the front from Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group and help the front to break out of the encirclement, if the order to do so followed.

On September 13, when the 38th Army was dissected, those units that were to the west of the breakthrough site were transferred to the 26th Army:

"The commander of the SWF ordered:

1. Subdue the 26th Army 37 cd and 97 cd.

1 Chief of the Operations Department Baghramyan was at the command post of the 38th Army these days.

2 Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0145 by 22 o'clock on September 11, 1941 on the combat operations and the situation of the front troops. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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2. Establish the left dividing line for the 26th Army: Gradizhsk, (suit.) Ocheretovatoe, Dikanka. 3. Confirm task 26A: firmly defend the river. Dnieper.

Chief of Staff of the SWF Major General Tupikov Military
Commissar of the Staff of the SWF Regimental Commissar Solovyov.

Thus, at the time of the creation of the Kiev pocket, the 26th Army obviously consisted of six rifle (301, 159, 264, 196, 116, 97) and one cavalry (37th) divisions. The divisions transferred from the 38A (37 kdi 97 sd) took up defensive positions along the western bank of the Sula with the task of not letting the enemy into the flank and rear of the 26th army. The "regular" divisions of the 26th Army at the time of the breakthrough were regrouping along the Dnieper.

According to I.Kh. Bagramyan, the 26th Army also included a group of General I.I. Alekseev, whom F.Ya. Kostenko ordered to cover the city of Orzhitsa.

On October 27, Bagramyan met with Alekseev, who had just left the encirclement:

"General I.I. Alekseev told me about the fate of the detachment that stood in the way of Kleist's divisions in the area of the city of Lubny.

On September 10, Alekseev, the former commander of the 6th Rifle Corps, returned to his headquarters from the hospital. But his position turned out to be occupied, the corps was already commanded by Major General A.I. Lopatin. Alekseev rushed to the commander Kostenko. He ordered him to urgently form a separate detachment, which included the 94th border detachment, the 6th regiment of the NKVD and one rifle regiment, and take up defense along the Sula River near the city of Lubny. The general believed that only the weak advanced units of the enemy had broken through here, and therefore decided to attack first. And in front of his small detachment were the large forces of Kleist's tank army. The enemy, of course, repulsed the attack, then moved tanks against the detachment. Au Alekseev not a single anti-tank gun. Soldiers and commanders fought furiously. The Nazis surrounded them. The warriors held out until their ammunition ran out. At the end of September for the last time

1 Combat order of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front No. 00424 dated September 13, 1941 by the commander of the troops of the 26th and 38th armies for the subordination of the 37th cavalry and 97th rifle divisions of the 26th army and the establishment of a dividing line for it . SBD WWII. T. 40.

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rushed to break. Few survived, but jumped out of the trap!

According to the data given by A.V. Isaev", the 26th Army also included a group of the commander of the 1st Airborne Corps, Major General Usenko.

According to some surviving documents, it can be assumed that the 26th Army at the time of the encirclement also included: the 186th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, the 55th, 17th and 259th separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions, the 195th engineer battalion and the control leniye of the 6th Rifle Corps. In early and mid-August, the divisions that were part of the 6th Rifle Corps are called the 264th, 196th and 289th. However, in the combat documents of the end of August and September, the 6th sk is referred to either simply as "b sk", without mentioning the divisions included in it, or as "direction of 6 sk". Based on the fact that during this period the corps was assigned defensive lines, it can be assumed that the 6th rifle corps was a corps headquarters with the remnants of any corps units and guards. Maybe the power of the 6th sk corresponded to the regiment ...

At the time of the encirclement, the 26th Army also included tank units. However, they did not have tanks, and their personnel were in the area of Priluk and Piryatin on reorganization, where, apparently, they died along with the headquarters of the South-Western Front.

In the same place, in Priluki, was at that time the commander of the battalion of the 264th division of the 26th army P.P. Vershigor, from whose book we can get some information about the breakthrough of the 16th Panzer Division to Lubny. However, let us first return to the history of the 16th Panzer.

September 14th. Meeting with the Model division. The boiler is closed!

"On Sunday, September 14, the 79th Motorized Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 64th Motorized Regiment attacked Lubny again," Wolfgang Werten continues his story. - In clear autumn weather, the offensive proceeded according to plan. The losses would be small. The first prisoners appeared, the arrows of the 11th and 12th companies of the 64th motorized rifle regiment shot down a Martin bomber. The division also prepared for

1 Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. pp. 307, 354.

2 Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. Moscow: AST Publishing House LLC; OOO "TGranzitkniga", 2004. S. 579.

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defense and on the bridgehead in the area of Osovets and Ternov. The 2nd company of the 16th engineer battalion, under the command of Oberleutnant Nantes Rinschen (Klissen) connected with the patrol group of the 3rd Panzer Division that approached from the north?. The vanguards of Guderian and Kleist's tank groups, "G" and "K", met in the rear of 50 red divisions. The big Kyiv cauldron was closed. And again the 16th Panzer Division, as before, at the Monastery,

occupied positions in the east with a front to the west, again she had to prepare for a hard fight with the Russians breaking out. Another busy day ahead.

When the expected counterattacks of the enemy did not follow, the corps struck to the west, into the cauldron.

The Russians, in front of these deeply penetrated tank wedges, behaved surprisingly nonchalantly, some groups or partisans seeped through the gaps; and now the Germans sought closer cooperation between infantry and tanks. Russian units were to be systematically defeated in the course of hostilities on a smaller scale”⁵.

The story of one of the future Kovpakovsky commanders P.P. Vershigory, who, by the will of fate, was brought in and carried out of Luben by horses, is a good emotional illustration of the situation on the Southwestern Front in the summer and autumn of 1941:

1 Near Lubny, on the western bank of the Sula.

? It was a battle group led by Oberleutnant Wartmann (Uaiitalp), commander of the 9th company of the 6th Panzer Regiment of the 3rd Panzer Division of Guderian's Model 2nd Panzer Group. Fuel for this group was poured from the entire 3rd division, which, approaching Lokhvitsa, was left without fuel, tanks and ammunition. An exceptionally favorable time for breaking the boiler was missed by the Soviet command. “You need to get out of the encirclement quickly or not at all,” the artist, director and partisan commander Vershigora, who had been in the Kiev encirclement, philosophically remarked.

3 Contrary to popular belief, the cauldron was closed near Lokhvitsa, near Luben. The meeting of the 16th and 3rd Panzer Divisions took place on September 14 at 1820, about 10 km north of Luben and 30 km south of Lokhvitsa.

4 This refers to the Uman cauldron, in which the 6th and 12th armies of the Southwestern Front (by the time of the encirclement were transferred to the Southern Front) were surrounded.

5 Enkep I'. Or. sn.5. 65.381

“It was at dawn on August 2, 1941 (still on the western bank of the Dnieper, in the Kanev area, speech of the 264th rifle division. - Auth.). We dug trenches... I must admit that I could not stand the artillery preparation, the first in my life. When the enemy opened heavy fire, I backed out of the individual trench! and it is not clear how he found himself somewhere in the middle of the field, obviously choosing his “command post” closer to the village ...

... German, a young guy in a homemade camouflage

dressed in a suit of leaves tied to a cape, he crawled up to me with a machine gun in his hands ... He began to fire at our fleeing platoon, and I saw two or three fallen soldiers ... One machine gunner shot a whole platoon of backs before my eyes. When the German was already a few steps away from me, I remembered that I was the commander of this platoon ... But this hour I am not completely sure that it was I who killed him. Coming to my senses only when the German became a corpse, I took his machine gun, my first trophy, caught up with the platoon and forced the people to obey me. He ordered them to lie down, shoot back ...

What else do I remember in the first fight? Some people in the sugar beet field, raising their hands, moved towards the enemy machine gunners, who also got up from the ground and walked towards them. There were five of these people. Not the Metz was alone, his second number trailed far behind. The solution came by itself. I commanded the "fire" of the platoon, which was already completely subordinate to me, and with one volley from several light machine guns and rifles we mowed them all down: both those who wanted to surrender and those who were going to take prisoners ...

... Within a few days, I managed to go through the practical experience of commanding a platoon, then a company, worked at the headquarters of the battalion, then again commanded a company, and on the tenth day of the fighting I commanded a battalion ...

I had to command the battalion after the four commanders who had been replaced in these few days. It consisted of hundreds of fighters, hardened in continuous battles...

When, after five days of fighting, the Germans stepped up pressure,

1 Somewhat later, the Soviet command, having come to the conclusion that the fighter is more easily demoralized in individual rifle cells, will recommend tearing off collective trenches instead of individual ones, and if conditions allow, then trenches.

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directing its blow first on the flanks, and then in the center, where my battalion stood, part of the division spontaneously withdrew and began to retreat to Kanev, and then, by inertia, ran to the very crossing on the Dnieper. Communication and control were lost, confusion began, which often ends in panic. People were forced to accumulate in the narrow neck of the crossing across the Dnieper.

Among the command there was a firm man who gathered most of the fugitives, put them in order, lined up, shot several alarmists in front of the formation. This was enough for the fugitives to return to their

place" ...

After crossing to the eastern bank of the Dnieper, Vershigora was wounded:

"The wound turned out to be light, the body quickly regained strength, and a month later I was seconded to the headquarters of the South-Western Front, to the command reserve company. There were several hundred of us commanders - from majors to junior lieutenants, people in clothes with the smell of a hospital still not weathered out and with empty holsters on their sides.

- It happened not far from Pryluky. A few days after being enrolled in the company, we learned that the reserve company, as well as part of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, was surrounded. The Germans dropped troops at the time when we were on the march and entered the city of Lubny. There was a battle with the landing force. I caught a running saddled horse, my comrade another. We turned off the main road and drove to the machine and tractor station, located two kilometers from the city. After that, they rode to the crossing, across the railway, which was fiercely bombed by the Junkers. In the evening we returned to the city again: the way back was also cut off.

The inhabitants sat in the basements, there was no one to ask if there were Germans in the city or not. We were walking along the sidewalk. The horseshoes clattered loudly on the stone slabs. Having reached the end of the street overlooking the square, we stopped and saw German tanks. They settled down for the night in the center of the square. We stood for a few minutes watching them. Then a rocket shot up into the sky, and our horses galloped back.

... Wanderings began in the environment ...

For myself, I drew conclusions: you need to get out of the environment

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quickly or not at all. On the first day of the exit from the encirclement, horses helped me and my comrade, who carried us fifty or sixty kilometers ahead "...!

September 17th. Dismemberment of the boiler.

"On September 17, units of the division, together with the 9th Panzer Division on the right and the 25th Infantry (Motorized) Division on the left, took up positions along Orzhitsa 30 km west of Luben. X! the corps drove the Russians from the southwest straight into the trunks of the 16th Panzer Division.

At 05.30, the tank regiment with the marching group Gefer (N&Yog) and the 1st battery of the 16th artillery regiment began the enterprise. The 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment remained in Lubny for the time being. The companies cleaned village after village. The liaison officer left behind by the tankers, Oberleutnant Bollert (BoJep), ensured close communication between the tankmen and the motorized riflemen. Large booty and a large number of prisoners proved the success of the new tactics (meaning the tough defense of the main encirclement ring, combined with strikes inside the boiler and

division of the Soviet troops. - Auth.). At 11.15 the vanguard reached Orzhitsa. The 1st battalion of the 64th motorized rifle regiment created a bridgehead in the Yablonevo area and took 500 KOV prisoners.

September 18-21. Endless breakthroughs.

As a rule, as long as the histories of German divisions, as well as our combat documents, deal with events preceding breakthroughs from the encirclement, the dates and facts coincide for the most part. But as soon as the encircled people begin active actions, such a mixture of troops begins, events flash by with such speed that later, even according to the documents of the winning side, it is almost impossible to restore their sequence and come to a common logical denominator. The main discrepancy between the events that took place in the area of the Orzhitsa River and the Orzhitsa settlement is the discrepancy between the date of the main breakthrough. According to our data, the first breakthrough of the troops of Kostenko's 26th army, namely

1 Vershigora P.P. People with a clear conscience. M.: Sovremennik, 1986.

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she was surrounded after the breakthrough of the front of the 38th Army, took place on September 21 or 22. According to the history of the 16th Panzer Division, 20 September. The second discrepancy is the frequency of breakthroughs by Soviet troops from the encirclement. According to German data, breakthroughs were constant. According to our data, it was not so easy to break through.

"Over the following days, the division occupied a front 25 km wide, being in defensive positions along Chumgak (T5svot)) and Orzhitsa, from Mikhailovka to Onishki (Onishki are located on the left bank of the Orzhitsa, near its confluence with the Sula, opposite Onishek, on the right bank of the Orzhitsa is the city of Orzhitsa. - Auth.), in order to prevent the breakthrough and destruction of the enemy, who was hunted to the south by the KhG Corps. On September 19, the Russians lost Kyiv. Reconnaissance and strike groups conducted active offensive operations, attacked villages in front of the forward line of defense, destroyed tanks, the 1st battalion of the 64th motorized regiment on the right flank repelled the attacks of cavalry squadrons (possibly, speech of the 37th cavalry division, part of which turned out to be cut off from the 38th Army and was transferred to the 26th Army. - Auth.) And enemy columns. The fight for Filippovichi went on for days on end, especially in the Belousovka area. The vanguards of the 45th, advancing from the north, immediately arrived here and took part in the battles. and the 279th with the 512th regiment of infantry divisions.

Oberst Gefer (Nj{eg) paid special attention to enemy concentrations on the western bank of the Orzhitsa near Krupoderintsev and Denisovka. He turned all the weapons at his disposal against these enemy bases.

When the strike group on September 21 established that Krupo-. Derintsy were occupied only by small forces, the commander of the 64th motorized rifle regiment, on his own initiative, ordered the 2nd battalion of the 64th regiment to take this settlement located on the opposite bank of the river, take up defense along its southern edge and establish an elbow connection with [6th reconnaissance battalion in Savintsy. Around 19.30 sapper

1 On modern Ukrainian Russian-language maps - Pilipovichi. Belousovka, Pilipovichi and Mikhailovka - villages on the right flank of the defense of the 16th Panzer Division along the Orzhitsa and Chumgak rivers.

The 2nd 45th Infantry Division was part of Army Group Center. Take Brest. The reconnaissance detachment of the division was commanded by Oberst Lieutenant Helmut von Panwitz, later - "camping ataman Batko von Panwitz."

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ny platoon restored the destroyed bridge. It was already dark. On reaching their starting positions, the battalion of Oberst Lieutenant Reimann (Reitmann) suddenly collided with a long column moving to the right and left of the road.

Cars stopped: "Password?" No answer came from the impenetrable darkness. Bursts of machine-gun fire slashed at the ghostly masses, which began to scatter in search of cover. While machine-gun and rifle fire suppressed the Russians, the vehicles took up new positions. Opening fire on the columns, they forced them to stop. The Russians threw out the white flag. Rich booty!

Nevertheless, the center of gravity of the Russian attempts to break through the enemy defenses lay on the left flank. Here the 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment took up defensive positions between Ostapovka and Onishki.

On the morning of September 20! units of four Russian divisions, which had been transported from the interior of the pocket to its eastern edge, launched an attack. They captured the crossing on the river near Onishki, broke through the cauldron and disappeared in a northeasterly direction. A special group was immediately organized (reinforced 1st battalion of the 64th motorized regiment without the 3rd company, one tank company and the 2nd division of the 16th artillery regiment), which was thrown on the threatened flank

At 17.30 the counterattack began. However, the Russian cavalry attacked the rear. The companies had to randomly retreat to their original positions. After the 1st Battalion of the 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment came to the aid of the Polo, supported by mortars, the offensive began again. With cries of "Hurrah!" the soldiers rushed forward. Strong Russian artillery fire covered the corn and hemp fields. Fountains of explosions rose above the ground, fragments hissed in the air and crashed into the arable land. Closer to the enemy! But here the Russians

opened fire from tank and anti-tank guns; the center of the attackers was hit by a "ratsh-boom"². Rifleman, like recruits, jumped from cover to cover, hiding in clusters behind the tanks. Finally, they reached the hill from the triangular

| The date of September 22 would agree with Soviet sources.

² Presumably, a 57-mm anti-tank gun (see: Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. M.: AST Publishing House LLC; Transitkniga LLC, 2004. P. 580).

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point and found themselves in front of the Russian trenches. Fierce close combat. The Russians preferred to be shot in the trenches rather than leave them; but the soldiers of the 16th Panzer Division were no less tough and resolute: they pushed back the desperately fighting enemy and closed the gap in the defense!

Many days later, Bagramyan, who came out of the encirclement, met other lucky ones, and learned from them about the breakthrough of the 26th Army in the Orzhitsa area:

"After consulting with Tupikov, Burmistenko and Rykov, the commander ordered the following tasks to be assigned to the armies: on the 21st - on September 18, concentrate on the line of Bragintsy, Gnedintsy (southeast of Priluk) and with the main forces to strike at Romny, towards the 2nd cavalry corps; 5th - part of the forces to cover the withdrawal of the 21st Army from the west, and the rest to strike at Lokhvitsa; 26th - having created a strong fist of two divisions, advance on Lubny; 37th - withdraw troops from the Kyiv fortified area to the left bank of the Dnieper, create a strike group from them and break through to Piryatin and further to the east, constituting the rearguard of the front forces; 40th and 38th - strike from the east towards the main forces of the front. in the directions to Romny and Lubny ...

... Commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, having received an order to leave the encirclement in the second half of the night of September 18, invited members of the Military Council D.E. Kolesnikov and V.S. Butyrin (former secretary of the Nikolaev Regional Committee of the CP(b)U), Chief of Staff Colonel I.S. Varennikov, Chief of Artillery Colonel P.S. Semenov, head of the political department of the regimental commissar I.V. Zakovorotny and the head of the special department P.V. Watis. After a short discussion of the situation that had arisen, Kostenko made a decision: to withdraw the troops under the cover of the rearguards to the Orzhitsa River and from this line to organize a breakthrough in the direction of Lubny, towards the 5th Cavalry Corps of General Kamkov advancing from the east (perhaps it is Kamkov's cavalrymen who are called in history of the 16th Panzer Division as having struck in the rear of the 16th TD. - Auth.) and the tank brigades of the 38th Army. Having given

| enyep I/. Or. si. \$. 66.387

order to the divisions, the army commander with his headquarters moved to the city of Orzhitsa, where all the troops were concentrated. The small Ukrainian town was filled to the limit with cars and convoys. Having ordered a small detachment of I.I. Alekseev to cover the city, the commander began to create a strike force. Without communications, this was difficult. In addition, it was necessary to constantly take care of the open flanks of the army, which were pressed from the north by the troops of Guderian, and from the south - by parts of the 17th German army.

On September 21, Kostenko made the first attempt to break through the front of the 1st Panzer Group Kleist. After a little artillery preparation, the divisions began to force the Orzhitsa River. The enemy offered fierce resistance. There, where the forward subunits managed to cling to the left bank, the fascist command threw its tank units. Our fighters met enemy tanks with artillery fire, bottles of flammable liquid and grenades. The people rose again and again to the vataku. -

Subsequently, one of the active participants in these battles said that the battalions of the 69th Infantry Regiment of the 97th Infantry Division (formerly part of the 38th Army) several times rushed to enemy positions, but under the hurricane fire of fascist soldiers buried in the ground tanks were forced to retreat. The same hot fights took place in all areas.

In their unsuccessful attempts to cross the river, the divisions used up almost all their ammunition. General Kostenko, having no connection with the headquarters of the front, managed to contact the Stavka and sent a radiogram to Marshal Shaposhnikov:

"I continue to fight in the encirclement on the Orzhitsa River. All attempts to cross the river were repulsed. There are no ammunition. Help those aircraft.

Marshal Shaposhnikov ordered to drop ammunition from the air into the Kostenko army's area of operations.

Oddly enough, but the misfortune of the 26th Army was the presence of radio communications, which, until September 23, it was possible to maintain with the commander-in-chief of the South-West direction S.K. Timo

Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1988. S. 307.

Shenko and Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Since these higher commanding authorities had no idea about what was really happening inside the boiler, then, accordingly, they would give accurate information and precise orders to Kostenko's army.
could not.

On September 20, Timoshenko ordered the 26th Army to "strike in order to break out of the encirclement not on Mirgorod, but in the general direction on Romny, leaving a strong barrier in the direction of Lubny Mirgorod"!

This indication:

- changed the previously determined direction of impact to break through the enemy ring by 90 degrees;

- now it was necessary to break through not to the east, through the ring created by the German tank divisions, but to the north - through the very thick of the enemy infantry formations. The difference is that the RING created by mobile formations can never be as dense as the ring created by infantry. Moreover, in the event of a breakthrough at night, the effectiveness of tanks is not as high as during the day. And in the event of a daytime breakthrough by aviation from the mainland, it is easier to detect and knock out tanks in a narrow section of the breakthrough than to fight the German infantry crawling into the crack;

- this instruction by Tymoshenko lengthened the exit route by one day (more than 25 km), which was extremely undesirable in those conditions;

- to the north of Orzhitsa are Piryatin and Chernukhi - the area of concentration of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the 5th Army, the remnants of units of the 5th, 21st and two divisions of the 26th Army; however, by September 20, all this had already died, and a breakthrough in this direction would not mean the connection and strengthening of Soviet troops;

- a breakthrough to Romny was recommended because it was there that a deblocking blow was delivered from the mainland; Thus, it was not the direction of the deblocking strike that adjusted to the encircled, but, on the contrary, the encircled, who were in obviously worse conditions, had to adjust to the deblocking strike.

1 Isaev A.V. Boilers of the 41st. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know. M.: Yau for; Eksmo, 2005. S. 190.

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September 22nd. The breakthroughs continue.

"The night passed quietly. On the morning of September 22, the Kharmeysky Corps approached 10 km from the southwest to Orzhitsa and pressed even harder on the Russians, who were opposite the positions of the 16th Panzer Division. Surrounded once again tried to snatch-

coming from a pocket south of Ostapovka. They were met by barrage fire from a cannon battery. However, by evening, on the second attempt, they managed to break through in the sector of the Vota battalion (1st battalion of the 79th motorized regiment).

And now, in the rear of the Wagner battle group, the enemy cavalry appeared, the batteries turned their guns 180 degrees. The attacking Cossack battalion walked through the headquarters of Vot's battalion; communication with the regiment was interrupted. At the same time, Ober-Lieutenant Kremer (Kgeter, 2nd company of the 64th regiment) on a completely dark night found himself among a group of Cossacks who had stopped to rest and pretended to be dead. Horses approached him, but he remained unnoticed and slipped away unharmed.

This episode from the history of the 16th Panzer Division describes a breakthrough at Ostapovka, which was located on the right flank of the line of defense of the 16th Panzer Division. Grebenka and the airfield of the South-Western Front are located 15 km northeast of Ostapovka, and Piryatin, where the headquarters of the Southwestern Front was located, is 15 km from Grebenka. Obviously, those breaking through in this direction did not know that both the airfield and Piryatin had long been in the hands of the Germans, and the front headquarters had died ...

However, the Headquarters did not know about this either:

"Seeing that the army could not break through to Lubny, on September 22, Shaposhnikov informed the commander that Kirponos, Potapov and Kuznetsov were advancing towards Belov's cavalry corps in the direction of Lokhvitsa, and demanded that he also turn to the northeast and make his way after them, - talks about this day Bagramyan. - September 22 at 9 pm Kostenko decided to try to cross the river again. But he did not have time: for the deputy head of the operational department of the army, Major A.K. Blazhey reported that the Germans broke into the eastern outskirts of Orzhitsa and set fire to it. Further waiting was like death. Kostenko summoned brigade commander A.B. Borisov, whose cavalry group was nearby and now became part of the 26th Army.

1 Yenyep I/. Or. si. 5.66.390

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Borisov received an order to strike at the enemy who had broken through. The battle was already approaching the army headquarters, when Borisov's horsemen attacked the Nazis.

Taking a machine gun and shoving grenades into his pockets, Kostenko told the officers of his headquarters:

- Come on, comrades!

Following the horsemen, they made their way to the dam, along which they crossed to the opposite bank. Here they were awaited by horses, prudently allocated by brigade commander Borisov.

Kostenko's headquarters, which used to be the headquarters of the cavalry group, consisted mainly of experienced horsemen. Once on horseback, they immediately cheered up. A rider on a good horse is strength! Together with Borisov's cavalry and other units, the army headquarters made its way forward with continuous battles. I had to cross several rivers. On the eastern bank of the Sula, at night they ran into the firing positions of German mortar batteries, covered by infantry units. A fight ensued. Twice the Soviet cavalry unsuccessfully rushed to the attack. Went for the third time. They broke through!

Judging by the radiograms, neither on September 21 nor on September 22 Kostenko managed to break out of the encirclement:

- September 22, 03.47: "159th Rifle Division is fighting surrounded in Dybovka, 196 Rifle Division of 164th Rifle Division are cut off and are fighting in the Denisovka area. The remaining parts are surrounded by Orzhitsa. Attempts to break through were unsuccessful. A large number of wounded have accumulated in Orzhitsa, the landing of air ambulances is impossible due to a small encirclement ring.

22.9. I make one last attempt to get out of the encirclement to the east. I ask you to orient yourself in the situation and whether real help can be expected.

Kostenko, Kolesnikov, Varennikov.

- September 23, 09.21: "The situation is extremely difficult.

With the onset of darkness, I will try to break through with the remnants into

in the direction of Orzhitsa - Iskovtsy - Sands. Huge carts

front and the wounded were forced to leave in Orzhitsa, who could not be taken out.

Kostenko, Kolesnikov"?

Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1988. S. 308.

. Radiograms are quoted from: Isaev A.V. Boilers of the 41st. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know. Moscow: Yauza; Eksmo, 2005, pp. 190-191.

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September 23-24. Last breakthrough. Boiler closing.

"At dawn the battle continued. The Russians held the place of the breakthrough and led their troops through it. Ostapovka was in the hands of the enemy.! Now the enemy also tried to break through the kyugu from Denisovka, crossed the river, took Zolotukhi and, striking to the northeast to Petrikov, slipped away with part of his troops to the east. German artillery fire turned

Xia in a hurricane, barrels of all calibers fired at the enemy's exit routes.

Only during September 23 and 24 was it possible to close the gaps again. Masses of prisoners appeared. Enemy pressure eased. The 16th Panzer Division prepared for the defense at Sula.

Chaos reigned in the places where the enemy had penetrated: hundreds of trucks and light vehicles lay scattered throughout the area. Often, when trying to jump out of cars, people were struck down and hung from the doors, burned like black mummies. Thousands of dead men lay around the vehicles, in the fields the remains of women's bodies, crushed by tanks, shreds of the uniform of a Russian general?, who, obviously, ran away in civilian clothes.

The nights were already cold, but during the day the warm sun shone over the corpse field, and the last days seemed like a terrible nightmare.

The fighting to clear the Kyiv pocket continued until 4 October. In all, 51 Russian divisions were destroyed, 665,000 men were taken prisoner, 3,718 guns and 884 tanks were captured, according to the Wehrmacht. -

The 16th Panzer Division was again fighting in the decisive sector; now she was a shot hare among tank units. The soldiers were proud of their division, the symbol of which was known everywhere in the south "...4

"In early October, the commander of the 26th Army with the remnants of his troops left the enemy ring in the combat zone of the 5th Cavalry Corps," concludes the story of

1 If the commander of 26A broke through at Orzhitsa through the left flank of the 16th TD, then it is possible that Ostapovka's strike, on the right flank of the Hube division, played a supporting role for Kostenko's breakthrough.

? According to A.V. Isaev, the commander of the 1st Airborne Corps, Major General Usenko, died in this area (decree. Op. C. 583).

3 That's right, but it was reported on September 27, and if the fighting continued until October 4, then Goebbels clearly made a mistake.

4 Line no. Or. si. 5.67.

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breakthrough of Kostenko's troops through the battle formations of the 16th Panzer Division I.Kh. Bagramyan. - For a long time after that, the stragglers and army commanders continued to seep through the front line in small groups, and even alone. A member of the Military Council of the Army, Brigadier Commissar D.E., safely left the encirclement. Kolesnikov, Head of the Literary Department, Regimental Commissar I.V. Zakovorotny and many other commanders and political workers. Some of the soldiers and officers, before being among their own, stepped back along you

enemy llamas several hundred kilometers. One such group, led by political instructor Mikhail Trofimovich Taran, overcame
, la a total of 600 kilometers and went out to her
life, documents and orders. The group included a woman - a military
paramedic from the 169th Infantry Regiment Antonina Afanasievna Matvienko.
She, along with the men, steadfastly endured all the hardships of the campaign.
She was tormented by bouts of malaria, the wounds on her legs festered, but she
continued to stubbornly march east, refusing the offers of compassionate
collective farmers to stay with them and receive medical treatment. When she lost
consciousness, the companions, who themselves could hardly keep on their feet,
carefully carried her. The 169th Rifle Regiment is also mentioned in the history of
Model's 3rd Panzer Division, but it refers to an earlier period: "On September
1, at about 05.00, the Russian 169th Rifle Regiment suddenly pressed on the rear
guard line passing in the Romen area. Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski (Zsppe!
4er-Koz (a! \$ K!), Having collected his tanks, moved towards the Russians!

For completeness of sensations and in order not to educate the people
in defeatist moods, we will complete the story with the words of the Hero
of the Soviet Union P.P. Vershigory. Having broken through the rings of
the 16th and 3rd Panzer Divisions, Vershigora found himself at the headquarters
of ... the Southwestern Front:

"... Going out to Bogodukhov, where our advanced units were, we went to
Kharkov. In Kharkov, the political department of the front, having learned about
my civilian specialty as a film director, sent me to the political department of the
40th Army to lead a brigade of front-line photojournalists.

1 Sezsyshe 4er 3. Rapgeg-Ouyup. Wet-Wtapdepbige 1935-1945. Negaizrerebept
wtm Tr@lwopzuegana 4er 00\\.\$op. Weglt: WeepPav - deg Wisnpapshi8 Soteg Esmeg, 1967. 5.
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In the political department of the 40th army, about ten of us gathered, armed
with FED portable cameras ...

... In the area east of Sumy, for the first time in this war, I saw how the Germans
were running. It was September 28, 1941. The first rains came, thick sticky mud
covered the roads. At this time, our tank brigade and motorized division broke
through the front near Shtepovka. And the first Austrian and full-blooded German
divisions, abandoning all their equipment, fled to the very Kono Top. For two
days, our tractors dragged away eight-ton German cars loaded with all sorts of
junk. For two days, my lads and I ran like crazy through the subdivisions of the
division and clicked our devices. Up to five hundred vehicles of various systems
stood in a small grove behind the Nikolaevka farm. We chose a brand new Oppel
Blitz, which rolled off the assembly line of the factory just two months ago.

Short story. The 257th Infantry Division was formed on August 26, 1939 in Berlin-Karlhorst as a division of the 4th wave. The main stages of the military path: 1940 - France, 1941 - San, Lvov, Uman cauldron, Kiev cauldron, Mirgorod, Poltava, Krasnograd, Izyum,

Slavyansk, Znamenka, 1942 - Donetsk,

France, 1943 - Izyum, Lozovaya, Dnep

Ropetrovsk, Krivoy Rog, 1944 - Niko- Emblem of the 257th field, Tiraspol, Bendery, death in the district infantry division. One Prut.

In June 1941, the 257th division included:

- 457th Infantry Regiment;
- 466th Infantry Regiment;
- 477th Infantry Regiment;
- 257th anti-tank battalion;
- 257th reconnaissance battalion;
- 257th artillery regiment;
- 257th communications battalion;
- 257th engineer battalion;
- 257th supply battalion, etc.

During the period of participation in the Kiev pocket, the 257th division was commanded by General of the Engineer Troops Karl Sachs (Sepega! 4er Rüpege Cap! Zass \$). In August, the division was part of the 52nd, and in September - the 11th Army Corps of the 17th Army of the ar group. mi "South".

Initial position. "On June 19, the division received an order from the command: "The start of the attack is on June 22 at 03.15." This order destroyed the last hope that we could avoid

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battle, for a happy outcome of which there were so few chances - given the breadth of the Russian space, inexhaustible reserves and adamant regime "- this is how Albert Benari begins the story of the participation of the 257th Infantry Division in the struggle on the Eastern Front!

On June 22, 1941, the 257th Infantry Division, as part of the 49th Corps of the 17th Stulpnagel Army, crossed the Soviet border and entered into the first battles with a new, hitherto unknown anti-Tivnik.

“The impression of the first battle day was this: the Russian is tough, very brave, but an insidious fighter and a very good

shooter, - says A. Benari. - Taking into account the general course of the battle, the impression was that, perhaps, we succeeded in tactical surprise ... The command and troops were preparing for the fact that there would be a fierce battle in the next two days. However, the fears were not justified. Daily tasks were carried out without serious resistance.

..The country with which we got to know did not differ significantly from Poland, which is quite familiar to us. More or less extensive forest areas enlivened the hilly terrain, the villages in most cases were hidden in green gardens, which also hid their poverty ... Again and again we were struck by the kind attitude of the Polish-Ukrainian population, which in almost all villages met us as liberators, with triumphal arches, banners, bread and salt, eggs and flowers. It was their sigh of relief after the horrors of Russian rule... However, in the settlements there were nursing homes, hospitals and kindergartens... Thus, our first impression of the activities of this regime was contradictory."

The first stage of the path of the 257th Infantry Division across Ukraine ended with participation in the encirclement and destruction of the troops of the 6th and 12th Soviet armies in the Uman region. During this period, from June 22 to August 8, the division lost: 25 officers killed and 40 wounded, 1370 non-commissioned officers and privates killed and
nasty...

: Vepagu A. Ge Vesnter Vagen-GU\1\$1op. Cessischshe 4er 257. !laschen Omop 1939-1945. UeNae Napz-Neppp8 Rod?ip, Ba@ MaiBelt, 1957. \$. 26.

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On August 30, reconnaissance of the Southwestern Front established the arrival of the 257th Infantry Division in the Kremenchug area. The scouts managed to capture the "Languages" from this division:

"INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 67 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE SWF 31.8.41 6.00

Card 500,000, 200,000

1) Grouping and concentration.

..Kremenchug grouping (in the area of St. Lipovo, Nv. Georgievsk, Derievka) - up to 4-5 divisions of infantry divisions are concentrated, of which 257 are installed (in the area of Nv. Georgievsk) and, prel positively, 18 infantry divisions (in the area of Derievka), the numbering of the remaining divisions has not been revealed.

Thus, the South-Western Front is opposed by 35-38 divisions, of which 4-5 are mechanized.

(...)

2) The actions of the enemy.

... According to military intelligence, requiring verification, enemy units of unknown numbers from Mudrovka and Borovitsa on the night of August 30 departed in the direction of Kurchanovka, 2 km south of Kremenchug.

On the night of August 30, the enemy unsuccessfully tried to cross the river. Dnieper southeast of Kryukov (south of Kremenchug).

The island northeast of Derievka is occupied by the enemy with a force of up to a battalion; during 30.8 there was an intense movement of boats from the western coast to the island.

(...)

Miscellaneous.

... Operating in the area of \u200b\u200bNv. Georgievsk 257 infantry division, according to the prisoners, has up to 25-30% losses in battles in the Uman region. The division is commanded by Lieutenant General Zaks.

(...)

Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front Military Commissar of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front
Head of the RO of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front "".

September 1-7. Transfer of the 257th division to the Kremenchug area. Capture of the Derievsky bridgehead. Preparations for the capture of the Kremenchug bridgehead. "The next big target was the Dnieper, to which the 1st Panzer Group rushed," continues

1 SBDVOV. T.40.

A. Benari. - On August 15, by order of the 49th Army Corps, the division set out. In long night marches, it moved without contact with the enemy through Novoukrainka, Pleteny Tashlyk, the area north of Kirovograd and reached the Dnieper on both sides of Novogeorgievsk, where the main forces of the division, having arrived there between 21 and 23 August, replaced the Italian division. The division took up defensive positions, deployed on a front of 30 km along the southern bank of the river - this wide 1000-meter lazy stream. Individual air raids and artillery attacks hardly interfered with a quiet life in amazingly clean, friendly villages with colorfully painted flowers and variously ornamented window frames. Here, for the first time, the population confirmed those "terrible stories" that we knew from the German newspapers of 1932-1933: in this granary of Russia they were so hungry that they caught children and babies and ate them. The explanation was given that due to crop failure food was sent to the industrial workers, leaving nothing for the peasants themselves.

On August 21, the division came under the command of the KhG of the army corps of General von Kortzfleisch (Sepega! wop Kop7Ye! cP). Separate local battles for the southern bank of the river and the islands located on the Dnieper were associated with heavy losses for both sides. It was not possible to take possession of these islands, since the 466th Infantry Regiment was not able to drive the Russians out of the large Dnieper island west of Kremenchug.

While the 1st Panzer Group fought for the bridgehead near Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk until 25 August, the 17th and 6th Armies formed a long, more than 400 km, defense line along the Dnieper up to the area west of Kiev, where the Russians retreated from the river only at the end of August!

The most important goal was, even before the onset of winter, the capture of the fortifications of the Crimea and the Donets industrial coal basin, as well as the blocking of the Russian oil supply from the Caucasus.

In order to ensure the mandatory provision of the northern flank of Army Group South, before the operations on Rostov and Kharkov, it was necessary to first destroy those echeloned in front of Kiev

Vepagu A. Gle Veigiteg Wagep-Bum51yup. Sezsysve er 257. Aschen Ou/m5yup 1939-1945. Uepa Napz-Neppya Rodtip, Va@ Maipetit, 1957. \$. 44.

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VOM powerful Russian troops. For this annihilating battle, the powerful forces of Army Groups Center and South were allocated.

The 17th Army was to create a bridgehead east of Kremenchug.

"For the construction of the pontoon bridge needed for this, strong engineer units were brought together, including the headquarters and the 2nd company of the 257th engineer battalion and about 16 pontoon-bridge columns," says A. Benari. The river was saturated with many islands, partially overgrown with forest. The western coast was, 2 km inland, a dune landscape. At dawn on September 1, the first assault boats moved forward under the cover of fog. At the same time, the construction of a military crossing was started. Thus, by the evening it was possible to transport those strong warheads that could be sustained by the pontoon section of the bridge designed for 8 tons. The crossing was built in 6 hours, despite the double destruction of it by Russian air raids. The bridge had a total length of 733 m, of which 650 m was afloat, and the rest was on bridge supports.

In the formation of a bridgehead to the east of Kremenchug! the division not only did not participate, but a few days later received a combat order to advance across the river west of Kremenchug. The views of the leadership of the division and the command of the corps on a more favorable place for the crossing diverged for a long time. In view of the supposed strong

defense of the river?, the division was engaged in reconnaissance for a long time and thought through the best possibilities. The choice fell on a seemingly not very favorable place for the crossing, about 9 km west of Kremenchug. However, just because of the inconvenience, this place also promised the advantage of surprise. Finally, the command of the corps announced its agreement with this plan.

For the offensive, the divisions were subordinated to:

- AgCo 6 shi 10 st Cap. Al. P/53 (artillery command with a division of 100-mm guns);

- Ap. B. 295 (295th artillery regiment);

- Mogzeg-AM. 732 (732 division 211-mm mortar);

' We are talking about the Derievsky bridgehead, for the elimination of which the main forces of the 38th Army and the reserves of the South-Western Front will be concentrated. However, Kleist's 1st Panzer Group would break through in a weakened sector - west of this bridgehead, in the region of Kremenchug itself.

2? Just this area was almost not defended.

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- Veobast. Ab.: 21 (21st reconnaissance artillery battalion);

- EP Ship85-Af.: 102 (102nd degassing, and in fact - rocket and artillery division);

- 1 Nak-Ashch. (air defense battery);

- Ra. Van. 295 (295th engineer battalion);

- 1./P1. Van. 73 (1st company of the 73rd engineer battalion);

- 1 VgasKep-KoJoppe E (pontoon-bridge column);

- 68 assault boats;

- 150 large inflatable boats.

How joyful the relatively large reinforcement of artillery was for us, just as upsetting, at the thought of the width of the river, were the forces of the sappers. The divisional order to force was issued after a thorough personal reconnaissance by the unit commanders and a detailed discussion with the commander of the sappers, Oberst-Lieutenant Capella (R1.-Reiger: OB\$11. Sara!Ne). | |

It was calculated to prepare everything so carefully that the power transition would take place with as little bloodshed as possible.

While the 257th division was preparing to cross the Dnieper just west of Kremenchug, on the left bank of the Dnieper, just east of Kremenchug, the 239th Infantry Division appeared. However, the 239th division crossed not the Dnieper, but Psel, which flows into the Dnieper 7 km east of Kremenchug. Between Psel and the mouth of the Vorskla, located 40 km east of it, there was the Derievsky bridgehead, from which the 239th division crossed to Kremenchug. Intelligence of the South-Western Front recorded this fact on September 4:

"INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 72 OF THE STAFF OF THE SWF 5.9.41 6.00

Card 500,000, 200,000

1) Grouping and concentration. A survey of prisoners established the action on the Konotop direction of 10 md, Zi 4 td, which are part of 24 ak. The same data established that 101, 125, 76 and, presumably, 18 frontiers operate in the Kremenchug-Perevolochnaya section (Derievsky bridgehead. - Auth.). In addition, the Kremenchug region is apparently heading

| Wepagu A. Oze Wegsheg Wagep-Om op. Sessshs No. 4er 257. |sheaiepe Omyuop 1939-1945. Vepayo Nap5-Nepshe Rod2in, Baa Maineit, 1957. 5. 45.

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257 pd, which occupied a section northwest of Kremenchug (on the right bank in the area of Nv. Georgievsk. - Auth.).

(...)

2) The actions of the enemy.

(...)

Kremenchug direction. During 4.9 the enemy continued to conduct stubborn battles on the left bank of the river. Dnieper at the front of Deinevka, Manki, Prishib, Solovka, Soloshino, Perevolochnaya (Derievsky bridgehead. - Auth.). At 16.00, the enemy, by unidentified forces, managed to cross over to the right bank of the river. Psel in the Potoky area! (this was the 239th infantry division. - Auth.), By the end of the day, the fighting continued "?.

8-9 September. Capture and expansion of the bridgehead at Kremenchug. "On the night of September 8, the attacking groups concentrated in the starting areas," continues the historian of the 257th division. - September 8 at 06.00 the transition began with a powerful artillery raid and a degassing battalion. In a deafening roar and a sea of fire from heavy throwing weapons? almost zero fire from both artillery regiments. At the same time, assault boats carried the first wave of infantry across the river (the 457th Infantry Regiment on the right, the 477th on the left). The fire raid affected the enemy so much that at first on the

enemy resistance was hardly observed, only a light and heavy Russian battery began firing. During the first half of the day, the bridgehead was so expanded that it was possible to cross the 1st light battery (1. 1e. Bailene). The battery began to ferry. But everything happened very slowly. The 8-ton ferry could only take guns without horses, and it took an hour and a half to travel there and back; in addition, more and more assault boats received engine damage, resulting in delays.

' We do not know what Soviet units were in this area on that day, but since August 10, the reserve of the 38th Army, the combined regiment of the Poltava Tractor School, has been stationed in Potoky.

2? SBD WWII. T. 40.

E Obviously, we are talking about firing missiles from launchers \$\\\" 40 (to?) or \$\\\" 41 (man). A 280-mm high-explosive rocket hit the enemy with fragments at a distance of 800 meters and completely destroyed a brick building with a direct hit. A 320 mm incendiary rocket set fire to an area of 200 square meters. meters. These installations were available in degassing battalions and were unofficially called "roaring cows".

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However, due to continued attacks from a large bridgehead east of Kremenchug, the Russians were already weakening and did not offer organized resistance. By evening, the division formed a bridgehead with a depth of about 5 km and 12 km along the circumference with its advanced units.

Losses of the day were:

1 officer and 2 enlisted men died;

1 officer, 1 non-commissioned officer and 1 private were injured.

, About 1000 prisoners fell into our hands.

In the evening, heavy thunderstorms paralyzed all movements, and above all to the place of the crossing. On September 9, the pace of the crossing slows down due to the ever-increasing losses in the assault boats that were towing the ferries. Despite this, with weak enemy resistance, the task for the day was completed already in the first half of the day. During the second half, contact was established with the 239th Infantry Division, which attacked from the army bridgehead across Kremenchug to the northwest in the direction of Peschanoe!.

The army bridgehead, which is mentioned in the history of the 257th Infantry Division, is the one that we call Derievsky. It was located below Kremenchug along the Dnieper. The village of Peschanoe, where the 257th division joined with the 239th, in fact

Chesky is the northwestern outskirts of Kremenchug. Thus, in the Kremenchug region, the Germans formed, as it were, two bridgeheads: a large one, Derievsky, and a small one, Kremenchug itself. But in fact it was one bridgehead, divided by the Psel River, which stretched along the left bank of the Dnieper for 50 kilometers. The forces of the Southwestern Front, intended to eliminate this bridgehead, were concentrated in the area below Kremenchug. But worst of all, the mobile units of the 38th Army of General N.V. Feklenko - tank and cavalry formations - were even further away - on the right flank of the Derievsky bridgehead (if you see the flank through the eyes of the Germans). ,

Just at that time, in the 38th Army, which was trying to throw the Germans from the Derievsky bridgehead, there was the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, I.Kh. Bag ramyan:

1 Vepagu A. Ge Vesheg Vagen-P1\1\$1up. Sezshse @4er 257. P4amene Om \$yup 1939-1945. WayaE Napz-Nepshya Rodgip, VaYa Mikeit, 1957. 5. 46.

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"The crossed German infantry division was supported by units from the previously captured bridgehead. And here Kremenchug was defended by only one regiment of the 297th Infantry Division. The forces were too unequal. The city was in the hands of the enemy. Having sent another infantry division here, the enemy tried to develop an offensive to the north. Persistent counterattacks of the units of the 297th Infantry Division of Colonel G.A. Afanasyev, he was stopped north of Kremenchug.

Having received a report on September 9 that further advance of the enemy in this area was reliably stopped, Feklenko again turned all his attention to preparing a counterattack on the left flank of his army. The command of the front did not expect serious danger from Kremenchug either. Having received information from reconnaissance that a reconnaissance battalion of the 9th Panzer Division had been identified in the area of the Derievsky bridgehead, it assumed that the main forces of General Kleist's tank group would also come here. It is here that the shock group of our 38th Army will give them battle. Know the enemy, as we will see later, had completely different plans ...

... While we were trying to clear the bridgehead at Derievka, General Kleist secretly transferred his tank and motorized divisions to the Kremenchug region. On the morning of September 12, they fell on one of the regiments of the 297th Infantry Division, cut through its front and rushed north, in the general direction of Khorol. In the zone of their offensive, we had very few forces. And of course, it was not difficult to guess - Kleist rushed towards Guderian, whose advanced units by that time were already far south of Romne.

It was not difficult to guess that Kleist's tank armada would try to rush to connect with Guderian's troops. But

we were sure that the enemy would move his tanks precisely from that large bridgehead that he had between the rivers Psel and Vorskla, that it was for this purpose that the fascists so persistently expanded it, built pontoon bridges behind it. This opinion was further strengthened by the fact that it was here on September 10 that prisoners from the Kleist group were captured.

In a word, we were not able to timely reveal the concentration of Kleist's tanks in the Kremenchug area and were therefore unable to determine the sector on which they would strike. It was, of course, a big mistake. Now, two of the four German tank groups that existed on the entire Soviet-German front were irresistibly rushing behind the rear of the main forces of our front.

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Now, when everything that happened in those days has become extremely clear, one involuntarily comes to the conclusion: even if our intelligence helped us figure out where the Kleist tank group would strike, it would still be unlikely that we could prevent its breakthrough. The general superiority in forces and means was too great for the enemy.

September 10-11. Fight on the bridgehead. "On September 10, the enemy increased resistance, having received reinforcements in the infantry and artillery. The division, due to the slow crossing and the resulting shortage of forces, felt very disadvantageous. To this was added a repeated downpour, which made the approach to the crossing and the entire surrounding area again impassable. First of all, our motorized units, which were supposed to be brought into action through the pontoon bridge near Kremenchug, could not pass and joined the division only in the afternoon of September 11².

A former non-commissioned officer of the 9th Battery of the 257th Artillery Regiment Wege (CHYa. Uwe 4er9./Ap. B 81.257) gave us an episode from the days of preparations for crossing the river:

"Northwest of Kremenchug, in the wide, unregulated channel of the Dnieper, there are many small islands, the largest of them received the nickname "Rose"³. This island, 500 meters wide and about 2,000 meters long, was overgrown with dense shrubs and deciduous trees, and only on the side facing our front line west of the Dnieper coast, near the village of Georgievsk, one narrow strip could be seen. Russian observers were repeatedly found at this place, in addition, a bunker was discovered. To clarify the enemy forces on the island of "Rose", the division ordered reconnaissance. This was to be done by the 7th company of the 477th infantry regiment (7./1нй. VI. 477) under the command of Lieutenant Sonntag (14. Zopta \$) with the support

1 Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine,

1988. S. 275-279.

y Bepagu A. Ge Vesheg Bore-Om 1yuop. Sezshs No. deg 257. Imashene Omzyul 1939-1945. Wyayo Napz-Neppip? Rodgip, Vad Maipait, 1957. 5. 46.

3 Perhaps this refers to the island of Vorovskoye, which is mentioned in the Opersvodka of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. Vorovskoye Island is occupied by the enemy with a force of up to two companies. The division was reinforced with a battalion of the 97th rifle division and a battalion of the 21st infantry regiment.

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a top unit of the 9th battery (\U.V. 9. Vaig.) under the leadership of Lieutenant Oertinger (14. Oerapweg). At about 04.30 in the morning this group gathered on the banks of the Dnieper. The gun of the 7th battery, installed on the shore, destroyed a well-visible pillbox on the island with a direct hit. At this time, radio-controlled fire from the 9th battery covered the area in the landing zone.

At about 0500, the artillery fire was moved into the depths, and a strong reconnaissance group was sent in inflatable sappers. At the same time, even after the landing, we did not encounter resistance, on the contrary, we found a long, well-equipped trench with observation posts and a wooden bunker, everything, however, was abandoned. By order of the commander of the reconnaissance group, it was divided into two platoons, which stretched out to comb the bushes and a piece of forest. Suddenly, from there, a completely targeted Russian rifle fire began. Several volleys from the 9th battery forced the Russians to retreat. In the woods we found skillfully hidden shooting cells that were hardly recognizable. Slowly, defending ourselves from all sides, we moved forward. Moreover, the right wing of the 2nd platoon was able to penetrate to the other side of the island, where heavy machine gun fire was opened on it from the eastern bank of the Dnieper. Since the artillery could no longer help us because of the difficult visibility of the forest, on further advance we came under heavy rifle and grenade fire from all sides. In order to avoid losses that could decide the fate of the enterprise, we fought back and, leaving the forest to the meadow, took up all-round defense. From here we could again use our artillery. Covered by her fire, we arrived at the inflatable boats waiting for us and at about 17.00 again crossed to our own bank of the Dnieper.

Hauptmann Rosenbrock (Kosepgosk) reports in detail about the river crossing itself:

"Our brief positional struggle near the Dnieper and its islands was a mixture of calm beach life and exciting warfare in the bushes of the coastal jungle. Now the crossing over this mighty river was to follow!

On the evening of September 7, the commanders of the subdivisions in cars drove down the river ... where, after a theoretical briefing on the map, we could even see with our own

ü Vepagu A. Ge Veteig Vagep-Pum op. Sezshsme 4er 257. Pashchepe Omol
1939-1945. UeNaz Nap5-Neppte Rodgip, Vad MaiPeit, 1957. 5. 47.

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through the eyes of the original territory. The roads were busy. Artillery was delivered to positions, ammunition was brought up and laid out, sappers prepared rafts and paved the way for the assault boats to move out; headquarters set up command posts, and telephone cables were laid. The heat of the day subsided, the cool air of the Dnieper valleys refreshed the weary soldiers. They worked as quietly as possible. But all the same, one could hear the goading of horses, motors of heavily loaded trucks going in first gear through swamps and sands, driving in piles and knocking hammers on rafts. We listened intently to the opposite shore. Did the Russians notice our preparations? When will enemy artillery fire fall on our prepared troops? We rejoiced when, a few hours later, we got back into our cars and were able to leave.

in your parts.

A special tension gripped us. We were on the eve of a big military event. For the first time we had such a state of mind that reminded us of the military enthusiasm of the first days of August 1914, of the great soldierly history of our people.

Thus, we came to the starting positions. Everywhere we saw a flurry of activity, everywhere individual soldiers, small groups or large columns were working to carry out the assigned task. Here the education of the German soldier justified itself, which, thanks to tedious drill, made him precise and punctual, both superior and subordinate, without the need to supervise the smallest details.

A few hundred meters from the shore, we dug ourselves in a dense coastal forest. I established contact with those on the right and left and informed the battalion about the concentration in the starting position. Then I went to the beach. The sappers were preparing the assault boats for launching, nothing else was visible. It was a bright summer night. The Dnieper lay before us like a sea, the opposite bank could not be seen. Will we be able tomorrow to reach the opposite bank, which is 4 km away, to form a bridgehead there and gain space? Do we have to march hundreds of kilometers again to reach the next river? And then what? What will be the end? And can the war end in these vast expanses at all? Yet we were soldiers enough to ward off such thoughts. We had a combat order for

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bad day. It needs to be done. Everything else we must

we leave to our commanders and the Lord. I lay down in my shooting cell and fell asleep, deep and sound.

The sentry woke me up. In half an hour, preparations should begin at the shrine. We packed our assault gear and drank hot coffee brought to us by the field kitchen. Now we could go. Watch in hand, we waited for the hellish concert to begin.

At exactly the appointed time, we were horrified by the ominous howl that was emitted by the throwing batteries standing close behind us? (le[er-Vatsenep). A few seconds later grenades exploded with a terrible roar on the opposite bank. Artillery entered the battle with lightning speed, and with a roar, shells flew over our heads towards the enemy.

I went ashore and saw how the assault boats were drawn to the water. I jumped into the first of them so that I could be on the other side ahead of the company, so that later I could meet and collect the rest. The boat roared forward. A wonderful feeling pierced my body and soul. Bow waves foamed high to the right and left. As if on wings, furiously rushing foxes towards the trunks of enemy weapons. The Russian artillery responded. Here, totam, shells exploded on the beret and in the water. Fountains of explosions rose high. For a while, assault boats flew over the waves. The opposite bank was not yet visible, although we had already left half of the river behind us. With tension, intently we looked ahead: What will the next moment bring? Damage to the gas tank - and the boat will become a stationary target for Russian machine guns. We would only have a choice between a bullet and drowning. Assault boat sappers reassured us yesterday by reporting that "only" 50% of accidents occur at such enterprises.

The sand crunched under the keel. We are firmly seated! The coast was visible in the distance. Now the enemy, ready for defense, could easily disable us. We were in front of him like game on a tray. The resolute sapper tried to get out of the shallows by backing up. After numerous attempts, which we closely and anxiously followed, we succeeded. After that, we again rushed to the enemy. Right and left in the rays of the rising

. Wepagu A. Ge We! Wagep-ohm tag 5yup. Sezsysche money 257. [amepe Omol 1939-1945. VepaE Nap\$-Nepshe Rodtip, Wad Matzpeit, 1957. \$. 48.

2 Rocket launchers of the degassing battalion.

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sun, we saw our comrades jump out of the boats and take up position. It was a great picture. The war showed itself to be its most brilliant side. She will never repeat this for us.

We jumped out of the boat. The soldiers of the company with whom I

sat down, quickly broke the Russian resistance. I was left alone and had to wait for the landing of my soldiers. But didn't find a single one. Soldiers from other units were disembarking from boats nearby. But where are mine? I searched for them for a long time on the shore, ran between the disappointed Russians squatting in their pits, who, however, did nothing for me. I was alone, completely alone. The front moved forward several hundred meters from the beach. Finally, I noticed someone waving far to the left. I rushed there and saw my group commander, sergeant-major Weshe (Ee9. Noezve) with a large part of my company. I landed in the wrong place, because the assault boat could not reach the planned shore due to the sandbar!.

I was glad that my unit was found. Now we had to urgently gather the rest, organize them and advance into the gaping gap in front of us, take part in the formation of the bridgehead. This was done quickly. The enemy resistance was broken, and we took up our position. Our task was to make it possible to cross and concentrate in the initial position for the subsequent breakthrough of Kleist's panzer army.

We moved on. Where the village of Krivushi lay? We did not know whether it was occupied and by what forces. There was no infantry or artillery fire. So we moved forward quickly. Nevertheless, when we came close to the village, a lot of artillery shots burst nearby. However, we did not see breaks, only heard some peculiar rustles of these close shots. We were confused, but only for a moment, and, ceasing to pay attention to this, we entered the village. When we reached about the middle, I saw, 150 meters to my right, the commander of this battalion at headquarters. Since there were no obstacles, since the moment of the crossing, I still had no connection with the battalion

at Vepagu A. Ge Velteir Vagen-P1u: \$yup. Sezshsshe deg 257. Pashchepe Omson 1939-1945. Wayaz Napz-Nepshya Rodgip, Vad Maipelt, 1957. 5. 49.

2 Krivushi is a village on the western outskirts of Kremenchug.

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nom, then I ran to Hauptmann Caprivi (Sarp \!) To get orders from him on further actions. We greeted each other, rejoicing at the successes achieved. And as soon as he offered me a cigarette, a deadly fire fell on my company. Nothing much could be learned about the enemy. He fired from many machine guns and rifles. Between me and my men there was a wide potato field, which was under fire. I had to run across it. Detour by roundabout ways was impossible due to the need to act quickly. A unit without a commander in such a completely unclear position can easily panic. I made a mistake by leaving my position and now I had to correct

[illegible]

Throw! Forward, march, march! Things are going on, you just need to keep it to the end! .. I rush, suffocate, run, stumble, run again, they catch me on the fly again, finally, I fall into a ditch right in front of the feet of my group commander. There was no darkness in the eyes. But after a few minutes I'm already coming to my senses. I let me report and find out that everything is in order. The company lies in its positions, and meanwhile the enemy has been identified. Platoon rushes

at Vepagu A. [Ile VegSteg Vagen-P/m\$1op. Sezshsyye 4er 257. Shametspe RBmzyuop 1939-1945. UeNae Napz-Neppie Rodtip, Vad Maineit, 1957. \$. 50.

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attack and knock back the enemy. Two guns and many prisoners fall into our hands. The village has been taken.

The next morning we strike further and reach Mudrovka. Since I and my company were far ahead of my neighbors both on the right and on the left, I am on the opposite side of the face. A thin strip of swamp provides us with protection. The enemy opens fire on the village and launches a counterattack with mighty forces. We see how its masses at a distance, about 2-3 km, descend from a bare slope. This has to be prevented somehow. If they go down, they can, unnoticed and completely hidden, make their way to the swamp in front of our village. But how can this be prevented? Our artillery has not yet crossed the Dnieper, we have only 2 light infantry guns and a medium mortar. And vice versa, the Russian artillery puts heavy fire on the village and our positions. Our machine guns do not reach the enemy. Both light infantry guns do not reach. Thus, we observe how the Russian infantry is approaching us, and we cannot prevent it in any way. What can be done? We are alone. No one is left or right. We fire heavy machine guns from as far away as it makes any sense. Soon, however, the enemy disappeared from the field of view and advanced towards our positions without

be under supervision. This is a very unpleasant feeling. At the latest in one hour, they will be able to fall on us, and then only in close combat can they be delayed. Close combat 20:1. On the left, our flank is completely open, but on the right, other companies of the battalion have finally arrived. I report the situation to the commander. But he cannot help, his command post is under heavy fire. We are blindly firing on the impenetrable lowland with both infantry guns, heavy machine guns and mortars. No movement. We are anxiously waiting. An attack may begin every minute, preceded by a wild "Hurrah!". If only we had a slightly longer range!

The second half of the day passes under agonizing expectation. The enemy artillery fires continuously and inflicts significant losses on us. The commander of our infantry guns gives the dead. It's getting dark. Now even more attention is needed. We know that the masses of the enemy lie directly in the lowland in front of us. They must, and they will attack us. With strained nerves and with weapons prepared for battle, we lie and wait. The night is completely dark. Do you hear rustles there? Right! Signal rocket! I can not see anything.

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Again darkness, and again rustles. Signal flare on the right! The machine gun fires a burst, and again silence!.

This is repeated many times. Finally, the traffic in front of the swamp intensifies. Our machine guns roared with might and main. On the other side there is confusion, plaintive cries. Our fire is suspended. Not an attacking "cheers", but only a wild cry. Then there were slaps on the water: slap, slap! Machine guns rumbled again. I order: "Stop." We lie in the highest tension. Something splashed again in the swamp. We gaze into the darkness. Signal rocket! They stand up to their stomachs in the water, without weapons, with their hands up, approaching us: 10, 100, more. Now what? Trick, ambush? Or do they want to give up? They come in droves. We absolutely do not know what we should do with them. There are many more of them than us, standing between us, gesticulating, talking. Is our . the tension is easing, our hearts are beating more freely. We laugh at the great fright that hovered over us.

Tomorrow Kleist with his tanks can break through the front.

Apparently, by September 9, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front did not yet have information about the crossing of the 257th division to Kremenchug and believed that the 297th rifle division was colonel of the GA. Afanasyeva is fighting only with the 239th Infantry Division:

"OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 0141 K. 22.00 9.9.41 HEADQUARTERS OF THE SWF. PRILUKY

Card 500,000 and 200,000

The troops of the South-Western Front are fighting hard on the front 40, 21, 5, the right wing of the 37th army and in the Kremenchug direction.

(...)

6. 38th army (map 100,000), data as of 16.00.

97 cd 37 cd - no change.

297th Rifle Division is fighting at the line of Bukachevka, Dementievka, sowing. env. Sandy, st. Mazurovka, Vanzhuli. .

In front of the front of the 239 enemy infantry regiment.

(...)

Tupikov, Solovyov, Zakhvataev?

1 Wepagu A. [le Veiteg Wagep-Omzyup. Sezsysme a4er 257. Laschene Pmaon 1939-1945. Venaz Nap\$-Neptpe Roagin, Vaa Maireit, 1957. \$. 51.

2? SBD WWII. T. 40. 412

On September 10, all the attention of our headquarters was focused on the start of the attack of the 38th Army on the Derievsky bridgehead, and only on that day did the situation with the forces of the enemy near Kremenchug become clear:

"INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 78 OF THE STAFF OF THE SWF 11.9.41 6.00

Card 500,000, 200,000

1) Grouping and concentration. Enemy forces opposing the South-Western Front on 10.9.41 are grouped as follows:
zom...

(...)

On the site Maksimovka, Kremenchug to the north. bank of the river The Dnieper operates 257 pd and in the Kremenchug section, r. Psel - 239 pd, developing success in a northerly direction. The possibility of bringing into action here divisions of 44 ak, operating in the Cherkassy region, is not ruled out!

September 12-16. Opening of the Kremenchug bridgehead by the Kleist tank group. The offensive of the 257th division to Sula. "On September 12th, the whole division began to attack in a northwesterly direction, which was facilitated by the attack of the 16th Panzer Division, which rumbled to the east of us," says Albert Benari. - The 3rd battalion of the 466th infantry regiment (Sh. / GpE.V 21.466) followed in the space between us. The 477th Infantry Regiment under Ne-

dogarkami. By evening, it seemed that the Russians were preparing to counterattack the 457th Infantry Regiment. However, in fact, these were units of the 239th Infantry Division, which suddenly appeared in front of our lines. The day, with insignificant own losses, brought 1100 prisoners, 4 guns and many machine guns, and our front advanced about 20 km northwest of Kremenchug.

Since the enemy resistance - especially, perhaps, under the impression of a tank breakthrough (the vanguard of the tanks in the evening was already in Semenovka ?, 105 km northwest of Kremenchug) - was greatly weakened, new targets were scheduled for September 13, and during the day advance party (consisting of

1 SBD VOV.T. 40.

2In the original - Zetepagka. If we are talking about Semyonovka, then it is two times closer to Kremenchuk than indicated. And if you start from 105 km, then this is already the vicinity of Luben.

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anti-tank battalion, reconnaissance battalion and the 3rd motorized company of the sapper battalion)! reached Zhovnino near the mouth of the Sula?.

On September 14, Sula was reached, the division took up defensive positions on both sides of Zhovnino and began reconnaissance for the subsequent crossing.

The landscape north of the Dnieper was for many kilometers a flat plain with miserable, far from being as clean villages as in the south of the river. 1-2.5 km west of Sula, the territory rose steeply to 40-50 m and dominated our positions. The river itself, about 40 meters wide and 4 to 5 meters deep, was an absolute barrier, and the crossing facilities at our disposal were more than meager.

After the opening of the Kremenchug bridgehead, the 16th Panzer Division rushed north, to link up with Guderian's troops, and the 257th Infantry Division rushed northwest, along the banks of the Dnieper towards Zolotonosha. This was already the line of responsibility of the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front. Here, to the west of the breakthrough area, there were also units cut off from the 38th Army, which were included in the 26th Army of General F.Ya. Kostenko.

Obviously, in this and in the subsequent period of hostilities, the 257th Infantry Division, in addition to the 297th Infantry Division of the 21st MRR, opposed and could resist such Soviet units:

- 37th Cavalry Division of Colonel G.M. Reutenberg, who, without completing the formation, arrived at the front

from Akhtyrka and took up defensive positions along the Dnieper above Kremenchuk - from Gradizhsk to Moskalenok;

- 97th Rifle Division Colonel F.V. Maltsev, who on September 5 received 639 replacements;

- 116th SD, which from mid-August, after the removal of Colonel Ya.F. Eremenko, temporarily commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V.F. Buyanov;

- 196th SD, which in mid-August was commanded by Major General K.E. Kulikov.

TV original - \U.A. (aiz 4eg P2.] av.Ashch., 4eg Au .ASHM. una 4eg 3. (then!.) Cotr. 4e5 Pl.Vats.).

2 This means that the 257th division went up the Dnieper, towards Zolotonosha.

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Bagramyan specifically indicates who met the 257th Infantry Division on the right bank of the Sula:

"Together with him (the headquarters of the 38th Army. - Auth.), the 297th Rifle Division, led by Colonel G.A., broke through. Afa Nasiev and part of the forces of the 37th Cavalry Division of Colonel GM. Roitenberg. The rest of the Cavalry Division and the 97th Rifle Division of Colonel F.V. Maltsev, as it turned out later, retreated to the right bank of the Sula River and took up defense there. The front commander on September 13 subordinated them to the commander of the 26th Army!

In the Operational Information of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0150 dated 10.00 September 14, it is reported that:

"The 26th Army, having completed the regrouping and dispatch of 289 infantry divisions of the 7th motorized rifle division (to Piryatin and Priluki. - Auth.), Continues to defend the east. bank of the river Dnieper.

As a result of the breakthrough of the front of the 297th rifle division of the 38th army, its right flank units: 97 rifle divisions of the 37th cd - withdrew beyond the river. Sula. There is no connection with Shtarm 38. Measures have been taken to defend the right bank of the river. Sula with the forces of 37 cd, 97 sd with the task of preventing the enemy from entering the flanks of the rear of the army.

Shtarm 26 - Birlovka"2. ,

Even earlier, on September 6, the 116th and 196th Rifle Divisions located on the right bank of the Sula, closer to Zolotonosha, were subordinated to the 26th Army. Thus, at the final stage of the activity of the 257th division, units of the 37th rifle division, 97th rifle division, 116th rifle division, and 196th rifle division were in its offensive zone.

September 17-22. Forcing the Sula, a breakthrough to Zolotonosha, blocking the boiler.

"On September 17 at 05.40 the offensive began.

457th regiment - on the right,

477th in the center,

32nd Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division - left.

At 0900, after scattered enemy resistance, the line of heights was reached, and the infantry crossing took place

| Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. Kyiv: Politizdat Ukraine, 1988. S. 293.

2? SBD VOV.T. 40.

- Wepagu A. [Ile Veglteg Wagep-Puu1510p. Sezsuische er 257. 1pamene Bmchup 1939-1945. Veja8 Nap5-Nepgiiv Rodgip, Vad MaiKeit, 1957. 5. 52.

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faster than expected," continues A. Benari. - 290 people and ten 76-mm guns were captured.

I also had to regret my own minor losses. at

How many human hardships and how much modest heroism is hidden behind scanty combat reports, clearly show the records of Hauptmann Rosen Brock (KosepfgosK), already mentioned by us, about the experiences of him and the company during the crossing over the Sula:

"September 17, early, still in the dark, we took up the starting position for crossing the Sula, which looks like a narrow river. Our shore was covered with thickets, which offered us good shelter, but also created enormous difficulties in getting to the shore. This was of particular importance for the inflatable boats, which the sappers had difficulty dragging forward. The enemy on the opposite bank did not seem to hear the noise. From time to time, in the gradually fading darkness, shots were heard. We lay close to the coastal slope and waited for the time "X". It was cold and uncomfortable. The unfriendly day announced itself with harsh gusts of wind. To the left, close to us, there was a mill, in the area of which they occasionally shot. The nervous tension before the attack and the morning cold caused chills and thoughts of the home front. Chattering teeth we lay here - the hands of the clock seemed to have slowed down.

Finally, everything is left behind! The sappers dragged and pushed their boats into the water, we jumped in and set off. Everything went well. Individual shots splashed into the water or hali thunders in the coastal thicket. But suddenly, right and left, a bullet began

meteoric fire; the rotten wood of the old mill, stitched with bursts, crackled. Directly in front of us was a small coastal forest, 200 meters wide and 100 meters deep, into which we penetrated quickly and without much loss. My company had a combat order - to ensure the crossing of the 2nd battalion on its left flank. When we came out of a small forest for this purpose and walked another 100 meters, we found ourselves in front of the second branch of the river and soon found that we had landed on an island. Now good advice would be dear. I ordered two platoons to take up position on the outskirts of the forest, and a third of him, left in reserve, to lie down behind a small coastal slope. I knelt by the largest bush and, looking through binoculars, pondered what should be done? All of a sudden -

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loud, to the point of pain in the ears, a shot from a rifle. The breeze of the whistling bullet takes my breath away. My eyes are blinded by tree dust. The heart stops. At 2 cm from my face, a bullet tore a branch as thick as a finger!

Or is it an accident that the branch took the trouble away from my head, or did God turn the bullet away from my left eye and temple?

But that was only the beginning. Shooting begins along the entire front next to me. Snipers and machine gunners join the work. With shovels, bayonets and hands we dig ourselves into the sand, but very carefully, without unnecessary movements, since, apparently, we can be seen here, although we assumed that the forest and bushes provide good protection. Luckily, the mill to the left and behind begins to burn and illuminates us sharply. Two steps away from me is a heavy machine gun that opens fire. But after the first shots, the machine gun stops. I see the shooter's head lowered onto the weapon. He does not respond to the calls of his comrades. Again and again the sniper's shots smack into the sand around us. The dead machine gunner is dragged away to make room for the reserve gunner. But he also falls, hit by a sniper's bullet in the head. I'm trying to intervene since this is all happening 2m in front of me. However, shots clapping after each other stop any movement. Next to me, one bullet strikes the sand, and it falls asleep in my eyes.

Our movement has stopped. The sniper's rate of fire slows down. Behind us, a wooden mill blazing with a bright flame crackles terribly. Other than that, we don't see or hear anything. Only from time to time bullets strike next to us, warning us not to move. We look forward tensely, but we cannot see anything. The machine gun crew wants to resume fire. A new shooter is crawling very carefully here. I yell at him to stay down and not shoot. Your arrows drown out my words. The shooter is already at the machine gun. I can hear him carefully loading it, barely moving. I'm afraid to even move, so as not to disturb him. Shot! And the shooter's head bows to the ground. Now the bullets are hitting next to me, on the left, I am again covered with sand and branches. What will happen now? A wild cry is heard from the right behind me. Very cool

ugly I turn my head - and immediately the bullet hits the ground

b Vepagu A. Ge Ve tag Vagep-01m1\$10op. Sezsmè 4er 257. Mashchene Pmiop 1939 - 1945. Wayayo Napz-Neppte Rod'in, Va Maiepit, 1957. 5. 53.

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right in front of me. When I came to my senses from horror, I saw that my platoon leader was wounded in the stomach. He groans in pain. The private lying behind him resolutely jumps up to help. The bullet intended for him was not in vain. What time could it be now? It's been 40 or only 5 minutes. I can't get my watch out because I can't move. The sniper obviously sees every move. Scream again! And another steel helmet is lowered next to the machine gun to the ground. I'll be alone soon. Four comrades were killed. On the right, a seriously wounded man groans: "Nurseman!" I can't move. I'm the only one that hasn't been killed in this area yet! A burning mill settles behind me. And then I hear the cry of my group commander: "Order to Hauptmann Rosenbrock: the 5th company leave the island, return to the coastal starting point, and, following the other companies, start crossing on the right!" I can hear it all clearly. It's too beautiful to be true! Get out of this hell!! However, isn't this a scam? "Move out of position. This is something unusual for German soldiers. I have never received such a command before. Error? I hesitate for a long time, longer than is proper, because every minute can cost the lives of my comrades. I shout back, finally getting confirmation of the order. So back! But how? Every movement means death, every smallest movement! I hesitate. Should I crawl back very slowly, inch by inch? But this will go on for too long. And since I now have a combat order, I must act very quickly. Everything now depends on me. However, I can't issue orders from here. So everything is at stake! I'm ready to jump back. Very carefully, centimeter by centimeter, I pull my legs up to my stomach, rest my hands ...

...Here comes the decisive moment, life or death! I jump up and run back. The shot whistled past me. Now I'm saved. Lightning flashes before the consciousness of the picture - four fallen machine gunners.

Behind the coastal slope, I give the command to withdraw. One by one, comrades crawl up, pursued by bullets, which, however, no longer harm anyone. The paramedic arrived. I showed him the way to the wounded platoon commander, after which the inflatable boat carried

| Vepagu A. [le Veteig Vagep-P/m1yup. Sezsysmè 4er 257. Laschepe Omson 1939-1945. Wayayo Nap5-Nepti? Rogeryn, Wad Maiwelt, 1957. \$5. 54.

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took me back to the original shore, where I gathered my greatly reduced company for a new use.

On September 17, the division commander, due to the wounding of the corps commander, was forced to take over the leadership of the corps as a deputy. General Anzher (AKo 110 - assigned to the division to cross the Sula!) became in command of the 257th Infantry Division.

At [8.30 a.m.] the military bridge was ready, so that the artillery could move forward during the night. However, when the first guns of the 10-cm battery entered it, the bridge collapsed, and only after repeated alterations around 14.30 did it become suitable for crossing again. And the attack on the northwest on September 18 was continued. Taking into account the situation in the boiler, the troops moved forward; In the evening, the 477th Infantry Regiment occupied a forested height 3 km west of Pervomaisky. The daily trek was approximately 20 km.

On September 19, the next 20 km scheduled for the day were covered. The division was led by General Sachs.

Kyiv and Poltava fell, and the 79th Infantry Division was to go to Zolotonosha (10 km ahead of us).

On September 20, a railway line to Pryatin was reached to the northeast of Zolotonosha, but it was not crossed, since troops were already approaching it from the north.

In the meantime, the large cauldron was split into smaller ones, and soon we were able to give a hand to our own troops!

On September 21, the division was deployed to the northeast and soon got into a whirlwind of battle with ?3 breaking out of the encirclement. Poor maps from the last century made orientation difficult and contributed to misunderstandings in target designation and advancement. Pictures of the battle on the environment were replenished with burning

1 Ako - artillery command, a special structure, which is the headquarters and management of artillery units. At different stages of the war, AgCo could include various artillery units. Ako 110 was created on October 1, 1939 in Potsdam. In June 1941, it included: the 1st division of the 77th artillery regiment, the 2nd division of the 54th artillery regiment, the 49th artillery regiment and the 31st artillery reconnaissance division. During the period of the Kyiv cauldron, AgCo 110 was commanded by Major General KurtAnger.

- Vepagu A. Ge Veglteg Wagep-PO1\151yup. Sezshseme er 257. ashchepe Bol 1939-1945. Wayav Nap\$-Neppiah Rodgip, Wad Maiepit, 1957. \$. 55.

3 On the sector of the 257th division, units of the 26th army retreated towards Orzhitsa. Orzhitsa was the starting point for the breakthrough of the 26th Army in the direction of Lubny.

llamas and stacks of straw, abandoned cars, weapons left lying on the battlefield, prisoners of war, stabbed to death by Red Army soldiers, commissars and armed women in uniform, with their stubborn and most fanatical resistance.

On September 22, the struggle ended with sweeps. We have not yet seen all the success, but still we were proud to participate in this decisive battle. The joy was even greater because our losses, from the crossing of the Dnieper to September 22 (in 14 days), amounted to only 84 killed and 240 wounded, i.e. half what we lost during the two days of the Russian breakthrough near Uman.

Albert Benari calls the next period in the history of the 257th Infantry Division "Combat pursuit in the direction of the Donets from September 23 to November 9, 1941." First, the division arrived at Lubny, where for several more days its mobile group under the command of Major Weisbrodt was engaged in cleansing operations north of Lubny. After that, the division set off along the route Mirgorod - Reshetilovka - Poltava, during which "from time to time there was more shooting with dispersed Russians ... The marching movement suffered not only from the beginning of the autumn period of thaw, but also from a lack of socks and footcloths. Therefore, rich booty in vehicles and trucks in the battle for the environment was very useful for the infantry. In cold weather with night frosts, troops of various divisions often crowded into a few miserable villages, since the tangle of battle for encirclement was unraveled very slowly "...

| Vepagu A. Re Veiteg Vagep-Rumya1op. Sezsm 4er 257. | UeNae Nap5-Nepta Rodgip, Vad Maipet, 1957. 5. 56.

125 PMEAMTENE-OGUTU OM

Brief history: The 125th Infantry Division was formed as a division [of the 1st wave in 1940. It included:

- 419th Infantry Regiment;
- 420th Infantry Regiment;
- 421st Infantry Regiment;
- 125th artillery regiment;
- 125th reconnaissance battalion;
- 125th anti-tank fighter DIVISION;

- 125th engineer battalion;
- 125th communications battalion;
- 125th field reserve battalion;
- sanitary and rear parts.

The combat path of the division: 1941 - Yugoslavia, Lviv, Vinnitsa, Uman, Kremenchug, Sula, Orzhitsa, Psel, Vorskla, Poltava, Mius. 1942 - Mius, Rostov, Don, Bataysk, Novorossiysk, Tuapse region. 1943 - Kuban, Dnieper. 1944 - Krivoy Rog, Nikopol, Nikolaev, retreat to the Dniester, death and Russian captivity.

During the period of the Kyiv cauldron, the 125th Infantry Division was commanded by General of Infantry Willy Schneckenburger (Sepega! In 1944 he was killed in Yugoslavia.

In September 1941, the 125th division was part of the 11th Army Corps of the 17th Army of Army Group South.

Weasel is the emblem of the 125th Infantry Division.

Initial position. The Kyiv cauldron consisted of many hearths. The initial stage of the encirclement of the troops of the Southwestern Front, until the opening of the Kremenchug bridgehead on September 12, ended with the encirclement of the troops of the 5th Army and the formation

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I eat the first three hearths of the Kyiv cauldron, which are reported by Halder! and Vladimirsky2.

After the breakthrough of Kleist's tanks and their connection at Luben with Guderian's tanks, another 4 (according to Fageytuz), 5 (according to Gaup4) or 6 (according to Isaev5) hearths of the boiler were formed.

The 125th Infantry Division took part in blockading the Orzhitsky hearth, an area bordered on the north by the Orzhitsa River and on the east by the Sula River. The 26th Army of Lieutenant General F.Ya., retreating from the Dnieper, entered this area. Kostenko. The area was blocked by the 16th Panzer Division, the 25th Motorized Division, the 24th, 257th and 239th Infantry Divisions. The 125th Infantry Division closed the Orzhitsky hearth from the east, taking up defensive positions along the eastern bank of the Sula and concentrating its forces in places suitable for crossings. Subsequently, the 125th G? crossed to the western bank of the river and took teaching

stie in cleaning the boiler.

125th Infantry Division in the Kiev Cauldron. September 11-23, 1941

"On September 11, 1941, the 125th division launched a new offensive from the northern suburbs of Kremenchug," Willy Sauter (MSh Zaszeg) told us in a collection devoted to the history of the Baden-Württemberg divisions. - The German forces were to strike between the Sula and Psel rivers in order to form the eastern front of the encirclement of the Russians in the area east of Kyiv. Two days later, the division, supported by motorized units, took up defense along the Sula with its front to the west.

During the march, south of the city of Khorol, the division was overtaken by units of the 25th motorized division. motorized artillery

1 Halder F. Military diary. Daily notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces 1939-1942. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1968-1971.
Record dated 09/09/1941.

2 Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. S. 268-269; scheme, p. 246-247.

at Eivate V. Oregaiop Vagfagozza. - Mouayu: Prez o Prez\$, 1984. Scheme 1.

s Nair! AND'. Agtu Sgoir Zoshv. Tne Uevgtasve piece Kizyaa 1941-1945. ZsrSheg And Kagu Nogu. Ashep, RA. 1998. Scheme, p. 72.

5 Isaev A.V. Boilers of the 41st. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know. M.: Yau for; Eksmo, 2005. S. 187-188.

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(125.49.0.)

Scheme of combat operations of the 125th Infantry Division in the Orzhitsa area according to Willy Sauter (UM Zashcheg).

The lerists recognized their old comrades and even the horses with which they had taken part in the French campaign a year before. Touching friendly scenes and hugs took place on Russian roads (.

'
For the formation of the 125th Infantry Division, divisions of the 5th Infantry, 260th Infantry and 25th Motorized Divisions were used. Apparently, the artillerymen of the 125th division during the blitzkrieg in France served in the 25th motorized division.

423

The front on Sula was calm. Separate attempts by the Russians to break through the Sula were frustrated. There were only a few places across the river and swamp suitable for crossing. At first, the Russians tried to break through the tank wedges, in which there were still gaps! Only when the holes were closed and the narrowing of the boiler began, the pressure on the crossing points became stronger. The regiments of the division crossed the Sula. The 421st regiment, resting its right flank on the swampy terrain, attacked to the north?. The encircled Russians no longer had any great desire to resist; but, apparently, they still had the hope of breaking out in a northerly or easterly direction. As a result, pressure increased on the weak German defenses on the eastern bank of the Sula. Thus, the 125th reconnaissance battalion, defending the bridge east of Tarasovka, had to endure heavy

watch.

The 421st regiment, which constantly intercepted requests for help from the 125th reconnaissance battalion by radio, on the evening of September 20, by the regiment commander's own decision, struck with a reinforced company and a platoon of tank destroyers in order to take the area around Tarasovka and unload the 125th reconnaissance battalion.

In a quick, courageous intervention under the personal leadership of the commander of the regiment, Oberst Lieutenant Reinhardt (KeshvVaga!) The area was taken, the Russians were driven back by the reconnaissance battalion, communication was established. At the same time, 1700 prisoners fell into German hands?

This attack prevented the Russians from breaking out of the pocket. If the Russians had succeeded, then tens of thousands of people would have escaped from the encirclement, who would have struck to the east, behind the rear of the German units fighting near Vorskla and Poltava.

1 The best direction for a breakthrough is through areas blocked by tank units. Goering, basing himself on the data he had received from his pilots, complained to Hitler that the enemy was "coming out in a continuous stream" from the Smolensk pocket. Herman Goth, commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, complained that "a significant number of Russian troops escaped from the encirclement near Nevel, to the creation of which so many forces and means were thrown."

2 He attacked in the direction of Orzhitsa.

3 Wadel-U/zgietjegrasve Pumchopepit 2.\ekpeya. Gizatepzezhe! whoop kiddo! UYsv. Kaigiye: Uepa8 S. Vgain, 1957. \$. 44.

Having broken through from the Kremenchug bridgehead [on September 2, the Germans rushed to the northwest and north to close the Kiev pocket, and to the northeast, towards Poltava, in order to prevent the release of the boiler from the side of the 38th Army cut off from the Southwestern Front .

Finally, the cauldron was so narrow that the whole area was swarming with Russian soldiers. Cornfields and sunflower fields offered ample protection for singles. Protecting many of the captives was a problem, and the only way the regiment could help itself was to house them all in the church of Chutovka. In order to avoid various surprises, it was necessary for the troops to take up all-round defense since yesterday.

On the morning of September 21, reconnaissance of the village of Plekhov¹, which was located on the northern edge of the boiler, was carried out. At the same time, the anti-tank platoon of the 14th company found that the village, although occupied by a large number of enemy troops, was not expected to have any organized resistance in it. Several hundred defectors followed the patrol when it returned. From Tarasovka it was possible to observe how Russian motorized columns again and again appeared from the side of the boiler and tried to find a gap for a breakthrough.

Suddenly, a motorized column appeared in front of Tarasovka. The lead vehicles had 2-cm anti-aircraft guns ready for use. The Russians were completely stunned when they found themselves in front of our weapons, unequivocally pointed at them and ready for use. These were several hundred Russian soldiers. What could stop this heavily armed column with our weak forces! Only later did we realize the danger in which we then found ourselves. During the first half of the day, the entire regiment pulled itself up to Tarasovka and, after occupying its starting position, began an offensive against the remnants of the encircled. The attack along the Sula proceeded well, and the village of Plekhov was partially taken. The 2nd battalion of the 421st regiment had to repulse strong counterattacks. This was the last push of the Russians in a hopeless situation, behind them was a swamp, and in front - our machine guns. With heavy losses for the enemy, who attacked in dense ranks, having previously concentrated in a ravine, this attack was repulsed.

In Orzhik, in the sector of the 24th Infantry Division, the Russians

¹ This refers to the northern part of the line that the 125th Infantry Division occupied along the Sula: Plekhov, Tarasovka, Chutovka, Buromka. Plekhov is located at the confluence of Orzhitsa and Sula, near the village of Orzhitsa.

² Vadeb-U/zgietjegrasve Puuchopep it 2.\e[Kpeya. Glzattapame wop KidoN Uysv. Kaizgive: UePav S. Vgain, 1957. 5.45.

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they took a bunch of several thousand cars and set them on fire. Black pillars of smoke rose up all day long. In the cornfields, many Russians preferred suicide to being taken prisoner. At night, the Russians, with terrible screams, destroyed their last stocks of vodka and arranged fireworks from ammunition.

passes and tracers. The next morning the boiler was cleaned. A large number of military equipment and horses were captured, 19,000 prisoners were taken by the regiment to the places of assembly. Only a few Russians managed to slip away through the swamp.

Starting from the offensive across the Dnieper, on September 2, and until the end of the encirclement battle, on September 23, almost 3 weeks passed. The division was constantly facing the enemy. By advancing across the Dnieper and Psel, she made a significant contribution to this great encirclement operation!"

The operation, which the Germans are so proud of, was as big as it was ineffective. Summing up the results of the Kiev cauldron, Western researcher Brian Fagate (Bryan Pargae) reported:

"Despite the fact that by September 26 the Southwestern Front had largely ceased to exist, some units of the encircled armies managed to slip in an easterly direction. A group of fifty people led by Baghramyan went to Gadyach on September 24th. A number of soldiers from the 5th and 21st armies also escaped, including five hundred people from the headquarters of the 21st army, led by Kuznetsov. The commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General Kostenko, went out with a large group, as did a cavalry unit with four thousand men, led by A.B. Bonsov (A.V. Vopsou). Several corps commanders, including Generals K.S. Moskalenko and A.I. Lopatina, you jumped out of the German trap, but Kirponos and his staff, however, were not so lucky. They were all killed near Shumeikov on 20 September.

The Red Army suffered its worst defeat of the war, but Guderian was right when he said that Kyiv was only a tactical, not a strategic victory, even in spite of the enormous Russian losses.

The number of prisoners taken from Kyiv, according to the official

: Wadep-\U/ogietbegaaspe Om! open yt 2.\Me[Kpev. Gizattepvezmesh wop Kido G \ cf. Kagglie: UePav S. Vgain, 1957.5. 46.

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the German account is 665,212. However, the Russian data are in disagreement with this number. According to official Soviet history, the KVO had 667,085 men at the beginning of the war. Of this number, 150,541 were in areas outside the encirclement or among those who managed to escape. Since the Southwestern Front suffered heavy losses before 26 September, the day the battle around Kyiv ended, it is unlikely that more than 222,000 soldiers were taken prisoner. German losses before and during the battle near Kyiv were also heavy!

Eizae V. Oregaiop Wagfagozza. \$tga{eru An@ Tasis\$ Op Twe Eazet Egop, 1941 - Mouayu: Prez19yu Prez\$, 1984. P. 270.

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KAMRESESSNUAPEK 53 GESTOM SOMOOV

Short story. The 53rd Bombardment Squadron - Katr@essp\u/adeq 53 "Eesop Condog" (KS 53) - was formed on May 1, 1939 on the basis of KS 355. The main weapon of KO 53 was the Heinkel-111 twin-engine bombers.

Battle path: 1939 - Poland; 1940 - France and the bombing of England; 1941 - raids on England, from June 1941 - to fall on the USSR as part of the 2nd Air Corps of the 2nd Air Fleet (Army Group Center), at the end of the year - reorganization in Germany due to heavy losses on the Eastern Front; 1942, 1943, 1944 - Eastern Front; since October 1944 - shelling of England with U-1 missiles; 1945 - Western Front as part of the 2nd Fighter Air Corps.

During the period of participation in the Kiev cauldron, the 53rd Geschwader "Essoon Condog" was based in Orsha, it was commanded by Oberst Paul Vaitkus (Ram! \ E {Ki \$).

Air reconnaissance on the eve of the war and during the period of the Kyiv pocket. "The war in the air had been practically going on for 9 months before the first bomb fell on the ground," he writes in his book.

TESYUN SOMOOV

Emblems of groups of the 53rd squadron: 1st group, 2nd group, 3rd group. 428

Commander of the 53rd squadron Paul Vaitkus (Rush UlyKi\$).

"Re \$ Masit MozKai" German military historian Werner Haupt (verner Nairi. - OKE (High Command Luf Twaffe), based on the plan for the upcoming campaign (on the USSR), already in October 1940 created a long-range reconnaissance group, which was equipped with heavy aircraft types He-111 and -88. These aircraft were equipped with special high-altitude motors and special cameras, which made it possible to shoot from long distances.

This reconnaissance group, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Rovel (Ko/en), reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief of Military Aviation. The task of the four squadrons was to photograph the areas of future operations between Leningrad and the Black Sea. The 1st squadron of this group took off from the Seerappen (Seegarrep) airfield in East

of Prussia, flew over the German-Russian border at an altitude of 12,000 m and photographed the entire operational area between Kiev and Minsk.

On the effectiveness of data-driven maps

1 Nairg I/. Se ZsShasve it Moskai. 2001.5.73.429

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aerial photographs, is also evidenced by one of those for whom these maps were intended:

"These maps were photocopies of aerial photographs taken in the area of operations. They turned out to be first-class and put our other cartographic materials to shame, "we find in the memoirs of Otto Carius, who fought on the Eastern Front!, the commander of the Tiger.

When, at the end of August 1941, the troops of Army Group Center turned south, the air formations of the 2nd Fleet, commanded by Field Marshal Kesselring, flew south with them. Ahead of the troops, as expected, was close air reconnaissance.

Someone hiding behind the pseudonym "E., Obeg <" left for us in one of the German wartime newspapers "A picture of the use of short-range reconnaissance aviation to support army divisions":

"The battle group is advancing south. An impenetrable, absolutely flat, but wooded, overgrown with shrubs and swampy territory separated the group from the target of the offensive - a settlement located about 20 km away. What enemy forces might be in this area? Marching columns, tanks, cavalry? Or anti-tank ditches, field fortifications, anti-aircraft artillery emplacements, soldiers digging trenches? How are the roads going, will the troops be able to ford rivers and streams, are the bridges intact? Our command must know all this in order to develop the correct directions for the attack and carry it out. Ground reconnaissance groups could not have opened all the white spots of this territory, and the commander requested aerial reconnaissance.

At dawn, the brigade radio station established contact with one of the scouts. |

Order: "Find out the situation in the direction of the general offensive." At first, a more precise indication is not required, because the scouts work for weeks for the battle group and know well what the commander needs.

The first report of the pilot: "The enemy is moving south everywhere."

1 Karius O. "Tigers" in the mud: Memoirs of a German tanker. M.: CJSC "Tsentrpoligraf". S. 146.

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Radiogram to the scout: "Are there any enemy tanks to the north of D.?"

Answer: "There is no enemy movement north of D.."

The next query is: "What do you observe between the railroad line and the river?"

Pilot's report: "On the entire territory in front of us, up to the railway line, I do not observe any movement of the enemy."

Ten minutes later: "Our tanks are in O.. Behind the G. is the movement of individual vehicles of the enemy. Approximately 5 km to the west-north-west of O. there is a large concentration of the enemy. Lots of vehicles, infantry. We were shot from there."

Commander's radio message: "What are you observing in the K.. area?"

Answer: "I am watching our units. In K., six Soviet aircraft are attacking our positions along the railway line from low altitude. S. is under enemy fire"...

Order: "Find out the situation behind the bridge."

Pilot's report: "Beyond the bridge, 200 meters from the village - 7 Soviet tanks."

After this report, the brigade commander ordered the "greens" to attack the village, as a result of which 6 Soviet tanks were destroyed.

Pilot's report: "To the east of us is a forest 700 meters wide. In the center of the eastern edge of this forest is a heavy Russian tank that could be easily attacked. I'm making a run on the tank!"

Tank destroyed.

Pilot's report: "300 m in front of our head patrol, a little to the east, 3 small tanks came out of the forest."

(...)

Pilot's report: "In the area of the K. station, four enemy tractors with guns are moving at full throttle to the west of the railway. The bridges in front of us are all intact."

The evening order of the battle group commander said verbatim: "Thanks to the activities of our reconnaissance pilots, we not only accelerated our advance, but also recognized in time the previously unnoticed retreat of the enemy,

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which made it possible to attack him effectively. In addition, the pilots saved us a lot of time by establishing the passability of the roads and various sectors. Tankers perceive with satisfaction the presence of reconnaissance pilots.

This newspaper article, which is cited in the book by Werner Haupt, speaks of Guderian's tank group, which went south from Novgorod-Seversky, towards Shostka and Konotop. "In August, after the troops of Army Group Center began to move from the central direction towards Kiev, air formations followed them ... Now all bomber and fighter squadrons were used to support the 2nd tank group in Ukraine, and not for our infantry divisions, who suffered near Smolensk and Yelnya, "Werner Haupt writes about this.

In the lists of German pilots, holders of the Knight's Cross, we found information that on September 13, 1941, in the region of Novgorod-Seversky, B {-110 of Hauptmann Karl-Heinz Stricker (Kag! means that in the operation to encircle our troops, in addition to the bomber and fighter squadrons reported by V. Haupt, there was also a geschwader of high-speed bombers, which was armed with Me-110 twin-engine fighters, which could also be used as night fighters, both as scouts and as bombers. Captain Stricker, who was shot down near Novgorod-Seversky, was posthumously awarded the Knight's Cross.

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Speaking about the aviation support of his group, its commander, Colonel General Heinz Guderian, reports that the tank group included: the air group of short-range bombers of General Fiebig, the Hermann Goering anti-aircraft artillery regiment of General von Axtgelm and reconnaissance aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel von Barzewisha. The area of the offensive of the tank group in the first weeks of hostilities was covered by the fighters of Colonel Melders.

However, the matter was not limited to these parts. The 53rd bomber squadron was removed from the bombardments of Moscow and redeployed for operations in the south.

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Quarter! Ress Nuayer 53 "Herljuop Con @ og" above the boiler. The 53rd bomber squadron consisted of four groups, three of which participated in the battles on the Eastern Front in 1941, and the fourth was at that time in France. How KS 53 based in the Orshegruppa were used in August-September can be found in the diary of the combat operations of this geschwader, which is cited by Werner Haupt. R

At first, these were actions in the Central (Moscow) direction:

"4.8.41. Night massive raid on Moscow (special purpose):

7.8.41. Massive night raid on Moscow (special purpose)

9.8.41. Massive night raid on Moscow

10.8.41. Massive night raid on Moscow

1.8.41. Raid at dusk on the Bryansk railway station

12.8.41. Raid at dusk on the Bryansk railway station

12.8.41. Night attack on the Vyazma railway station

14.8.41. Daytime attack on Zhlobin

14.8.41. Daytime attack on an artillery position 2 km north-east of Zhlobin

15.8.41. Day attack on troops on the road north of Gomel

15.8.41. Daytime attack on an artillery position north of Yelnya

16.8.41. Daytime attack on the troops near Ushcherpye in the Klinty area

16.8.41. Day attack on Novozybkov (70 km east of Gomel).

As we see, even before August 21, COP 53, following Guderian and Weichs, was slowly shifting its operations in a southerly direction. And on August 21, instantly reacting to Hitler's directive to turn troops to the south, the 53rd Geschwader immediately proceeds to carry out new orders:

"21.8.41. Daytime attack on the railway line Gomel - Snovsk! and railway rolling stock

'
Snovsk is a city of Shchors in the Chernihiv region. Was in the rear

area of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front. On Shchors, from the side of Gomel, the troops of the 3rd and 21st armies of the Central Front retreated.

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22.8.41. Daytime attack on the railway line and railway. rolling stock 10 km north of Snovsk

22.8.41. Daytime attack on the railway line Gomel - Snovsk

23.8.41. Daytime attack on the Bakhmach railway station.

About how the raid on Bakhmach looked like from the ground, we were told by the commander of the 5th railway brigade P.A. Kaba is new:

"The Bakhmach knot was subjected to a particularly cruel bombardment. He worked in six areas: Kiev, Bryansk, Kharkov, Gomel, Kremenchug and Poltava. The failure of the Bakhmachsky knot would disrupt the supply of the troops of the Southwestern Front, the evacuation of the equipment of plants and factories, as well as military equipment from Kyiv and Gomel, would be suspended. We made every effort to maintain the survivability of the entire site and all stations of the node. The movement of trains was not interrupted, often the echelons were running even during the bombing. In such cases, our fighters and commanders came to the aid of local railway workers.

I witnessed one of the most vicious raids by fascist vultures. That day, many trains accumulated at the Bakhmach Kyiv station. Next to the trains loaded with explosives, there were routes with fuel and sanitary trains. A group of enemy planes flew in. Several bombs hit gasoline tanks and an ammunition echelon. The station was instantly flooded with a sea of fire. Shells and tanks exploded. Wagons with national economic goods were on fire. Only the 2nd mechanization battalion of our brigade covered the station. Soldiers and commanders rushed to carry the wounded out of the ambulance train. Then they began to take away the trains, put out the fire. The small battalion, together with the railroad workers, did a great job. More than 100 loaded wagons and fuel tanks were taken out of the fire. Corporal Rustamov and junior sergeants Oguz and Raroche skillfully untwisted the red-hot ties of the cars. Seven hours later, the movement of trains was restored along the main track, and the next day, the territory of the station was cleared of broken and burnt rolling stock. The entire personnel of the battalion was worthy of the highest praise.

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After this raid, road operators and workers

The officers of the VOSO of our front came to the conclusion: under no circumstances should trains be allowed to accumulate at the stations and trains with fuel and ammunition should not be placed nearby. In the event of a threat of air attack, put trains with fire hazardous cargo on hauls!

However, let's get back to the actions of the 53rd bomber squadron:

"23.8.41. Daytime attack on the Nedanchichi-Chernigov railway line?

23.8.41. Night attack on the Chernihiv railway station

24.8.41. Daytime attack on the Krolevtsaz railway station

24.8.41. Daytime attack on the Chernigov railway station.

The raids of the 53rd squadron on Chernigov looked like this from the ground:

G.A. Kuznetsov (resident of Chernigov, in 1941 - a teenager):

"A fatal Sunday for Chernigov, August 23, began as usual, and nothing seemed to foreshadow those tragic events that unfolded a few hours later. As usual, numerous convoys of refugees stretched across the city to the road bridge across the Desna, occasionally cars with military personnel passed through the streets, and on the station tracks, cars were loaded with various property for evacuation to the east. |

...At 18 o'clock, 9 German bombers appeared from the direction of Gomel. They flew in threes at a low altitude, and when they reached the center of the city, some incomprehensible rustling was heard. A few seconds later, a hail of incendiary thermite bombs hit the peaceful quarters of Chernihiv in its central part. Numerous fires broke out.

Attempts by residents to put out lighters were interrupted

1 Kabanov P.A. Steel tracks. M.: Military Publishing House, 1973. S. 104.

? To Nedanchichi, on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, Potapov's 5th army retreated from this western bank. On this railway she could receive reinforcements and quickly transfer her troops to Chernigov, which on August 25 would begin the offensive of the Weichs division. The mined bridge in Nedanchichi exploded from a lightning strike.

3 Krolevets was in the path of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group.

blowing wave of enemy aircraft, which poured a load of fragmentation and high-explosive bombs of various calibers onto the city.

With short breaks, wave after wave of German bombers attacked Chernihiv...

...An eerie spectacle was the Catherine Church standing on a small hill at the entrance to Chernigov along the Kyiv Highway 5, an architectural monument of the 18th century, each head of which burned like a giant candle. Five pillars of fire rose above her.

In the prewar years, the church was turned into a repository of archives. The bombs, breaking through the iron roof of the temple, ignited racks of paper, the glass of the windows flew out from the explosions - a strong draft of hot air threw burning sheets of documents hundreds of meters into the air through the burnt-out domes. They scattered across the meadows on the banks of the Desna and there burned out in the grass and bushes.
max.

A huge crimson glow that rose over Chernigov was seen in Repki, Berezhnoye, Kulikovka and other settlements at a distance of tens of kilometers.

Massive German air raids continued until August 25, that is, for three days in a row there was a systematic deliberate destruction of one of the most ancient cities in the country with its unique monuments of antiquity, history and culture.

In the following days, until the entry of German troops into Chernigov on September 9, the city also continued to be bombed, although not as fiercely as on previous days. flew into a department
new aircraft.

How many people died during these bombings cannot be counted ...

... The bomb that fell on the street. Tolstoy, was so large that the crater from its explosion completely blocked this rather wide street. The edge of the funnel passed just a few meters from the gap in the monastery garden where they hid | and shell-shocked.

| Human. Some of them died, the rest were injured

In the basement of a multi-storey brick building at the corner of Shevchenko and Sovetskaya streets, collapsed ceilings and walls overwhelmed an unknown number of Chernigov residents and refugees. A nauseating smell from human corpses came from these times

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valine long. Therefore, both the Germans and the locals bypassed this place until the onset of frost ...

... Through the streets of Chernigov among the smoldering ruins, whether dressed in anything or completely naked, sick psycho-

neurological dispensary, left unattended. They terrified the few inhabitants who remained in their homes on the outskirts of the city.

Abandoned by the population, the dilapidated city was invaded by marauders who flooded in from the villages close to the city. They went to Chernigov in droves and light, only with empty sacks in their hands. Everything that fell under their hands was pulled back. Robbed without a twinge of conscience and housing, and shops, and warehouses ...

... There was no one to disperse this pack! Local authorities went beyond the Desna. And the chairman of the city executive committee Bron I.Ya. managed to reach Kharkov. He was arrested and, by the verdict of a military tribunal, was shot for cowardice, for leaving the city at such a difficult hour for him.

A.F. Fedorov (in 1941 - first secretary of the regional committee of the Communist Party):

"The worst mood I have ever been in in my life was during the days of August 23-29, 1941.

I went to the Military Council of the Central Front. On the way back to Chernigov, I met a convoy of cars, I stopped the leading one and asked those sitting in it: "Who, where?" Checked mutually documents. It turned out that the leaders of the Gomel region were coming and with them the secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Belarus, Comrade Edinov.

"Our people have left Gomel," Comrade Edinov told me. — The Germans are moving on Chernigov.

I arrived at the Regional Committee very tired and hungry. If they brought me a plate of borscht into the office, I settled down by the window, put the plate on the windowsill.

The siren wailed. Lately there have been alarms

1 In the summer of 1941, in anticipation of robberies, 4,142 outposts were set up in the Chernihiv region to protect socialist (i.e. state) property.

2 Kuznetsov G.A. Chronicle of the city of Chernigov during the Second World War 1941-1945 according to documents, eyewitness accounts, journalism and memoirs. Chernigov: Desna, 1992, pp. 15-16.

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twenty a day. I have already got used to them and often did not leave the room. There were no heavy bombings yet.

As I continued to eat, I looked out the window. I could see a large part of the city. Looking over the rooftops, I saw several planes in the distance. From behind the clouds emerged another black

flock, and a minute later the Germans were over the city. I saw how the bombs were falling, I even accurately determined: the theater was the first to fly into the air, followed by the building of the regional police, the post office ... Aya mechanically continued to eat. Bombers sailed over the regional committee building. Explosions, the rattle of machine guns, the fire of anti-aircraft guns merged into a terrible rumble... People rushed through the streets. Someone was screaming terribly, it was impossible to understand whether it was a female or a male voice. :

I left the office and went to the shelter!. I was taken over by numbness...

...For the first time, I spent the whole night in a shelter. The Germans flew twelve times. Sitting and waiting passively, not seeing or knowing anything, is a humiliating occupation.

In the morning, although the anxiety did not stop, I returned to the regional committee.

Black clouds of smoke hung over the roofs of the houses, flames rushed to the sky. Everywhere you look, it's on fire. Firefighters tried to douse the flames. But what could be done when more and more hearths arose every minute and in ever greater numbers! People were no longer able to fight the fire.

...During the break between raids, I decided to go around the city.

We drove down Shevchenko street. Flames burst out of the windows of every third or fourth house. A lame horse galloped towards us. The driver had to turn onto the pavement, otherwise the mad animal would have run into the car.

Behind us, about fifteen meters, no more, the wall collapsed. Burning beams filled up the horse.

A man in a hat and glasses was crawling on all fours on the wide pavement. I called out to him. He didn't answer. The driver stopped the car, I called again:

- Comrade!

Then he got up from all fours, looked at me with cloudy eyes, and ran through the gates of some house. There was no point in chasing him.

1 Interestingly, the bomb shelters in Chernihiv were built at the expense of local finance under loans from the Central Communal Bank.

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We drove to Kuibyshev Square. Most of the houses were on fire, some were already collapsed, even in the middle of the square it was hot.

On the square, in the center, stood a tall, stout man with his arms outstretched. His face was black with soot. I called out

his.

He didn't notice us. I called him again: no impression niya. The driver brought the car close to him. I took my friend by the hand. He obediently climbed into the car, but did not answer questions for a long time.

Then, when I told him how we picked him up, he shrugged:

— I don't remember anything.

We drove around a few more streets. When we were at the city square, the "Heinkels" reappeared over the city. One of them fired a machine-gun burst at our car. Bullets whirled overhead.

We picked up two more people. One of them had to be tied up: he lost his mind.

We drove for about an hour. During this time, two groups of bombers unloaded over the city ... -

... Chernihiv was isolated from the outside world; the power plant was out of order, telephone and telegraph communications were interrupted. There were almost no residents in the city, factories and institutions were also evacuated.

With a heavy feeling we left the city, deserted, destroyed!"

During the bombing of Chernigov, the 53rd squadron lost at least one aircraft. Unfortunately, he was not credited to the pilot who shot him down. The fact of the destruction of the aircraft is confirmed by two sources. First. of them is the commander of the Air Force of the 5th Army, N.S. Skripko:

"My new command post was planned in Kolychevka, northwest of Chernigov. There was the headquarters of the 62nd bomber division ...

...Then, without much hindrance, we reached the new command post. At the field airfield, located along the edge of the forest, there were a dozen camouflaged I-16s. By this time in

1 Fedorov A.F. The underground regional committee operates. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1986. S. 23.

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10-15 combat vehicles remained on the shelves, there were three to four times more pilots, so they flew all daylight hours with little or no inspection. The technical staff barely had time to refuel the vehicles, and the armed forces replenished their ammunition.

In the evening, the commander of the Air Force of the front, General F.A. Astakhov, bypassing the headquarters of the Army Air Forces, set new combat missions for our divisions. According to this order, only the 92nd Fighter Aviation Regiment operated in the interests of the 5th Army, covering Chernigov, crossings over the Desna.

And on August 23, I witnessed an air battle between an I-16 flight and a flight of Nazi He-111 bombers. At an altitude of approximately 1400 meters, our fighters, with their attacks, prevented the enemy from making an aimed bomb

tanya.

Junior Lieutenant G.S. Banchenkov, having used up his ammunition, decided to ram the Heinkel and, having caught up with the German plane, hit it with a propeller on the left plane and on the left side of the fuselage. The bomber fell not far from the front line in the territory occupied by the enemy. An explosion was clearly observed and then black smoke rose high. It was an enemy bomber on the ground.

Pilot Banchenkov was presented with a high award, however, according to the then existing procedures, as material evidence of a ramming, it was required to remove a plate indicating the engine number from the aircraft. How can you remove this plate if the plane crashed behind the forward edge in the position of the German troops? I cited this episode in order to remind once again how many truly heroic feats the Soviet pilots performed, boldly engaging in air battles over the territory occupied by the enemy, and how many enemy aircraft they shot down were not counted!

Already mentioned by us G.A. Kuznepov talks about the fall of the German plane in a slightly different way. Firstly, it was not junior lieutenant G.S. Banchenkov, and Lieutenant Georgy Konstantinovich Banchenkov. Secondly, the German aircraft fell in the location of our units:

"At first, anti-aircraft guns hit them (the Germans) ... Then our fighters entered the battle, and the anti-aircraft guns stopped firing.

b Skripko N.S. For targets near and far. M.: Military Publishing House, 1981. S. 135

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Downed He-111 from the 53rd squadron.

From the sky, where an air battle was going on at an altitude of more than a kilometer, the clatter of machine guns reached the ground. Hundreds of Chernihiv residents watched the fight with bated breath. When the planes, having passed the city, were already flying over the Zadlesnyansky meadows, G.K. Banchenkov, having shot all the ammunition, went to ram the lead bomber. However, instead of cutting off the tail with the screw of his fighter, he, having missed, hit the right plane of the aircraft. Everything happened in some way

few seconds, and numerous spectators on the streets of the city saw that our fighter flew like a stone down, and the enemy aircraft continued to fly along the previous course, although next to the cockpit the right wing was more than half knocked out, and it was not clear how the bomber was holding up in air.

The Soviet pilot managed to jump out and parachute down to the meadow near Magistratskoye Lake. Collective farmers from the village of Anisov were just working there harvesting hay. The ubiquitous boys from the Kav

kaza".

Banchenkov landed successfully. People who ran up to him later said that he furiously scolded himself for an unsuccessful ram. According to him, since the beginning of the war, this was already his third ram ... But the hero pilot lamented in vain. Enemy Self

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lost altitude for years and soon landed near Kulikovka. His crew was taken prisoner...

... August 27, 1941 Lieutenant G.K. Banchenkov took off on a mission on a U-2 aircraft from the Kolichevsk airfield and went missing!

On August 25, the day when the troops of the Army Group "Center" launched an offensive to the south, the 53rd bomber squadron switched to work from the offensive zone of the 2nd Army (to Chernigov) to the offensive zone of the 2nd Panzer Group (to Konotop) and to protect the left flank of this group (Bryansk, Sumy):

"25.8.41. Daytime attack on the railway line Konotop - Putivl

25.8.41. Daytime attack on the railway line Konotop - Krolevets

26.8.41. Daytime attack on the Kholmechi (Spoptes) railway station

28.8.41. Daytime attack on Kholmechi station and trains

30.8.41. Daytime attack on the Paliki station (RaPK!) and the Bryansk-Sev railway station.

1.9.41. Daytime attack on Komarichi train station? (Kotizes!)

6.9.41. Night attack on warehouses in Bryansk

7.9.41. Daytime attack on the station and railway line

Klimovka (KitozKka) - Sumy.

"As a result of heavy fighting during September 5–7, the situation on the Southwestern Front became more complicated," states the Report of the Commander of the Southwestern Front No. situation at the front.

The battle to encircle and destroy the troops of the Southwestern Front was entering its final phase, and the 53rd Geschwader Legion Condor, having stopped providing the eastern wing and eastern flank of the Guderian group, moved on to actions to

1 Kuznetsov G.A. Chronicle of the city of Chernigov during the Second World War 1941-1945 according to documents, eyewitness accounts, journalism and memoirs. Chernigov: Desna, 1992, p. 13.

: Perhaps they mean Kholmechi and Komarichi in the Bryansk region and Paliki between Sukhinichi and Zhizdra.

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ensuring its head divisions in the direction of the main attack:

"8.9.41. Daytime attack on trains running along the Bakhmach-Konotop line

9.9.41. Daytime attack on the Romny station and the railway line

10.9.41. Daytime attack on the station and railway line near Piryatin

10.9.41. Day attack on troops and tanks near Ichni

12.9.41. Day attack on concentrations of troops and tanks near Razmana (Kagtapu)

13.9.41. Daytime attack on concentrations of troops and tanks near Piryatin and Chernukha

14.9.41. Daytime attack on troop concentrations near Pryluky

15.9.41. Daytime attack on concentrations of troops and tanks! in the Priluki-Piryatin area.

That, in fact, is all. As early as September 14, the advanced units of the German tank groups participating in the encirclement of the South-Western Front established contact with each other in the Luben area. On September 15, the contact turned into an impenetrable outer line of the Kyiv pocket. The remnants of the 21st, 5th, 37th and 26th armies, as well as part of the forces of the 38th and 40th armies, which ended up in it, were already destroyed with the help of the aviation of Army Group South. For example, the pilots of 1./KS55 (1st group of the 55th bomber squadron) in September 1941 in battles east of Kyiv were

58 trains, 675 various vehicles and 22 tanks were destroyed. The group was commanded by Hauptmann Rudolf Kiel (Kiel), who was awarded the Knight's Cross for these battles?.

Aircraft operating together with GA "Center", including KS 53, having struck at the troops concentrating to deblock the boiler (Sumy), returned to the Moscow direction (Kaluga):

"16.9.41. Daytime attack on moving trains Klinovka (Kl'ovka) - Sumy

there were no accumulations of Soviet tanks on that Priluk, Piryatina, Ichni and Chernukh. At that time, there could have been only a few surviving tanks of Semenchenko's 10th Panzer Division.

2 Zefirov M. Aces of the Luftwaffe. Bomber aircraft. M.: LLC "Publishing house AST", 2003. P. 120.

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17.9.41. Daytime attack on Komarichi Station

19.9.41. Daytime attack on the Smorodino railway station

20.9.41. Daytime attack on moving trains at Kiri
dexterity

24.9.41. Day attack on the railway line Bryansk - Orel - Kursk - Lgov

26.9.41. Daytime attack on a track crossing 10 km northwest of Kaluga

27.9.41. Daytime attack on moving trains near Kaluga

28.9.41. Daytime attack on moving trains near Kaluga... |

| Nairg I'. Ge ZsShasm it MozKai. 2001. \$. 86-87. 445

KAMRESESSNUASHEK 54 "TOTEMKORE"

Emblem of the 2nd group
of the 54th squadron.

Short story. The 54th bomber squadron
"Totenkopf" (KS 54) was formed | May 1939. In 1940,
she was re-equipped from He-111R to J M-88A.

Stages of the combat path: 1939 - Poland. 1940 - war with France, bombardment of Rotterdam!, air war with England. 1941 - continuation of the air war against England, the war with the USSR in the southern sector as part of the 5th air corps. 1942 - Mediterranean Sea. 1943 - Sardinia, Sicily. 1944 - France, Germany.

On September 10, 1944, the squadron was re-qualified as a combat fighter aviation squadron, which was supposed to fight on Me-262 jets. In 1945, not used in battles

fell.

In 1941, the commander of KO54 was "Uncle Otto" - Oberst Lieutenant Otto Gene (Ono Neupe), who shot down 6 enemy aircraft in World War I. The 2nd group was commanded by Major Erhard Kraft von Delmensingen (Efag @

Kga® wop Oeljtepztvep). Only the 2nd group took part in the Kiev pocket, which was based at airfields in the areas of Belaya Tserkov, Berdichev, Zhitomir, Kanatov and Kirovograd

1 According to German data, from 650 to 1000 people were killed in Rotterlam

ny residents.

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Yes. During this period, the 2nd group was part of the 5th Air Corps of General Aviation von Greim (KoBem E Sheg wop Ste! T) of the 4th Air Fleet of Colonel General Lera (Gog), and fought on bombers] and - 88A.

The emblem of the 54th bombing squadron was the image of a human skull - after the model of the emblem of the Braunschweig Black Hussars. Therefore, unofficially, the 54th squadron was called "Toep Korezsl / adeg".

Commander of the 54th squadron Otto Gene

Starting position 54th (Ono Nevpe).

bomber squadron on

eve of the Kyiv cauldron. From the beginning

In the wake of the war against the Soviet Union, the aircraft of the KS 54 - the 54th bomber squadron or the 54th combat geschwader - were used by the Army Group South in the sky of Ukraine in the most needed areas at any given time. In the first days of the war, the squadron bombed our airfields, then switched to tanks. After that - the fight against the approach of reserves and the destruction of communications, for which the 54th Gesh Vader bombed bridges, railways, stations and columns of troops marching to the front.

The main source for us on the history of the 54th Geschwader is the book by Siegfried Radtke (KaCh{ZhKe) "Katr/vessimaadeg 54. Jop 4er Li 52 sig Me 262. Ete SytotK pasi Knevyaaveryasyet, Vetsshep ipa Rokitetep 1935-1945". About the composition of the air forces operating against our Southwestern and Southern fronts, Radtke reports the following:

"Army Group South" (Field Marshal von Rund Stedt) with the 6th Army (Field Marshal von Reichenau), the 17th Army (Infantry General von Stulpnagel), the 11th Army (Colonel General von Schobert!) and the 1st armored

1 \$snob.

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group (Colonel-General von Kleist) form the right flank of the Eastern Front.

... The 4th Air Fleet, which directly supported Army Group South, included:

4. (E) / 122 (La 88) - 4th reconnaissance squadron of the 122nd group

KStr 2.b.u. 50 IPD 104 (7152) - 50th and 104th Special Purpose Combat Groups |

78 52 (Me 109) - 52nd Fighter Squadron

U. EyewegKogrz (at Sget) - 5th Air Corps Greim B
composition:

KS 51 (71 88) - 51st bomber squadron

KS 54 (L: 88) - 54th bomber squadron

KS 55 (Not 111) - 55th bomber squadron

4. (E) / 121 (7188) - 4th reconnaissance squadron of the 121st group

76 3 (Me 109) - 3rd Fighter Squadron

THAT. EShevegKogr5 - 4th Air Corps Pflugbeyl (Ryaizbe!) Consisting of:

KS 27 (Not 111) - 27th bomber squadron

15 77 (Me 109) - 77th Fighter Squadron

3. (E) / 121 (7288) - 3rd reconnaissance squadron of the 121st group

P. NaKKogr (Dessloh!) - 2nd Air Defense Corps "2.

The actions of the 54th bomber squadron in the Kiev pocket. In the encirclement of the troops of the Southwestern Front in August - September 1941, only the 2nd group of the 54th Geschwader took part. In view of the loss of most of the documents, its operations during this period can only be partially reconstructed according to flight books - Siegfried warns us. Radtke and gives such a chronology of the combat use of this

groups:

1 Abstract.

? vasike 5. Katr@essV/adeq 54. Von 4er L 52 gig Me 262. Yeshe SrgopK pasi Kperzavebasvet, VepsMen ip EoKiteshcchep 1935-1945. \$spla Uepar. \$. 70.

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"11.08. 1941

Flights to the Leplyavo area! (Gereda\mo) with strong fighter opposition. The headquarters link (51a P. / 54) lost Lieutenant Geber (Nbjer). During the air battle, B3 + 1T.S (3469) 2 was lost. Another 7-88 (6353) made a forced landing with significant damage in Belaya Tserkov.

14.08/15.08. 1941

"The 17th Army reached Kirovograd"?

"The use of August 15 was also accompanied by strong fighter opposition. LI-88 V3Z + EM (8284) non-commissioned officer Brockmeier (VgoKteeg) from the 5th squadron was attacked by a fighter and did not return. ý3+ýý (8215) non-commissioned officer Gruber (Sgobeg) from the 6th squadron after an air battle west of Kanev5 returned with holes and wounded

crew."

Having found out that in mid-August the 2nd group of the 54th squadron fought in the area of the Kanev tête-de-pon, we will pause briefly to look at the situation in the air through the eyes of a Soviet pilot. In August 1941, the Kanev area, where units of the Soviet 26th Army fought, was covered by the 88th Fighter Aviation Regiment. Fought in the 88th IAP GA. Wheat Nick told the following about the battles of August 14-15:

"The pilots of our regiment, along with other units of the 44th Fighter Aviation Division, fought on the front of the 26th Army, covering the crossings across the Dnieper near Kanev and Cherkassy,

1 Obviously, this refers to Leplyavo, a settlement on the left bank of the Dnieper, opposite Kanev. Right next to Leplyavo is Kaleberda, where the headquarters was located until August 15, and later the command post of the 26th army of F. I. Kostenko.

? Aircraft tactical code. The first letters - B3 - indicate belonging to the 54th bomber squadron. Subsequent letters and numbers indicate the belonging of the aircraft to the group and squadron, individual number.

3 Quoted in German original.

4 According to the Opersvodka of the South-Western Front, on August 14, the front's aviation shot down one Me-109, on the 15th - no victories were reported. Perhaps the downed Yu-88 from KS 54 was not credited to our pilot.

5 These days, our 26th Army still held the bridgehead near Kanev, and the 12th Panzer Division and the 5th Cavalry Corps were urgently evacuated to the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

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as well as accompanying attack aircraft and bombers in combat missions.

... One of the main tasks of our regiment during this period was patrolling the railway bridge across the Dnieper near Kanev. Trains were constantly moving along it: to the east with valuable property and equipment, to the west with weapons and materiel for the troops.

The Germans had set their sights on this bridge for a long time, but they could not overcome the air barrier for a long time. If the bridge was guarded by a link of our aircraft, then the Nazis, noticing this, brought twice or three times as many of their Messerschmitts into battle, echeloning them in height. We could not always oppose them with an equal number of combat vehicles - the composition of the regiment, as, indeed, of the entire air division, noticeably thinned out. And again, our I-16s showed themselves from the best side. Horizontal maneuver, combat on a turn, frontal attacks - all this was skillfully used by our pilots, squeezing the maximum out of their obedient, maneuverable donkeys.

... The next day (August 14), the enemy threw large groups of fighters onto the bridge across the Dnieper to open the way for bombers. Vasily Lipatov, patrolling with his link over the river, noticed a couple of Messerschmitts. The pilots rushed after the Germans, one "Messer" was immediately set on fire. At this time, six more "Messers" arrived in time to help the Nazis. An unequal battle ensued, but Lipatov fought so bravely and boldly, as if we had an advantage of four aircraft on our side. And yet, in one of the attacks, Vasily could not evade enemy fire: he was seriously wounded, the plane was seriously damaged. However, he stayed in the air until his comrades flew to the rescue. The plane, finally losing control, rushed to the ground ...

... August 14, 1941. Three sections of our aircraft, led by Lieutenant P. Sereda, climbed to cover the bridge near Kanev, to which 18 enemy bombers were heading, divided into two groups. Our fighters quickly finished with the first nine of the enemy, shooting down two Junkers, the rest hurried to get out. But the second nine Yu-88 stubbornly strove for the bridge, and seven Messerschmitts from the cover group had already arrived in time to reel it up. A fierce battle ensued. The deadly merry-go-round spun in the air. More

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six cars were shot down by our pilots, three of them - Vasily De
change.

The pilots told how, heated up by the excitement of the battle, Vasily decided to ram the fascist and sent his I-16 straight into the body of the Messer. But the price of this "Messer" was the heroic death of one of the most courageous and experienced pilots of the regiment. Soon Vasily Demenok was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin for his inspired feat.

... One of the main problems during those August days was the repair of military equipment. In the bloody battles over the Dnieper, many aircraft were seriously damaged, some were downright in a hopeless state. Sometimes we wondered how the pilots made it to the airfield in these machines riddled with bullets and shrapnel. Practically only 8-10 full-fledged fighters remained in the regiment. It was difficult in such conditions to count on the successful completion of combat missions. But we also had no right to justify the forced inaction by this.

There were more pilots in the regiment than serviceable ones.
years ... In

... In mid-August, the regiment moved - once again - to the Chernobay airfield. Nearby, in a forest landing, especially damaged vehicles of two regiments were assembled near it (the 249th air regiment was billeted with us). Commander

division, Colonel Zabaluev, who arrived in Chernobay on August 15, uttered only one bitter word about this: "Cemetery!" - and ordered to assemble the engineering and technical staff of both regiments ...

... An hour after the meeting, the engineer of the Mitsenmakhor regiment flew out on a U-2 plane with the commander of the 1st squadron, V.B. Moskalchuk to comb the vicinity of the airfield within a radius of 40-50 kilometers. The search was successful - they found two aircraft, I-16 and I-153, on which the pilots had to make an emergency landing, and marked their location on the maps. In the morning, these vehicles were brought to the regiment on trucks and immediately dismantled - thus, they received

some spare parts.

... And the battles had to be fought on a new sector of the front, near Dnepropetrovsk, where a very difficult situation developed.

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Our units held the bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper until the last opportunity. However, under the onslaught of the enemy, the troops were forced to withdraw. Defensive battles unfolded directly at Dnepropetrovsk. The entire 44th Air Division was again returned to the Southern Front, thrown to the aid of the ground forces.

However, let us return to the actions of the Totenkopfgeschwader. In mid-August, his actions were also transferred to other sectors, including Dnepropetrovsk.

16.08-21.08. 1941

"The OKW issued instructions to concentrate in the initial position for the battle around Kyiv. On August 16, units of the 6th Army stand in front of Kanev. The 11th Army occupied Nikolaev. Kherson since August 19 is also in German hands. On August 21, the 50th division occupied Ochakov. The retreat of the 5th Soviet army beyond the Dnieper was discovered.

The 2nd group attacks railway stations, military echelons and columns of troops west of Dnepropetrovsk and in the Nezhin region.

22.08. 1941

"SS division "Viking" penetrated into Dnepropetrovsk."

In the Khabny area? V3Z + UM (3345) of Chief Corporal Harslev (Naag \$ ey) from the 4th squadron was lost.

23.08.124.08. 1941 Use
for troops and field positions near Yanov3.

08/25/1941

"The 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian of the Army Group Center launched an offensive to the south. 3rd Panzer Division in front of Novgorod-Seversky. The formations of the Kleist tank group took Dnepro-Petrovsk.

Pshenyanik G.A. We will reach the Oder. M.: Voenizdat, 1985. S. 65-73.

In the Khabny area (120 km northwest of Kyiv) was the headquarters of Potapov's 5th Army.

: Obviously, it means Yanov on Pripyat, in the withdrawal zone of the 5th are missions.

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The 2nd group of the 54th squadron (P. / KS54) is being transferred from Belaya Tserkov (Kamanovka) and Berdichev-West to Zhitomir / Kanatov. After that - the use of the troops at Kosachevka !.

26.08/27.08. 1941

In double and triple sorties, the retreating Soviet troops and columns are bombed east of Dnepropetrovsk, the road beyond Novomoskovsk? destroyed by bombs.

28.08./29.08. 1941

The offensive of the 6th army north of Kyiv is trying to stop the 5th Soviet army - a blow to the flank from the northeast direction through the Desna. The pontoon bridge across the Desna Maksimaz, discovered by scouts, was attacked and destroyed by the 2nd group of the 54th squadron on August 28 at about 17.00. However, the Russians do not give up. By the morning of August 29, the crossing was restored. Powerful tank * and motorized units are moving through the Desna. Despite strong air defenses, the 2nd Group attacked the bridge around 0920 with twenty-two 1-88s. The commander of the unit, the 5th squadron of the 54th squadron, Lieutenant Petzold (Re!2014) achieves decisive hits. The Soviets were feverishly trying to fix the crossing over the Desna. The crossing was raided again in the afternoon and the Soviets surrendered. Their attack on the flank of the 6th Army failed.

1 Kosachevka - a village on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, in the zone of the 5th Potapov Army. Here, to the north of the Okuninovskiy bridgehead formed by the Germans, was the 228th Rifle Division of Colonel V.G. Chernov, who fought with the 98th and 111th infantry divisions of the Germans, who were trying to expand the bridgehead. Not far from Kosachevka was also the 124th Rifle Division.

2 Most likely, this refers to a very important railway near the village of Novomoskovskoe: Kremenchug - Romodan (and from Romodan - to Kyiv, Bakhmach and Poltava).

3 Maxim - a village on the Desna, where one of the crossings of Potapov's 5th army was located. The crossing was a bridge on floating supports - 12 barges - 136 m long. "Enemy aircraft destroyed the floating bridge across the river. Desna in the Maxim area," the Operational Report of the South-Western Front Headquarters No. 00119 reported by 22:00 on August 29, 1941. However, this crossing was soon restored again.

4 Warmia Potapov tanks by this time were gone.

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30.08. 1941 |

"The divisions of the 2nd Army attacking from the north captured the crossing over the Desna near Kiselevka!"

The 2nd group of the 54th squadron is relocated north of Kiro Vograd.

31.08. 1941

Departures for railway targets near Pavlograd?.

1.09/02.09

The 2nd Group of the 54th Squadron takes part in heavy air raids on the Lozovaya and Gorodishche railway stations, as well as on the railway lines Poltava-Kremenchug and Lubny-Kremenchug³.

03.09. 1941

"The beginning of the battle for the encirclement around Kyiv."

The fight against Soviet troops and marching columns near Piryatin.

10.09. 1941

"The 4th Panzer Division has taken Gorodishche (the headquarters of the command of the 38th Soviet Army) and continues to advance on Romny in the area of the Romen River"⁴.

09/11/1941

Fight against supply lines Akhtyrka - Kharkov - Kirikovka. V3Z + SM (4320) Chief Sergeant Major Schmalfuss (Zsita! d1\$\$) from the 5th Squadron of the 54th Squadron did not return after one of these sorties. Fate is unknown.

\ This refers to the capture of the Vyblinsky bridgehead by the 260th Infantry Division of the 2nd Weichs Army of Army Group Center. However, this bridgehead was formed on September 1-2. And the 260th division reached Kiselevka on August 31.

? Pavlograd is a city to the east of Dnepropetrovsk.

3 Just in these days, the Germans captured the Derievsky bridgehead near Kremenchug.

4 If you mean the Settlement, which was in the zone of the 4th Panzer Division, i.e. north of Bakhmach, then there could not be the headquarters of the 38th army.

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12.09. 1941

"J-yatank group struck from the bridgehead near Kremenchug to the north. The 3rd Panzer Division of the 2nd Panzer Group is on the offensive south of Lokhvitsa to Piryatin.

The 2nd group of the 54th squadron supports the attack on the Soviet troops in the Piryatin area. During takeoff, AE + SR (3340) from the 6th squadron falls. While the ji-88 breaks 55% and the crew leader dies, the remaining crew members come out unscathed.

13.09. 1941

"German air reconnaissance detects a strong movement of Soviet formations from the Priluk region to the Lokhvitsa-Romny line." |

Repeated flights to columns and field positions near Luben!. 6th Squadron lost two 1-88s at once. AF+UR (2437) of Lieutenant Lehmann (Geytapp) and AF+UR (5132) of Sergeant Sauter (Zashcheg) collide west of Luben during the attack due to too tight formation in the air. Both crews find flying death.

14.09—19.09. 194]

"The end of the Southwestern Front is coming. While the 3rd Panzer Division, advancing from the north, takes Lokhvitsa and strikes further south, the 16th Panzer Division is fighting near Luben, where the two panzer divisions meet. At the same time, the boiler closes. |

4th Panzer Division takes Priluki; 52nd Army Corps, September 18 - Poltava. On September 16-19, the 29th Army Corps storms Kyiv, and on August 19 the city falls into German hands.

On September 18, the commander of the 2nd group of the 54th squadron presented a

the mandir of the 5th squadron, Lieutenant Ernst Petzold (Egg \$ { Re! To! 4) Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, which he was awarded on September 17. Oberleutnant Petnold, who has been fighting since 1940, received this award for remarkable successes in the air war against England and the Soviet Union and, among other things, for the decisive double destruction of the pontoon bridge across the Desna on August 28-29.

{| On that day, the 16th Panzer Division approached Lubny, advancing from Kremenchug to the north.

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On September 19, the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross was awarded to the commander of the 1st group of the 54th squadron, Hauptmann Richard Linke (E1spaga ZIKe), which he was also awarded on September 17 for the sinking of an English submarine in the North Sea as a pilot and for the successful leadership of the 1st group of the 54th squadron in the air war against England and the Soviet Union!.

09/20/1941

The railroad tracks on the routes Krasnograd-Kharkovi Krasnograd-Balki, as well as Novaya Vodolaga railway station, are the goals of this day. Probably, the hit of an anti-aircraft shell caused the non-return of the staff 7-88 V3Z + VS (2208) lieutenant Remberg (Ketfeg). Later, the plane was found wrecked near Kharkov.

09/21/1941

"The resistance in the western part of the boiler is collapsing. Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Soviet Army, Major General Potapov surrenders?. When trying to escape, the commander-in-chief of the army group, Colonel General Kirponos, dies. The OKW issues an order to the 11th Army to seize the Crimea.

22.09. 1941

Departures to support the 11th Army to the Isthmus of Perekop and to firing positions north of Armyansk.

188 (2067) non-commissioned officer Neubauer (Meibatseg) is damaged in an air battle near Krivoy Rog and returns with wounded crew members.

The 2nd group of the 54th squadron, with strong fighter opposition, attacks the airfield in Bogodukhov, west of Khary

1 "By the end of September 1941, the pilots of the 1st group of the 54th squadron under the command of Richard Linke destroyed over 240 Soviet sa-

aircraft, over 100 tanks and a large number of trucks. Linke himself had 30 Soviet tanks on his account, "Mikhail Zefirov tells us in his book: Aces of the Luftwaffe. Bomber aircraft. Moscow: AST Publishing House LLC. S. 128.

2 M.I. Potapov was taken prisoner wounded and shell-shocked. Those who saw Potapov after the war spoke of a swelling on his arm following a blow in hand-to-hand combat in 1941.

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kova. In air battles, the crew of Lieutenant Schlegel (5sese) from the 5th squadron set fire to one I-181.

September 26-27, 1941

"The battle around Kyiv, the biggest encirclement battle in world history, is over."

The OKW report of September 27 says: "As already announced by special notice, the big battle around Kiev is over ... In the course of the operation, carried out in the closest cooperation between the army and the Luftwaffe, a total of 665,000 prisoners, 884 tanks, 3718 guns; countless other military equipment captured or destroyed."

25-30.09.1941

Destruction of railway lines and supply trains on the Kupyansk-Lysichansk and Krasnograd-Balki routes. Several trains with tanks take off into the air. 1-88 (8112) is damaged by a fighter attack and lands with the wounded on board in Poltava"2.

Along with the number of trophies taken by the German troops, Radtke also cites the number of losses of the 54th Geschwader, however, not only in the Kiev pocket, but throughout the initial period of the war with the USSR:

"After 5 months of hard use in the East, the es karada lost approximately 70% of its aircraft and more than 50% of the flight crew"?.

One of the foreign authors, Caius Becker, evaluates the results of the use of the Luftwaffe in the Kiev pocket as follows:

"There, 600 miles to the south, the encirclement ring around Kiev was on fire — a battle which Hitler forced his generals to start against their will and which delayed the advance of Army Group Center on Moscow to vital

1 So the Germans called our MiG-3 fighter.

? kaasche 5. Katriezspuadeg 54. Won deg 1 52 gig Me 262. Ete SvgopK pass Kpermavebospet, Vepschep ipd OoKitetep 1935-1945. \$ sNlv Uepav. \$. 92.

3 Kaashe 5. Catrezspuadeg 54. Won 4er a 52 gig Me 262. Ete SporK pasi Kpermavebaspet, Vepschep ipd OoKitetmen 1935-1945. Zsvia Uepayav. \$. 99.

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two month. Here, despite participating in ground battles, the backlash of the waffe solved an even more important task of blockade of the battlefield. For 4 whole weeks, his planes daily and systematically attacked all railway communications in the east and northeast: stations, bridges, fashion shows, trains and locomotives. All reinforcements that went to the aid of Budyonny's armies were blocked, all retreat routes were destroyed.

And yet, despite this quick and local success, the Russian railway system as a whole remained practically untouched...

... The successful blockade of the Kyiv sector of battles was the last major military operation of the Luftwaffe before the onset of the Russian winter. Just a few days later, it would no longer be possible, because the planes began to sink in the mud, and many were simply unable to get off the ground, "said Caius Becker!"

1 Becker K. War diaries of the Luftwaffe. Chronicle of the fighting of the German Air Force in World War II 1939-1945. M.: CJSC "Centro Ligraf", 2004. S. 310.

Atrocities of the Kyiv Cauldron

The war unleashed by Hitler against the Soviet Union in order to take away their ancestral lands from the Slavs and other peoples of the USSR, from the very beginning took on an extremely fierce character.

Unfortunately, the extermination nature of the war imposed on us led not only to a particularly bloody battle, but also to extremely cruel treatment of the enemy defeated in the course of the battles and taken prisoner.

During the war, of the military personnel held captive by the warring parties, the following died or were killed:

- 2.6% French;

- 9.7% of the Japanese;

- 12.4% of the Germans (in Soviet captivity);
- 17.2% of Germany's allies (Hungarians, Italians, Romanians, Finns and Slovaks - in Soviet captivity);
- 57% of Soviet military personnel (in German captivity)!

Below we present some testimonies about the atrocities committed by the opposing sides in the Kiev cauldron.

Soviet atrocities (official German documents). Bolshevik crimes against the law of war and humanity, a multi-volume collection with this title, was published by the German Foreign Ministry during World War II for distribution to the international community. This collection included the testimonies of German servicemen about the atrocities committed by our soldiers, as well as some Soviet documents, which, in the opinion of the compilers of the collection, testified to the crimes of the Soviet side. In one of the volumes for 1941, an order is placed

\ Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. Moscow: Yauza; Eksmo, 2005. S. 319.

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one each from the armies of the South-Western Front that German soldiers who were taken prisoner should be shot. To be honest, the author of this book thought that the text of the order was falsified at a low level - it does not correspond to the accepted standards for army orders of 1941. An error in assessing the order given in the collection as false is possible, but unlikely, since this document did not have to be translated - it was submitted in the form of a photocopy.

The following documents of the collection of the German Foreign Ministry kas
there are events that took place in the Kiev cauldron:

No. 662

PROTOCOL

Apartment location, November 21, 1941. Court of the field
commandant's office...

In the presence:

Military judge Dr. Tsien (Leyep) Non-commissioned
officer Krause, as recorder

Luftwaffe lieutenant Meyering appeared before the court

(MeueppV), 22./KatrezsV\madegs, and swore to tell only the truth...

Personality: My name is Heinz Meiering, 23 years old, lieutenant.

Facts of the case: On September 12, 1941, after an air battle, our vehicle had to make an emergency landing about 6 km south of the village of Pronozovka* (south of

1 Here it would be appropriate to recall the well-known fake "Order of Zhukov-Beria to evict all Ukrainians from Ukraine", which is full of terms that can terrify a civilian, for whom, in fact, this fake is designed. However, the military terms in this "order" (for example, "punitive division"), distributed by the Germans in 1944 in the form of leaflets, do not correspond to those actually existing in the USSR at that time and indicate a low-level falsification.

2 Vosnemizsne Vergespep sevep Kierzges(un Meanschnisnkey. Rokitem gizattepveee v Auslagyrep Ap. 2. Rosé. Veit 1942. Seask un Oeschespep Veyav, Veit. \$. 136. The numbers of the documents correspond to the numbers in the source.

3 In the original, the exact numbers of military units, divisions, regiments, air squadrons are not indicated.

y Pronozovka is a village on the banks of the Dnieper near the mouth of the Sula. On September 12, 20 km east of the village, the Kleist tank group broke through the front of the 38th Army and rushed from Kremenchug to Lubny. And in the direction of Pronozovka and Zhovnino, the 257th Infantry Division was advancing.

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road Kremenchug - Zhovnino) in the steppe territory. Eki-

The page of the aircraft consisted of Lieutenant O. as commander, sergeant major S. as a pilot, non-commissioned officer M., corporal K. and me. Non-commissioned officer M. received severe gunshot wounds to his arm and leg during the battle.

After landing, we carried M. out of the car and gave him a temporary bandage. We could not remain where we were, for our landing had no doubt been noticed. As a guard, they sent me ahead. I was followed by a pilot and a gunner with a wounded man. The commander secured us with a machine gun. Soon we were discovered and fired on, obviously with pistols, army rifles and hunting rifles, and then with automatic weapons ... Our machine gun fired 2 bursts and fell silent. During this battle, the pilot first appeared next to me, but then we lost each other. During the exchange of fire, and also after that, I no longer saw other comrades. After three days of wandering, I reached the German advanced

lines.

Approximately 10 days after my return to the troops, I was again at the place of our forced landing. Pe-

In front of the glass cockpit of the car was a grave, on which stood a cross made of aircraft parts. In my presence, and in the presence of Military Police Commissioner Miller of SER. - Stirre! ..., as well as a Luftwaffe doctor, the corpse of Lieutenant O. was dug out of this grave. As it turned out later, the grave was made by German soldiers who found the lieutenant dead and half-dressed by the plane.

We examined the corpse of Lieutenant O. and found that the overalls had been cut off to the waist. The lower part of the overalls, flight trousers, boots and socks were removed. It is obvious that after that O. was ill-treated, since multiple marks of blows were clearly visible on the back of his body. We and the doctor in question came to the conclusion that O. had been beaten with sticks and whips. The left wrist was smashed, apparently with a blunt object. The bone of the left hand was completely crushed. It was obviously a bruised wound, not a gunshot wound. The lieutenant's nose was cut off. A hole the size of a fist was found in the skull of a lieutenant, at the back of the head. According to the doctor present at the examination, the skull of the Lieutenant Nantes was broken by something. Splitting the skull with a shot

SER field secret police.

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included. Otherwise, we would have to find some kind of inlet.

A shot was found on the corpse of O., which he received from behind, under the left shoulder blade, in the heart ...

Corporal K. lay buried in the cemetery of the village. According to Commissar Miller, Corporal K. was killed by Red Guards and Communists. It was not possible to establish where non-commissioned officer M. had gone. Obviously, as Commissar Miller said, the Red Guards took him with them!

y. 2..2

signed by Heinz Meyering, Lieutenant

Witness sworn in

Closed:

signed by Dr. Tsien, military judge

signed by Krause, non-commissioned officer

No. 683
PROTOCOL

Apartment location, November 24, 1941.

Court ... infantry division

In the presence:

Military judge Kebler (KoSheg), as a judge

Chief Corporal Baumann (Vaitapp), as recorder

On the violation of international law: the discovery of a mutilated German soldier, the testimony of Lieutenant Tenzler (Tan2Jer), an infantry regiment ...

The subject of the interrogation is announced to the witness, the meaning of the oath is indicated, then, as indicated below, they are shown:

Personality: My name is Eberhard Tenzler, b. November 15, 1911 in Dresden, Evangelical Lutheran, senior school teacher by profession, married.

Circumstances of the case: On September 6, 1941, I received a combat .

. It is strange that Commissar Miller from the SER remembered the outdated by 1941 word "Red Guard". Perhaps we are talking about a fighter detachment of local residents or the 274th Kremenchug militia division of the 38th army. Parts of the 37th Cavalry Division and the 297th Infantry Division could have been at the crash site.

2 U.5.i. - "reported, approved, signed."

3 Vo1ss Nemizisve Uegbtswep rep Kievzges ipa MepssviisvKek. Vokitezhe gizattepvezhme! wat Aiz\magizep Apts. 2. Rose. Vegt 1942. Seatshskit OeshssNep Uetsav, Vegt. 5.140.

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an order to bury the dead Russians who lay on both sides of the Oshitki-Novoselki road!. Together with Oberleutnant Frank, battery commander of 2./APShepe-Kegitepe..., I noticed that about 80 meters to the right of the road was the mutilated corpse of a German soldier. Together with Lieutenant Frank, we approached this place.

Approximately 500 m from Oshitki, the road cuts through a sand dune. At 80 m west of the road, at some distance from the dune, lay on a vegetated area, in an earth furrow, devoid of eyes. The lid of the skull was damaged, the eyes were cut out, the nose was cut off, the teeth were knocked out, a deep incision ran along the chest, from which the ribs were found. The skin was pulled off the palm of his hand and curled up like parchment on his wrist.

The pockets of the uniform and trousers were turned inside out, and their contents were empty, there were no boots.

y. . And.

signed by Tenilaire

The witness, according to the law, was sworn in

signed by Kebler

signed by Baumann

No. 762
PROTOCOL

Court ... infantry division

Division headquarters apartment, 1 December 1941

In the presence of: field military judge Dr.

Vitaseka (Ipausyek)

Non-commissioned officer Gendriok (Nepaposk), as a recorder

Sergeant Major Groshe (Otozswe), Headquarters Sh./Iamege-Vevitep(3...) appeared before the sul, and after he was informed about the subject of interrogation and he was called to tell the truth and sworn in, he testified as follows:

1! Oshitki is a village (now a camp site) on the Dnieper above Kyiv, in the southern part of the famous Okuninovsky bridgehead. In the Oshitka-Novo area, the 131st MD, 87th Rifle Division of the 41st Rifle Division of the 37th Army of A.A. fought. Vlasov. From the side of the Germans - the 113th front.

2 Vosnem 5 Izspe Vergesnep revep Kpevzges ip MenzsvlisvKey. Rokiteshche gizattevezhe! Wat Aiz\Magivep Apk. 2. Row. Veglp 1942. Sedgisk it Oeshbwep UepPav, Veglp. 5. 153-158.

° Sh./ashchepe-Kezitepe - 3rd battalion of the infantry regiment.

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1. Witness: I am Dr. Rudolf Grosche, sergeant major, soldier since 07/01/1940, from 06/01/1941 in Sh./LUtashchepe-Kegitepi...

ve

embassies.

The witness was handed over protocol Sh. ... FROM 10/25/1941 with his testimony, and after returning about the tokol was read aloud:

"On September 22, 1941, at about 6 p.m., the third battalion received an order to take back the southern part of the area near Baryshevka?, to the railway embankment. After the fire support of the division

By the "Nebelwerfer" zone and the onset of darkness, the battalion launched an attack and, under the leadership of the battalion commander, reached the ordered goal of the offensive - the railway embankment near Baryshevka. The Russian counterattack from the left flank was repulsed, but the Russians managed to break through the defenses at the junction between the second and third battalions and break through with superior forces to the rear of the third battalion. From 9 o'clock the companies of the third battalion were forced to evade the enemy surrounding them. Some units managed to break through to Baryshevka and capture the center. However, the main forces of the battalion, which were behind, were cut off. The last exit for them was a large, several meters deep swamp in the east; where many drowned.

The next day, the area of the railway embankment at Baryshevka was reconquered, and it became possible to find and bury the comrades who had died in the swamp.

On September 23, 1941, the battalion lost: 92 killed, 32 wounded, 26 missing, in total - 150 people.

During the burial of the dead, it turned out that they had a large number of injuries. I was convinced of this myself when the coffins were set up for the solemn farewell to the dead. For this, a military cemetery was laid in the northeastern part of Baryshevka. The commander of the army, General Field Marshal Reichenau, examined the bodies of the mutilated soldiers

at Protocol of the 3rd battalion. Obviously, these were previously taken affidavits of a witness.

. Baryshevka is a settlement to the east of Kyiv, between Borispol and Yagotyn. A railway passes through the southern part of Baryshevka. to Grebenka (not far from Piryatin), to Lubny and, further, to the mainland. On this road, they tried to get out of the encirclement of the 37th army of A.A. Vlasov.

- Obviously, a swamp adjacent to the Trubezh River.

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dates of the third battalion during his visit to Baryshevka on September 26.

The witness stated:

The record read aloud to me is authentic. It fully matches my testimony. I am adding the following:

Since I was then both an officer for assignments and at the same time an officer of the battalion responsible for the burial, I checked in Baryshevka the readiness for the burial of the corpses of the members of the battalion. In doing so, I spoke critically of injuries that could be stab or cut wounds received in hand-to-hand combat, and not related to atrocities. In this regard, I would like to point out the following: first,

before visiting the cemetery where the dead were prepared for burial, Mr. Field Marshal Rey chenau! also pointed out that there should be some caution in assessing atrocities. When he examined the approximately 50 dead lying there, he noticed that, nevertheless, we could talk not only about combat injuries, but also about atrocities.

Based on my own experience and from the reports of the participants in the battle, I can say, however, that on September 23, 1941, it did not come to hand-to-hand combat with the Russians at all. I examined the dead before burial and came to the conclusion that injuries could have occurred not only at the time of the battle, but also after that. I am of the opinion that the soldiers in the swamp could not defend themselves and therefore surrendered without resistance. From the reports of the members of the battalion who managed to return then, it follows that the soldiers of the battalion, who were in the swamp, did not stop resisting before the Russians raised their hands. During the evacuation of the dead, I recognized some of them, in particular, on the basis of my previous affiliation with the company. Thus, corporal S., 11./shashepe-Vezitep: ... had a broken skull. I regarded this injury as an atrocity. Then I saw Corporal S., 11./pashepe-Veztepi..., whose eyes were cut out. I also identified Oberfeldwebel K., 11./n{amenpe-Kesten..., who had cut wounds to the throat, head and face, which, in my opinion, could not have been received at the time of the battle either. The soldiers who returned reported, in particular, that K., after

! Commander of the 6th Army.

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reducing resistance in the swamp, unwounded and unarmed approached the Russians with their hands up.

The general impression that I got then, when examining many of the dead, is the following: even if some of the injuries examined then were caused by shots at close range, and some of the remaining injuries were probably received in hand-to-hand combat, nevertheless, in to a large extent, most of all injuries from the Russians were received after the cessation of hostilities.

W. &. And. and read

signed by Dr. Rudolf Grosche, sergeant major

Witness testified under oath

2. Witness: Gloger (Cloweg), born 2/1/1911 in Patchkau (RazzsVKai), Catholic, factory worker, soldier 26/2/1940, non-commissioned officer from 1/10/1940, since July 1940 in Kegtpe ...

The witness is presented with his testimony dated October 25

1941 contained in the protocol Sh./pashchepe-Keztephs ..., after returning they are read aloud:

"I took part in the battle at the railway embankment in Baryshevka. At about 9 o'clock my company was forced to retreat under powerful pressure from the Russians, first to the south and then to the east. When we approached the swamp, I saw how several comrades, from 8 to 9 people, entered the swamp. However, seeing no longer any possibility for further withdrawal, after throwing out their weapons, with raised hands, not wounded, they went to the Russians. I saw them from a distance of about 20 meters, including non-commissioned officer E. At that moment I myself was up to my head in a swamp. Shortly after the comrades left for the Russians, I heard cries of pain from there. I myself managed to evade capture.

I am ready to repeat my testimony under oath."

He also stated:

The testimony read aloud to me is authentic... I also add the following:

Before burial in Baryshevka, I examined the dead of the company and other units of the battalion. I also took part in the evacuation of the dead from the swamp. Arrow Y\.. I saw a gunshot wound to the head and a bayonet wound to the thigh. Ephraim K.'s eyes were cut out, he also had cut wounds

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heads. Sergeant major M. had a broken neck. In my mind, it was an injury that he could only have received after removing his steel helmet. Although we went into the swamp without weapons, we did not take off our steel helmets.

y. &. And. and read

signed by Alfred Gloger, non-commissioned officer

Witness testified under oath

3. Witness: the witness of non-commissioned officer Grün (Ogop), Roman, born on 24.4.1904 in Tarnowitz (Tagpouy2 O./5.), appeared before the court, was a Catholic, a soldier with

26/8/1939, non-commissioned officer from May 1940, currently in 9./aepe-Kezttepi by profession a police gendarme of the mayor's office (Sepdagtepemasnite! \$ er).

The witness is presented with his testimony dated October 25, 1941, contained in the protocol Sh./Chamepe-Kertenk ..., after returning they are read aloud:

"I took part in the battle at the railway embankment in Baryshevka. At about 9 o'clock the company under heavy pressure in

the rear of the company was supposed to evade the Russians. At first we evaded with our platoon to the east and later to the north. When we came to the swamp, the Russians began to approach us, I could no longer hope that I would slip away from them. I was lying behind a bump, and the Russians went past me. I got up again and tried to elude the Russians. At the same time, I met a seriously wounded comrade, a corporal /., whom I had to leave. Meanwhile, the Russians returned, I tried to pretend to be dead, but the Russian came up to me and established that I was still alive. He asked me to follow him, I could understand the Russian invitation, as I know Polish. The Russian officer said that I should follow him, he wants to show me something. In the immediate vicinity of me there were about 15 to 20 Russians ... Now we were moving towards separately lying German wounded and not wounded comrades. There were approximately 10 to 12 of them, including 2 not wounded. The unwounded raised their hands, the weapons were thrown away or even earlier lost in the swamp. Do the Russians ask the Germans to give them their valuables with the following words: "T5sp der", which roughly means: "What can you offer?" The German comrades gave the Russians their valuables, such as watches and wallets. Then

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they were shot and stabbed to death by the Russians, although they, as well as the wounded, begged for their lives. At the same time, I stood in close proximity and was a witness to everything.

As soon as the Russians finished off one of ours, the whole gang shouted "Hurrah!".

Later I managed to escape Russian captivity. Before a close bayonet fight, in which stab wounds could appear, in my presence it never reached.

In the first half of the day, while I was walking with the Russians through the swamp, one of the Russians, imitating the voice of a wounded man, shouted in German: "Comrades, help!" The Russians wanted in this way to induce the German comrades who remained in the swamp to make themselves known and surrender.

I am ready to repeat the testimony under oath."

The witness also explained:

The testimony read aloud to me is authentic... I want to add that the Russian officer who took me with him, if I understood him correctly, probably told me that something special would be planned with me... Of course, I saw with my own eyes how 2 German soldiers were shot even though they raised their hands; how the other comrades were killed by the Russians, I did not look. In addition to these shots, there were also others around me from the Russian side, in addition, I heard the furious cries of the Russians and the cries of pain of the German soldiers. I didn't dare to look around, because next to me was a Russian officer with all his people. At this time I also heard

grenade explosions on the opposite side. The Russians drag me in great haste to the edge of the swamp, across the meadow, to the house on the edge of the village. However, before this dragging away, in the place where they fired - in my opinion at our comrades, to the sound of furious cries - it was already quiet. After a shell hit the roof of the indicated house, I managed to slip away. I was probably in the hands of the Russians for one hour. After my captivity, one Russian drawled out in German: "Comrades, help!" Perhaps he wanted other German soldiers from the swamp to capitulate.

As I could see, the German soldiers in the swamp were without weapons, since with weapons in their hands in this deep

T IMHO: it was not a Russian who shouted in German, but a witness saving his own skin.

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It was impossible to escape in any swamp, and it was impossible to think of resistance in this situation.

After that, I saw how the corpses removed from the swamp lay in the cemetery in Baryshevka. I was then so impressed by my personal experiences that I saw only a general view of the cemetery, and did not consider each soldier separately. Since hand-to-hand combat did not occur in the swamp and, as already mentioned, the German soldiers in the swamp were unarmed when the Russians approached, it must be assumed that the injuries inflicted on the dead should be regarded, in my opinion, as atrocities. at

I saw the eyes repeatedly cut out from the dead, split skulls, stab wounds with bayonet in the groin, face, head and ear.

y. #. And. and read

signed by Roman Grun

Witness testified under oath

signed by Dr. Vitashek

signed by Hendriok, non-commissioned officer

No. 77
PROTOCOL

Court ... infantry division

Division headquarters apartment, December 2, 1941.

In the presence of: field military judge Dr. Vitashek

Corporal Münnich (Miptshsy), as recorder

Non-commissioned officer Frikke (Epske), 10./Tpatmepe-Veztete, appeared before the court after he was informed about the subject of interrogation and he was called to tell only the truth and was sworn in, he testified as follows:

My name is Richard Fricke, born September 15, 1919 in Sommerfeld (Sommerfeld! 4), Evangelical confession, economist by profession, soldier from September 1, 1939, from December 1, 1939 at 10./1 {atshepe-Keritepi ...

The witness is presented with his testimony dated October 25, 1941, contained in the protocol of Sh./shtashchepe-Kegitepi ..., after returning they are read aloud:

1 Vspem! Rokitetshe gizatteprez {e! Wat Aiz\Magivep Ap. 2. Yeowe. Vegln 1942. Sedgiskoit Reshbssep UePar, Vet. \$. 159.

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"I took part in the battles near Baryshevka as part of the 10th company. When we had to retreat under pressure from the Russians to the east, I tried to take cover on the edge of the swamp. Nevertheless, the Russians were getting closer and closer to me, as they outflanked us from the rear. When I was at the edge of the swamp, about 15 meters away from me lay several wounded German comrades; about 6 to 8 soldiers. I saw how the Russians approached them and treated them with bayonets. I could even hear the Russians saying something to the German comrades; but what exactly, I still could not understand. The German comrades asked the Russians for life. I saw exactly how the Russians, with their bayonets, treated the wounded comrades in turn, first one, then rushed to the next. I managed to avoid Russian captivity because I hid behind a nearby house. I have not seen close bayonet fighting between Germans and Russians anywhere.

I am ready to repeat the testimony under oath."

The witness then stated the following:

'Aloud the testimony is genuine. I confirm them today.

y. E. i.

signed by Richard Fricke, non-commissioned officer

Witness testified under oath

2. Witness: Corporal Shen (5sNbp). After a warning to tell the truth and after pointing out the meaning of the sworn oath: .

My name is Konrad Shen, I was born on December 3, 1910 in Vakhta le (lasche!), Religion Catholic, a worker by profession, since December 3, 1939 a soldier, since October 24, 1940 in 11. / shashchep Keritepi ...

The witness is presented with his testimony dated October 25, 1941 in the protocol Sh./ashchepe-Kezitepi ..., they are read aloud: after return

"I took part in the struggle around Baryshevka on September 23, 1941 as part of the 11th company. When we retreated to the east, I managed to get through to the swamp. I climbed into the swamp, about 60 m, and saw how, at a distance of 30 m, three of my comrades with raised hands and without weapons approached the Russians in order to surrender, since there were no other options left. A bunch of Russians, whose numbers I don't know for sure

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I can name, rushed at three comrades and dealt with them with shots and blows from rifle butts. At that moment, I was at a distance, about 30 meters from the scene of this incident.

I myself managed to escape Russian captivity by slipping unnoticed through the swamp.

I did not observe hand-to-hand combat between Germans and Russians anywhere.

The witness then stated the following: the evidence read aloud to me is authentic. I confirm them today.

y, 2. i.

signed by Konrad Shen, corporal

Witness testified under oath

3. Witness: Corporal Haberkamm (NabegKatp). After a warning to tell the truth and after pointing out the meaning of the sworn oath:

My name is Fritz Haberkamm, born February 20, 1914. in Gelsenkirchen (Se]senKispep), evangelical, steelworker, soldier February 14, 1940, from March 14, 1941 in 12./N\ashchepe-Kerttepi ...

I participated in the evacuation of dead comrades. During the evacuation, we ran into Corporal K., from the 12th company, who was wounded. K. told us that he saw how the Russians gouged out the eyes of Corporal S. with a bayonet. Corporal S. is currently in a military hospital, it is still not known which one.

y, E. i.

signed by Fritz Haberkamm, Lance Corporal

Witness testified under oath

signed by Dr. Vitashek

signed Münnich, corporal

Fascist atrocities (official Soviet documents). Almost simultaneously with Germany, the Soviet Union began its activities in a similar direction. On November 25, 1941, the Soviet government sent a note to all the ambassadors and envoys of the countries with which the USSR had diplomatic relations, informing them of the fascist atrocities.

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This note also included a case that occurred in late August or early September in the Repok region of the Chernihiv region. The 200th Infantry Division of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front was defending in this sector. It was attacked by the 134th Infantry Division of the 2nd Army of Army Group Center, advancing from the north, from the side of Gomel.

Further, in the language of the SWF document dated September 4, 1941, about the fact included in the note of the Soviet government of November 25:

"In the area of the village of Repki, the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 642nd rifle regiment of the 200th rifle division, Senior Lieutenant Bobrov, was killed. Three Red Army soldiers were killed while trying to carry the body of the commander from the battlefield. Having driven the enemy away, the Red Army soldiers found the punctured and burned bodies of Commander Bobrov, political instructor Pyatigorsky, and two other comrades. They were carved with five-pointed stars. Hands and feet were nailed to stakes.

In another area, our scouts saw on an extinct fire the mutilated body of a Red Army soldier with his ears, nose and tongue cut off ...

Learning about these atrocities, the Red Army soldiers and commanders cruelly take revenge on the enemy for the blood of their comrades-in-arms "...!

Fascist atrocities (Soviet memoirs). Secretary of the Chernihiv regional committee of the CP(b)U and future commander of the partisan unit in the Chernihiv region A.F. On September 16, Fedorov left his region and arrived in Piryatin, where at that time he had moved from Pryluky and the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. Fedorov did not participate in the breakthrough of the headquarters to the east, across the river Mnoga, and for about ten days he was in the forests between Piryatin, the village of Chernukha and the river Mnoga, that is, in the very epicenter of the Kiev cauldron.

Throughout this period, Fedorov unsuccessfully tried to get out of the encirclement with various detachments and groups of fighters and commanders. Finally, obviously, when the Germans ubra

1 Reports of the head of the political department of the Southwestern Front to the head of the GPU of the Red Army on the exploits of the soldiers and commanders of the 5th Army in the battles on the outskirts of Chernigov (Chernigov region during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945): Collection of documents and materials. Kiev: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1978. S. 52). th

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If most of his troops from this zone, Fedorov and two of his companions managed to get out of the Chernush region and go to the Chernihiv region:

"One afternoon we were walking along a fairly wide, well-packed grader. The weather turned out to be warm and calm... The Ams still ended up in an area where there were no battles at all, the war did not leave its black mark here.

Along this road, framed by bushes, and in some places by young trees, we walked for an hour and a half, no less. We barely spoke, all three probably had the same mindset
nie.

Along the road, on the sides, shallow channels were dug - ditches. Branches of bushes hung over them. There were few leaves left on the branches, so all three of us noticed the person lying in the ditch at the same time. It was a Red Army man. We had seen a lot of corpses before, but here, in a quiet peaceful area... We wanted to find documents, find out who was killed, but found nothing. The pockets in the tunic were unbuttoned, and the pockets of the trousers were turned inside out; a man was killed by a shot in the back of the head.

Twenty paces later they saw another corpse, also in a ditch, and a bullet in his head, too. We went faster. They did not talk about what they saw: as if nothing had happened. But there was no trace of a peaceful mood. They immediately felt terribly tired.

A little later, Yakov picked up a German bag of chlorine tablets...

Twenty paces later Simonenko picked up the spoon, looked around: it was German, and dropped it. Then, we look, a metal button is lying around; an eagle glitters on it.

- It looks like, - I say, - guys, that Fritz was undressing here.

We walked another fifty paces, and we saw a small cross on a small hillock. The sight is extremely pleasant: a German steel helmet is on the cross. But that means that somewhere not far away are those who buried... The road, however, looked far ahead. It's empty.

Nevertheless, we decided to move away from the grader. We moved into the thick of the bushes and, after walking for several minutes, heard a rustle and a groan.

Clinging to the bushes with bloody hands, a guy in faded Red Army clothes tried to get up on his knees.

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de. Simonenko ran up to him, grabbed him under the armpits, wanted to help, but the guy screamed terribly, twisted and fell on his back; he continued to scream and lay down. His eyes were wide open, but he probably did not see or understand anything. Hair, chest, arms - everything was covered in blood. The right side of the face was so crushed that the jaw bone was exposed.

Simonenko pressed a flask to the Red Army soldier's lips. The water spilled, but a few drops still got into the mouth; the wounded man made a swallowing movement. He continued to scream, but not so loudly. A meaningful look appeared in his eyes. He wheezed and whispered something hastily.

— Pea coat, mother, cover! - I remember these words; he repeated them several times. Then his eyes cleared completely: "Brothers, I'm dying!" My surname Nikodimov... from the sixth company... lei, lei more, - now he greedily sucked from the flask, - save Nikodimov Seryoga! He started drinking more and more. Simonenko supported the back of his head with his palm and lifted his head from the ground. - Put it down! ordered the wounded man. - Yes, it's a lie, it's impossible to endure!

Simonenko lowered the head of the Red Army soldier to the ground. Zus Serman and I stomped around, looked at each other.

- Give me some. Eh, I won't swallow, the bastard's teeth were knocked out. Tell me, guys, how Seryoga Nikodimov was captured by the Germans ...

He spoke and interrupted himself. The story at times turned into a delirium. But still, from his incoherent words, we understood that the group of prisoners in which he was was led for four days and was not fed. The escort corporal beat with anything, and recently he shot two in turn: they lagged behind. Then Nikodimov smashed the corporal's head with a stone.

- I knocked him down and tore, tore with his teeth. And they beat me with their feet and with the butt, they took away that bastard from me ... alive, yes, oh, brothers? .. Why, why is he alive?

Then, half-delirious, he sat down with his hands on the ground. He scolded us, and himself, and all those who were taken prisoner; He, of course, took us for prisoners. Suddenly he began to roll on the ground; blood gushed from his throat. When he calmed down, we understood: everything was over!

ny, 1986, p. 51.

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Fascist atrocities (German memoirs). The brutal treatment of prisoners described below took place later than the time frame of the Kiev pocket, but the person we bring as a witness will tell us about the Kiev pocket, the terrible traces of which he observed in December 1942 and January 1943.

Our witness is the "last soldier of the Third Reich" Guy Sayer, who, before joining the "Greater Germany" division, served in the convoy troops and escorted the "northern convoys" to Stalingrad. Each such convoy consisted of several tens or hundreds of vehicles loaded with ammunition and warm clothing, accompanied by tanks, armored vehicles, reconnaissance aircraft and an artillery battery.

In December 1942, Guy Sayer arrived in Minsk. Further events unfolded as follows:

"The distance from Minsk to Kyiv, where we made our first stop, was 250 miles. Considering the problems that lay in wait for us along the way, we received a five-day ration. In fact, it was necessary to issue an eight-day one, since we also ate the emergency supply. In addition, thirty-eight trucks broke down, and we had to destroy them along with the cargo so that they would not fall into the hands of the partisans. Two seriously ill patients died, and several soldiers had their arms or legs amputated.

Three days before our arrival in Kyiv, we crossed the former Russian defensive line. For several hours we drove through a country filled with the carcasses of burnt tanks, trucks, guns and planes: the whole field was littered with them, as far as the eye could see. Crosses and pillars said that there was also a cemetery of Russian and German soldiers who died in battle.

In fact, more Russians died than Germans. But the soldiers of the Reich were buried, if possible, one by one, and each Orthodox cross marked a mass grave, in which ten or twelve Russian soldiers lay.

All this picture did not add vigor to us. In addition, it was necessary to fill the funnels formed from the explosions of bombs and grenades.

Finally, our convoy arrived in Kyiv. This beautiful city

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not badly hurt. The Red Army tried to stop

Wehrmacht troops outside the city, in the zone through which we passed"...

After Kyiv, the "Stalingrad convoy" went to Khar
cov:

"We were driving on broken roads covered with snow and ice. On both sides they were bordered by mounds of snow formed after clearing. In the gaps between them, devastated and burned villages and broken equipment could be seen. Ten mi kilometers we just crawled.

Troops of von Weichs, Guderian, von Reichenau and von Stulpnagel! recaptured this territory after several weeks of intense fighting; between Kiev and Kharkov, several hundred thousand prisoners of war were taken prisoner. The amount of Soviet ammunition buried under the snow was amazing. And how do they still hold on after that?

One can somehow understand (but not justify) the atrocities committed immediately after the battle by excited victors. It is possible, quite logically, to answer the question: "And what to do with the captured Germans if they surrendered to our military unit, which is surrounded and breaks out of it? Let go?" However, the following fact, reported by Guy Sayer, about the massacre of Soviet prisoners of war cannot be logically explained:

"Once I was horrified to see how one bastard was tying prisoners to the gate bars. Having properly secured their hands, he thrust a grenade into one of them's greatcoat, removed the pin, and ran for cover. The Russians vomited their guts; until the last minute they screamed for help...

Contemporary assessment of the Geneva Convention. The testimonies we have cited speak of the brutal attitude towards prisoners of war in the first days and even in the first minutes of their capture. That is, outside the military camps

. The commanders are listed: 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group of Army Group Center, 6th and 17th Armies of Army Group South, who participated in the creation of the Kiev pocket. Among the "participants" is not named the commander of the 1st Panzer Group Kleist.

2 Sayer G. The last soldier of the Third Reich. Per. English S.A. Danilova. M.: CJSC "Tsentrpoligraf", 2002. S. 51, 54, 141.

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prisoners and not from the side of some special bodies, but from the side of ordinary front-line units. Nevertheless, all these people, voluntarily or involuntarily ceasing resistance and unarmed, were to be considered prisoners of war and the norms of the Geneva Convention on the Detention of Prisoners of War of July 27 should apply to them.

1929.

Unfortunately, this convention, especially in the former republics of the USSR, is interpreted in the most primitive way: "The Germans mistreated our prisoners of war because Stalin did not sign the Geneva Convention."

Meanwhile, there is no need to interpret the Geneva Convention. It is enough just to read it, which I. Pyha did

fishing:

"A lot has been said about the tragic fate of Soviet servicemen who found themselves in German captivity," writes Igor Pykhalov. "Unfortunately, in recent years, this topic has also become the subject of shameless speculation on the part of debunkers of the "totalitarian past" of our country.

Could the Geneva Convention help us?

... Who should be responsible for the destruction of our prisoners of war? It would seem that the question is purely rhetorical. Naturally, the leadership of the Third Reich, led by Hitler, gave criminal orders. But it was not there! According to the popular version of the current truth-seekers, Stalin is again to blame for this ...

... Let's not be too lazy to look into the text of the Convention on the Detention of Prisoners of War concluded on July 27, 1929 in Geneva:

"Article four.

The power that took prisoners of war is obliged to take care of their maintenance.

"Article eighty-two.

The provisions of this convention shall be observed by the high contracting parties in all circumstances.

If, in case of war, one of the belligerents turns out not to be a party to the convention, nevertheless, the provisions of such remain binding on all belligerents, signing the convention
Shih".

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As we can see, from the text of the Geneva Convention it clearly follows that, firstly, the cost of maintaining prisoners of war is borne by the state that captured them. Secondly, a state that has acceded to a convention is obliged to comply with it regardless of whether its opponent has signed the convention. Germany signed the Geneva Convention "...1

... And that means that she was obliged to comply with her norms regarding

the decision of the military personnel of the USSR that did not sign this convention ...

Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. Moscow: Yauza; Eksmo, 2005, p. 321.

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INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION:

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE 5TH
ARMY, MAJOR GENERAL OF TANK TROOPS POTAPOV

The 5th Army of the Southwestern Front was one of the main, and at the first stage, the main object of the Wehrmacht operation in August - September 1941. Hitler in his directives and orders of the initial period of the war once mentions the 6th, 12th and 21st Soviet armies; but he points to the 5th army of Potapov, for the same period, six times.

Popular rumor claims that Hitler offered the captured commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov to lead the SS division "Viking". This is hardly true. However, Hitler left quite a lot of written evidence of the great importance he attached to the destruction of the 5th Army.

Hitler about Potapov's army:

Directive No. 32 "Actions after Barbarossa" (dated June 11, 1941) - the war with the USSR has not yet begun, but the directive states that "After the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces, Germany and Italy will be the military owners of the European continent, with the temporary exception of the Iberian Peninsula" and that "no

. M.I. Potapov, circa 1936—a serious threat to Europe in 1937. (hereinafter, the photo will not remain on dry land." from the archive of M.F. Potapova).

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Appendix to Directive No. 32 (dated July 14, 1941) - the war with the USSR has been going on for three weeks, but the annex to the directive says

it is not about the war, but about the reduction of the German army after the victory over Russia "thanks to our (i.e. German. - Auth.) military skill on the European continent."

Directive No. 33 "Continuation of the War in the East" (dated 07/19/1941) - somehow so abruptly, and completely unexpectedly, especially in the light of previous directives, Hitler moved from reducing his armed forces to the "enemy 5th Army": "The enemy 5th Army must be quickly and decisively defeated and destroyed by the joint efforts of the southern flank of Army Group Center and the northern flank of Army Group South. This was Hitler's first Directive (after No. 21 of December 1940), which dealt with military operations on the Eastern Front. And in this first, in fact, military directive, Hitler immediately pointed to the 5th Army. And immediately - to two of their army groups.

Directive No. 34 "Changing Strategy in Russia" (dated 07/30/1941) - "The 5th Red Army, fighting in the swamps northwest of Kiev, must be forced to fight west of the Dnieper and destroyed. To prevent the slightest danger of a breakthrough of this army through Pripyat to the north.

Appendix to Directive No. 34 (dated August 12, 1941)¹ - "The central part of the Eastern Front: The most important task here is to eliminate the danger on the flanks ... To accomplish this task, actions coordinated in time and directions are especially important between the adjacent flanks of Army Group South and Army Group Center. Russian 5th Army? must be deprived of any further power and, with the interception of the roads to Ovruch and Mozyr, from where it receives reinforcements, finally destroyed.

|" Nierz\Mag Onescue\$ 1939-1945. 1 ...: Zlae\msK Apa GasKsop, 1964.

? Hitler quickly renamed the 5th Army from "enemy" and "red" to "Russian". Subsequently, the Germans interrogating the captive Potapov will come to the conclusion that he is a Russian nationalist.

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Marianna Fedorovna and Mikhail Ivanovich Popapov.

Adolf Hitler's order of August 21, 1941! (Instruction I'E\$. G. M. 44141/41T): "The purpose of this operation should not be to push back the 5th Russian Army beyond the Dnieper by the forces of the 6th Army alone, but to completely destroy this enemy army ... to allocate for this task as many divisions as necessary to achieve the main goal - the destruction of the 5th Russian army ... Only a close blockade of Leningrad, connection with the Finnish troops and destruction

The formation of the 5th Russian Army will create the prerequisites and release the forces necessary in order to launch a successful offensive against the Timoshenko group of troops ... "

Marianna Fedorovna Potapova-Modorova spoke about her husband, former commander of the 5th Army, Colonel General M.I. Potapov?, the following:

. Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. S. 196-197.

? Colonel General - the last post-war rank of Potapov. 3 The author wrote down the story of M.F. Potapova in Moscow in September 2005.

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M.I. Potapov at Khalkhin Gol.

"We met Mikhail Ivanovich after the war, when he returned from captivity. How did he conquer me? He had one incredible virtue - a colossal sense of humor. He didn't have to think about it. I had a school friend, she was so witty, she calls me: "Well, where are you hanging around there?" And I answer: "Listen, I have a general here! And you can imagine, he spoke to me!" "It can't be," the friend replies, "it's unrealistic!"

Then she went to our school boys, and they ask: "Well, how is Mariska?" "Oh, Mariska found herself some kind of barely general, only pants with stripes! Daeshchei was a prisoner.

And one of our guys was in the Hammelburg camp, in the same place where Mikhail Ivanovich was. And this guy will attack my girlfriend: "Are you talking about Potapov? It was she who grabbed Potapov?! Do you know who it is? This was the first person in captivity! This is the most worthy person! This is the most respected person! Potapov! And you, fools, still dare to say such words - "barely!".

A friend called me back: "Well, Mariska, they almost killed me for calling your "barely" called ...

And so it always seems to me that this cry, which my friend told about, and the admiration, the enthusiasm with which they talked about Potapov, were the most decisive in my choice. Nui outwardly - Mikhail Ivanovich was very imposing ...

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... He studied at the seminary

rii, he was even very proud that he had been a deacon for some time. His father was a bridge builder, he paved roads. Mikhail Ivanovich says in all his biographies that he graduated from a teacher's school. Maybe it was a seminary school. I can't say for sure, but he told me: "I was a deacon and his voice is a low chic baritone! Gorgeous, gorgeous voice! And he knew all the services, knew and loved.

When our son, Vanya,

when he was 13, he and his father went to Moscow. And Mikhail Ivano, "Chaplain" of the 5th army, when he came to Moscow, M.S. Nikishev (died while there was no such thing, so that he would not break through from the Kyiv encirclement). went to a temple. So this time he and his son went to Kolomenskoye, to one of the functioning churches. And then my son already told me this when he returned from Kolomenskoye. He told me how he and papa went into the church and Mikhail Ivanovich made him take off his hat. And he stood, taking off his cap. The son said: "It made such an impression on me! Lieutenant General, standing and holding his cap, like in a movie! Then the priest came up and they bowed to each other.

But Mikhail Ivanovich was not a hypocrite. See. Say, here I am - a believer! He had respect for customs, he honored them. Moreover, he told me that his knowledge of church rituals and church customs helped him to make a military career. He began his command activity as an assistant to the squadron commander in the Cossack division, and the Cossacks respected him terribly because he knew all their customs...

He always had the best relations with the commissars. Always. He called them chaplains. By the way, the Germans, when they interrogated him and the talk turned to political workers, he answered them that the army needed political workers, that the commander often had no time to deal with people, and the political worker dealt with people specifically.

They told him: "All commissars are Jews." And he: "In vain you

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So. Two percent are Jews, and the rest are Russians." Mikhail Ivanovich's attitude towards the political workers was always very friendly, the members of the Military Council were always our close friends...

.. I don't know where Mikhail Ivanovich came across before the war with Kuznetsov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, but they were on good terms. When a German defector, having crossed the Bug, announced that the war would soon begin, Potapov immediately telephoned Kuznetsov about this. I will not claim that Kuznetsov did not have information about this from other sources. Mikhail Ivanovich informed about M.I. Potapov, Lvov, December - a defector, of course, not only in 1940 or January 1941 to Kuznetsov, but everywhere they answered him: "Do not raise a panic!" I remembered one post-war incident. Come to Odessa! the director of the Lvov Theater, Flor Adamovich Timashevsky, arrived. When he found out that I was Potapova, he told me the following story. At the beginning of the war, he was a junior lieutenant, or junior political officer, on an armored train. This armored train with fights departed to Korosten, on it all officers were killed, and the junior lieutenant remained the most senior. The Germans are shooting, and a bunch of women with children are asking to be put in armored trains. And he, although it was forbidden, took them all with him. When we got to Korosten, women with children were thrown out of the cars. Right on some lieutenant general. Representative from Moscow. "What is this? Who allowed? Shoot!" the lieutenant general immediately shouted. And two sailors led Timashevsky to be shot. "I'm going to the execution and I want to sleep so much, I'm dying right away that I don't even think about the execution," he told me. - Suddenly I hear shouting: "Stop, turn back!" Lead to the commander

1 After the war, M.I. Potapov was the first deputy commander of the Odessa Military District.

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Mu 5th Army to Potapov: "Did you plant women with children? What, you don't know orders? Polk... so that I don't see you here! And I went to bed. So, thanks to Potapov, he remained alive

... As early as June 27, or rather, the 30th, Mikhail Ivanovich issued an order for his army to not shoot German prisoners. He motivated this by the fact that during executions we would not know anything about what was happening in the enemy troops. But in fact, this is my personal opinion, I think that he simply did not consider it possible to kill prisoners ...

Mikhail Ivanovich himself was taken prisoner, wounded. He told me that the wound was trifling, not dangerous. Noon was shell-shocked and his chest was burned. What was the matter, he did not remember, he was unconscious for a long time.

Mikhail Ivanovich's documents were taken away and buried. The documents were then handed over to Kirill Semyonovich Moskalenko, who managed to break through the encirclement. Moskalenko told me: "I literally sobbed when they handed me the documents of our commander. I didn't know at all what would happen to us now, since Mikhail Ivanovich died "(about the fact that Potapov survived and was captured, the commander of the anti-tank brigade and rifle corps in 1941 and Marshal of the Soviet Union in the post-war period K. S. Moskalenko found out only in 1948. - Auth.).

M.I. Potapov was buried with corpses thrown from above. They didn't fill up the earth, in that situation it wasn't up to that. In fact, he lay there for three days. And when the Germans began to sort out the corpses, they saw that one person was still alive. When he was brought to his senses and he gave his name and position, the Germans did not believe him. There were no documents. And Potapov - he was a thunderstorm for them! They took him with them. And for a long time they could not believe that they had succeeded in capturing Potapov himself. He was then brought by plane to the place of captivity, they tried to find documents ...

...Mikhail Ivanovich was in several camps, including Hammelburg. He was with M. Lukin, I. Muzychenko, S. Vishnevsky, P. Abramidze, who also refused to cooperate - they refused to cooperate with the Germans, and with Vlasov. The most respected, said Mikhail Ivanovich, was Lieutenant General Mikhail Fedorovich Lukin. The commander Prokhorov was also there. I don't know them, but they were very friendly with each other. This Prokhorov, general, I don't remember which army he commanded, he fired back at the Germans with a pistol, running from one haystack, or straw stack, to another. It was remembered that

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he had 14 rounds. And with the last cartridge he shot himself in the heart, but the bullet went through literally a millimeter of osseous tissue, and the Germans cured him ...

In 1945, already in April, the Germans took a group of generals out of this camp, allegedly to be transferred to another place, and immediately shot them. Among those shot was Mikhail Ivanovich's best friend, Volodya Sotensky, the artillery commander of the 5th Army. Reliable person, reliable commander. His husband respected him immensely and until the last minutes of his life he remembered Volodya ...

... No, he did not meet with Vlasov in captivity. Mikhail Ivanovich always said that Vlasov's army defended Kyiv brilliantly. Everything that happened to Vlasov later was a mystery to my husband. He could not understand this ... The secretary about the coma in Odessa told me that it was not Vlasov at all. And the fake face...

Mikhail Ivanovich was not closely acquainted with Vlasov. He first met him before the war, during exercises in Ki-

evsk district. After that, Zhukov appointed Mikhail Ivanovich commander of the 5th Army. Potapov, of course, did not think that he would be given an army. He was then single. widower. At that time, in order to be appointed to a respectable position, one had to be married. Well, in general, he liked to walk. This was told to me by my comrades, who were in captivity with him and who served with him earlier. And Zhukov took and appointed him. Then Potapov handed over to Vlasov his mechanized corps, which he organized in Lvov. When the corps was handed over, their meeting took place. He said that Vlasov was an intelligent commander. And when they scolded Vlasov for drowning his corps during the retreat, Mikhail Ivanovich said that he had done the right thing for those conditions. The enemy did not get the equipment, for that he brought out all the people ...

... This is all talk, even Ponomarenko, my boss, God rest his soul, said that he had read in Holland, when he was scrapped, by some German author, that Potapov spat in Vlasov's face. But Mikhail Ivanovich told me that he did not see Vlasov in captivity at all. Only Zhilenkov came to visit them...

"It's amazing for me," Mikhail Ivanovich said about Vlasov, "a man crawled out of the encirclement for a month and a half, ate berries ... If betrayal had been laid in him, he could have surrendered much earlier. The tragedy with Vlasov is incomprehensible to me. He's a big man, not some lieutenant. He could not count that for treason

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the enemy will show him some kind of respect... Going over to the side of the enemy is illogical. Just common sense does not allow. Well, they will be shot... So a military man can be shot, he must be prepared that they can kill him "...

...The head of their section, SS Lieutenant Colonel Otto, I don't know my last name, went to the Americans, Paton's army, with a white flag, and said that he was the commandant of the general's camp. The Americans arrived at the camp and transported all the prisoners back to themselves. It was April 22nd. Enormous respect was shown to the prisoners! Because M.I.

Potapov after captivity. that these were the people who took upon themselves and withstood the first blows of the war. The Americans appreciated it very much.

The Americans incredibly solemnly received the former prisoners, then put them on a plane and sent them to Parikh, to

de Gaulle. At the disposal of the General Staff of France. The French welcomed ours splendidly too. They celebrated Victory Day together with de Gaulle...

The French dressed them splendidly, sewing them civil coats, elegant, dark blue, of soft material. Maybe not very expensive for that time, but very beautiful. They sewed new tunics, the color was dark beige. And they lived in France for a whole month in love and honor.

Then, finally, after Victory Day, everyone was transferred to Moscow. My husband couldn't stand talking about it. In general, he did not like to remember a number of things. And Lukin writes in his memoirs that they thought they were flying home, but they flew in ... There was nobody at the airfield except for the guards. Transferred to another plane and sent on ...

Then they were transported to the Moscow region, to Golitsino, and they began to check - who did not betray the Motherland?

Mikhail Ivanovich was checked for seven months. His case was handled directly by Abakumov. Well, worse than this person, Mikhail Ivanovich never met a person in his life.

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The meanest thing is that Abakumov and his henchmen forced my husband to say vile words about Stalin's son Yakov Dzhugashvili. They forced him to give false evidence. Mikhail Ivanovich did not do this, because he sincerely considered Yakov a decent person. After all, they were not only in the same camp, but also in the water chamber.

Yakov had previously been in some other camp, and they say that he died there. No, he didn't die then. He had some trouble with the British there. He was cured and sent to Hammelburg, to the general's compartment, under the command of this very Otto. And interestingly, all the prisoners had one number, and Jacob had two, both in front and behind. When he was transferred to Hammelburg, Jacob was tormented by hunger, and the prisoners shared their rations with him to support him.

In March 1945, the Germans took away Stalin's son, and no one heard anything more about him. In private conversations, Mikhail Ivanovich never spoke badly of Yakov, he considered him a decent person...

Mikhail Ivanovich was an unusually quick-witted person, unusually quick to understand the situation and make decisions. If he worked in the theater, he would be a great director. No, he was not fond of fishing and hunting, he was a fierce preference ...

He was very proud to be an engineer. Not just a tank commander, but an engineer. A brilliant mathematician, he calculated instantly and knew Russian literature very well. He knew her absolutely. I respected Korolenko very much. It is interesting that we

he was also united by "Peter 1". They had no books in captivity. Only one book ended up there by chance - "Peter 1" by Alexei Tolstoy. And he read this book to the point that he learned by heart. And my thesis was just on "Peter I". And thanks to Mikhail Ivanovich, it so happened that we know the same book by heart. Peter [brought us closer!.

M.I. Potapov had a high opinion of himself - he considered himself incredible handsome, he knew that the girls fall when they see him.

1 Marianna Fedorovna Potapova-Modorova - actress, graduated from the Shchepkinskoye school, during the Great Patriotic War she worked under the guidance of P.K. Ponomarenko as a secretary in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus and the Headquarters of the partisan movement, went behind the front line to the Bati Minai brigade; authen of Marianna Fedorovna - People's Artist of the RSFSR, Honored Artist of the Byelorussian SSR, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Arts of the USSR, Professor Fyodor Alexandrovich Modorov.

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Malinovsky complained: "Well, I don't have the strength - all the girls are to him!" And Mikhail Ivanovich is sitting, laughing, already bursting. But he was by no means a womanizer. On the first day of our acquaintance, it was on Upper Maslovka, at the fire in the workshop, we went to see him off, you called a taxi. And on the street he kissed us, all the women who saw him off. And we noted that he kisses very well! ..

He often went to the theater with me. I never missed Vertinsky's concerts... M.I. Potapov after the war.

Mikhail Ivanovich was at all these idiotic tests, together with Zhukov, to whom he was irradiated. He could still live and live ... And then they irradiated him in the hospital, they thought that he had lung cancer ... Later they said that a person who had undergone radiation could not be irradiated. But, as it turned out, there was no cancer either. And this, when he was lying in a pit, in the 41st, he had some kind of message ... He had a tumor on his arm, also from the war. In hand-to-hand combat, when they launched a bayonet attack to break out of the encirclement, they hit him hard on the arm ... He lived with all this for another hundred years. It couldn't be irradiated. As Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov later told me: "Your men burned you somehow!" ...

... On the last day of his life, I.Kh. Bagramyan. I was present at their conversation. They talked about the war, about its initial period, about the command

blowing the Southwestern Front Kirponos, about Stalin... Imagine that Potapov did not scold Stalin. He said: "Well, what to demand from Stalin? He had advisors. "Well, what are you, Mikhail Ivanovich, could Stalin have said something?" Bagramyan objected. And Potapov: "If you were appointed to a position, then you must be able to tell Stalin about what is really happening, but Kirponos did not know how ..."

On the night of January 25-26, 1965, Mikhail Ivanovich passed away from life ...

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M.I. Potapov after the war.

From his safe, they gave me only money, a passbook and a copy of G.K. Zhukov to receive Mikhail Ivanovich into the party!..

Anyone, but Zhukov in relation to Potapov has always been decent. And when I called his wife, Alexandra Avdeevna, that Mikhail Ivanovich was gone, she cried so much. "Oh, Misha, Misha, he was the youngest..."

When Potapov returned from captivity, Zhukov greeted him with the words: "You are my Michael the Archangel." I don't know why he said that. But, I think, because Michael the Archangel was the first to fight the forces of Darkness. And George the Victorious defeated them '! .. "

1 From the recommendation of G.K. Zhukov (possibly about reinstatement in the party): "I have known Comrade Potapov for more than 10 years. I know him as the commander of a regiment, brigade, commander of the 5th Army and deputy. commander of the 1st army group (at Khalkhin Gol. - Auth.) ... As for commanding qualities, comrade. Potapov M.I. he was always the best commander, and the unit and formation he commanded were always the leading ones ... At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he commanded the 5th Army (KOVO) of the SWF. In the border battle, the army under the command of Potapov fought with exceptional tenacity and valor. During the retreat to the Dnieper River Comrade. Potapov led the army brilliantly ... "

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Konstantin Bykov

Kyiv "BOILER"

The biggest defeat of the Red Army

Published in the author's edition Art
editor 7. Volkov Technical editor V. Kulagina
Computer layout L. Panina Proofreader N.
Smirnova

Yauza Publishing House LLC
109507, Moscow, Samarkand boulevard, 15

For correspondence: 127299, Moscow, st. Clara Zetkin, 18, office 5. Tel.: (495) 745-58-23

OOO Publishing House Eksmo
127299, Moscow, st. Clara Zetkin, 18/5. Tel.: 411-68-86, 956-39-21. Note glade: ilimi.ekato.gi E-
thai: yoke@Fekato.gi

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Nevsky", 13. Tel. (812) 310-22-44.

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Signed for publication from ready-made transparencies 06.11.2006. Format 84x108 1/32. Headset "Newton". Offset printing. Paper type. Conv. oven I. 26.04. Circulation 7000 copies. Order No. 4449.

Printed from electronic media of the publisher. OAO "Tver Polygraphic Plant", 170024, Tver, Lenin Ave., 5 Rade - mlmmi.1uerk.gy E-mail (E-tai) - za1e@/megrk.gy

Hitler called this battle "the greatest battle in world history."

The German generals called it "the biggest encirclement battle in the Second World War" and their "biggest victory".

Domestic researchers write about "the most terrible defeat of the Red Army" and even about "the greatest military catastrophe in the history of Russia."

In the Kiev "cauldron" of 1941, an entire front perished: four Soviet armies were defeated and completely destroyed, two more were partially destroyed; according to German data, our losses reached 665 thousand people in prisoners alone - "the largest number of prisoners captured in one battle."

Historians are still arguing, "what led to such a crushing defeat of the troops of the Southwestern Front, to their death and captivity in the Kiev "cauldron".

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